UNIVERSITY OF PÉCS

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

EVOLUTIONARY AND COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY DOCTORAL PROGRAM

BEHIND THE MASK OF MANIPULATION

Unique features underlying manipulation among the Dark Triad

Doctoral (PhD) dissertation

Edit SZABÓ

Consultant:

Prof. Tamás BERECZKEI DSc

Pécs, 2019

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Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor and my mentors, Prof. Dr. Tamás Bereczkei, Dr. Daniel N Jones, and Dr. Zoltán Z Varga.

I am especially thankful to Professor Bereczkei. Not only for your support, inspiration, patience, and feedback but also for getting me interested in evolutionary psychology and mindreading in the first place.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Jones for supporting me and helping me to achieve my career goals. Thank you for always asking the most important questions.

I am forever indebted to Dr. Z Varga. Thank you for helping to facilitate my scientific interest in interdisciplinary fields and for pushing me to dream big.

Many thanks to the members of the Evolutionary Psychology Research Group of Pécs for all the feedback and support.

I would like to thank Dan, Diana, Grace, Lance, Leila, Moises, Shelby, and the Improvokál Theatre for voice acting and recording the stories for the CST. I would also like to thank all my research assistants, Bianka, Desi, Diana, Niki, and Tamás for their hard work and dedication.

Thanks to my family and my friends, for everything.

"There is no reason why good cannot triumph as often as evil. The triumph of anything is a matter of organization. If there are such things as angels, I hope that they are organized along the lines of the Mafia."

— Kurt Vonnegut, *The Sirens of Titan* (1959)

Preface

This dissertation sought to elaborate the construct of manipulation in relation to social cognition and impulsivity of the Dark Triad of personality. In an attempt to measure the detection of manipulation, a new assessment of mindreading ability will be introduced. The new measure: The *Conflict Stories Task (CST)* was developed for neuro-typical adults in order to assess individual differences in social cognition.

The *CST* was developed in Hungarian language and translated to English. It was applied for research in Hungary and in the United States. The method was validated and refined. From these analyses, the final stimulus material (8 stories) emerged and was used in a series of studies to analyze differences in mindreading among the Dark Triad.

Besides the *CST*, other questionnaires were also applied to examine relevant concepts of social cognition, e.g. affective and cognitive empathy and trait emotional intelligence, along with impulsivity. These questionnaires were used to elaborate differences in relevant aspects of trait Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy with a special focus of the subfacets of these constructs. In line with theoretical implications, in the study of impulsive behavior gender differences were as well elaborated.

I conclude with an overview and conclusion suggesting future directions and important implications for the *CST* and the construct of manipulation among the Dark Triad. Taken together, the studies in this dissertation indicate that manipulation takes multiple forms among dark personalities with each trait characterized by different skills and deficits in self-control and social understanding.

Chapters 3–6 present a series of empirical studies which have been previously published or are currently under submission for publication.

Chapter 3 *How can you hurt if you can't feel?*

Published as: Szabo, E., & Bereczkei, T. (2017). Different Paths to Different Strategies? Unique Associations Among Facets of the Dark Triad, Empathy, and Trait Emotional Intelligence. *Advances in Cognitive Psychology, 13*(4), 306.

Chapter 4 *Sounds like manipulation*

Published as: Szabo, E., Bereczkei, T., & Jones, D. N. (2020). Sounds like manipulation: A story-audio based approach to theory of mind in conflict-related contexts. (*under submission*).

Chapter 5 *Who knows who is being manipulated?*

Published as: Szabo, E., Jones, D. N., & Bereczkei, T. (2020). The Dark Triad and mindreading in manipulation: Limited understanding for psychopathy, but not for Machiavellianism. (*under submission*).

Chapter 6 *Giving in to the impulses*

Published as: Szabo, E., & Jones, D. N. (2019). Gender differences moderate Machiavellianism and impulsivity: Implications for Dark Triad research. *Personality and Individual Differences, 141*, 160–165.

1 Dark Triad: The origins

The Dark Triad (DT) of personality refers to three interrelated personality constructs: Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). In general, these traits are described as being manipulative and callous. In particular, Machiavellianism entails the strategic interpersonal manipulation of others and a pragmatic, cynical perspective on life (Christie & Geis, 1970). Narcissism is defined by grandiose self-views, egocentricism, and a sense of entitlement (Raskin & Hall, 1979). Psychopathy is characterized by an antisocial behavioral style, high impulsivity, thrill-seeking, and a lack of remorse (Giammarco & Vernon, 2014; Hare, 1999). Besides their unique behavioral outcomes, DT traits share a number of common features, such as disagreeableness, lack of honesty and humility, low levels of empathy, and interpersonal exploitation (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006; Jones & Figueredo, 2013; Paulhus & Williams, 2002).

In empirical studies, moderate interrelations have been reported among the three traits with the lowest correlations between narcissism and Machiavellianism and the highest correlations between psychopathy and Machiavellianism (Furnham, Richards, & Paulhus, 2013).

1.1 Subcomponents of the DT

While Machiavellianism considered one-dimensional, the other two DT traits can be further divided into subcomponents. Psychopathy can be differentiated into two related factors; primary and secondary psychopathy (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995). The primary facet is associated with interpersonal coldness and depends more on heritable dispositions and less on the environment (Jonason, Lyons, Bethell, & Ross, 2013; Jonason, Webster, Schmitt, Li, & Crysel, 2012). Such individuals have diminished abilities to experience social emotions and negative emotions, especially anxiety (Mealey, 1995). In contrast, the secondary factor is the hostile/reactive form of psychopathy, which is more environmentally influenced. Individuals high in secondary psychopathy are aggressive, impulsive, and neurotic (Falkenbach, Poythress, Falki, & Manchak, 2007; Hicks, Markon, Patrick, Krueger, & Newman, 2004).

Similarly to psychopathy, narcissism has, however, a more recent conceptualization as a two-dimensional construct that is built of a grandiose and a vulnerable aspect. Grandiose narcissism is characterized by self-admiration and exhibitionism. In contrast, individuals with vulnerable narcissism appear to be more insecure and hypersensitive (Houlcroft, Bore, & Munro, 2012; Zeigler-Hill, Clark, & Pickard, 2008).

It is the grandiose aspect of narcissism that is considered the more "toxic element" and the more relevant to the DT (Furnham et al., 2013; Jones & Paulhus, 2011a; Paulhus & Jones, 2015). In addition, grandiose narcissism can be further divided into three factors including Leadership/Authority, Grandiose Exhibitionism, and Entitlement/Exploitativeness (Ackerman et al., 2011).

1.2   Personality theories

Besides distinguishing traits and subfacets of the DT, it is important to locate dark personalities in the personality space, thus, in relevance to normal personality traits (Furnham et al, 2013). The most important links are those with the interpersonal circumplex (e.g., Wiggins, 1979), the Five Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1991) also known as the Big Five, and the HEXACO model (Lee & Ashton, 2005), also known as the Big Six.

1.2.1   *The Big Five*

The five factor model reflects on the personality dimensions: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience (Costa & McCrae, 1991). Both positive and negative correlations have been found between the DT and the Big Five. The most consistent, across different measures of the Big Five, are negative associations with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness (e.g. Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006; Jonason, Koenig, & Tost, 2010; Jonason, Li, & Buss, 2010; Paulhus & Williams, 2002).

Positive correlations have been reported with Extraversion and Openness for both psychopathy, narcissism, and the composite DT (Jonason, Koenig, et al., 2010; Lee & Ashton, 2005; Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Vernon et al., 2008). Finally, Neuroticism correlates negatively with

psychopathy and the composite DT (Jonason, Li, & Teicher, 2010; Paulhus & Williams, 2002), but positively with Machiavellianism (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006; Szijjarto & Bereczkei, 2015; Veselka, Schermer, & Vernon, 2012).

Thus, overall this pattern shows that DT individuals score low on Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, but high on Extraversion and Openness. Within an evolutionary perspective, an extroverted but disagreeable personality with low conscientiousness may reflects a manipulative person who is apt to extract resources from the social environment (Jonason, Li, Teicher, 2010).

1.2.2   *The Big Six*

The six factor model was proposed as an alternative to the five factor model with the inclusion of the personality dimension: Honesty/Humility (Ashton & Lee, 2001; Lee & Ashton, 2005). As the additional dimension explicitly diverges between pro-social and anti-social behavior, it is considered as even more relevant to the DT than are the other five dimensions (Book, Visser, & Volk, 2015; Furnham et al., 2013). Low scores on Honesty/Humility are linked to exploitation and deception (Furnham et al., 2013).

In addition, low Honesty/Humility also predict short-term mating, risk-taking, and antisocial behavior, outcome variables that are characteristic of the DT (Lee et al. 2013; Spain, Harms, & Lebreton, 2014; Visser, Pozzebon, & Reina-Tamayo, 2014). Therefore, unsurprisingly, empirical studies with the Big Six demonstrated strong negative correlations for the Honesty/Humility factor in the DT traits (Lee & Ashton, 2005; Veselka, Schermer, Martin, & Vernon, 2010).

1.3   **Evolutionary background**

Because of such undesirable social consequences, most theoretical work considers DT traits as bad for individuals as well as for the groups they live in (Kowalski, 2001; Nathanson, Paulhus, & Williams, 2006; Twenge & Campbell, 2009). By turning to an evolutionary perspective, however, despite their antisocial tendencies, a manipulative strategy even with such undesirable traits as the DT can be adaptive. Thus, while enacting a successful exploitative life strategy, DT members might

have provided solutions to problems related to mating or survival (Jonason & Webster, 2012; Jonason, Webster, et al., 2012).

In particular, selfishness of dark personalities might be optimal for their individual success, thus, in the context of their own lives (Dawkins, 1978; Jonason Webster, et al. 2012; Mealey, 1995). However, success may only be reached on a shorter timescale, and therefore, DT traits may indorse a successful fast life strategy (Buss, 2009; Jonason & Webster, 2012; *for a more extensive review see below Chapter 2*). In particular, those high on the DT might follow a cheater strategy that has the adaptive challenge: the cheater and the cheater strategy is successful if he/she/it can win in a co-evolutionary arms race with cheater-detection devices (Bereczkei, 2017, 2018; Jonason & Webster, 2012; Mealey, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).

As a consequence, it is beneficial for cheaters to use multiple tactics of manipulation in order to avoid detection. Thus, in other words, such individuals might adopt a protean behavior to remain undetectable (Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, & Smith, 2002; Humphries & Driver, 1988; Jonason & Webster, 2012). In this way, the effectiveness of manipulative tactics can be enhanced by endowing them with evolved characteristics that cannot be predicted by an evolutionary opponent. In sum, natural selection might have fostered the development of highly variable alternatives that led to the evolution of skillful and creative exploitation strategies (Bereczkei, 2017; Miller, 1997).

1.3.1 *Narcissism*

Narcissism may be an adaptive trait as evidenced by its positive outcomes in relation to fitness, and especially, mating. In particular, narcissistic individuals are perceived as more attractive and, according to self-reported sexual success, they are more successful in short-term mating (Campbell & Foster, 2002; Holtzman & Strube, 2012; Jonason, Li, Webster, & Schmitt, 2009; Jonason, Valentine, Li, & Harbeson, 2011; Rowe, 1995).

Research has also shown positive links with self-esteem, well-being, and trait emotional intelligence for narcissism (Jonason, Baughman, Carter, & Parker, 2015; Petrides, Vernon, Schermer, & Veselka, 2011; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). Therefore, the narcissistic personality is considered

as a milder trait and, moreover, the brightest one among the DT (Furnham et al, 2013; Jonason et al., 2012; Schermer & Jones, 2019).

However, narcissistic self-esteem is maintained by inflated self-views and the sense of entitlement or superiority (John & Robins, 1994). The strong self-focus and constant need for admiration of narcissistic individuals might involve negative social consequences in maintaining long-term interpersonal relationships (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001; Jonason, Li, & Buss, 2010). Besides, they are characterized by such undesirable behaviors as aggression, especially when they feel an ego-threat or provocation (Baumeister, Bushman, & Campbell, 2000; Bukowski, Schwartzman, Santo, Bagwell, & Adams, 2009). Thus, their self-centered interpersonal style can reflect in negative outcomes over time.

1.3.2 *Machiavellianism*

Machiavellianism is a cynical and manipulative trait that might be part of an evolutionary cheater strategy (Jonason, et al., 2009; Mealey, 1995). Such a strategy depends on target individuals to be available to exploit. However, the cheater needs to avoid future interactions with those who have been exploited (Figueredo et al., 2005). Therefore, it is not surprising that Machiavellian individuals thrive in less structured social environments where they can easier avoid punishment (Shultz, 1993).

In general, Machiavellians are deceptive and manipulative in their interpersonal relationships and endorse a self-serving and overly pragmatic approach to others. Thus, they pursue to maximize their personal outcomes even on the expense of others without considering the possible negative social consequences of their behavior or decisions (Hawley, 2006; Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1998). In accordance with theory, research demonstrated a deceptive mating style in their romantic relationships that may reflect to a short-term sexual strategy (Jonason et al., 2009; Jonason, Li, & Buss, 2010).

However, in some cases, Machiavellian individuals are willing to cooperate, but only if cooperation serves their self-interest (Bereczkei, 2017). Such flexibility reflects on their sexual

behavior as well (Jonason & Kavanagh, 2010). Thus, Machiavellians might be "bistrategic" in their social encounters as they apply both prosocial and proself strategies depending on the situation (Hawley, 2006). This propensity of them to alternate cooperation with exploitation of others might have led to evolutionary advantages, particularly in unstable environments (Figueredo et al., 2006). Thus, overall, Machiavellians' flexible social strategy facilitates relationship maintenance more than the cheater strategy of psychopaths' that is characterized by being more impulsive and aggressive (Bereczkei, 2017; Jonason & Kavanagh, 2010).

1.3.3 *Psychopathy*

Psychopathy is associated with low impulse control, callousness, and aggressiveness. Thus, unsurprisingly, this trait is typically viewed as the darkest among the DT (e.g., Rauthmann & Kolar, 2012, Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Impulsive and aggressive behavior for psychopaths can result in some serious negative consequences. In particular, they are often excluded from communities and involved in criminal behavior (Glenn, Kurzban, & Raine, 2011).

Psychopathy's social strategy is straightforward, fast, and callous: to seek immediate gratification and to take what they want. Consequently, such individuals are unable to make accurate risk judgments (Jonason, Koenig, & Tost, 2010; van Honk, Hermans, Putman, Montagne, & Schutter, 2002). Nevertheless, they are also unable to learn from their mistakes (van Honk et al. 2002).

However, even the darkest personality trait could be associated with some individual benefits. Unsurprisingly, psychopathic individuals are short-term oriented in their intimate relationships. Thus, they prefer to seek sexual opportunities without emotional engagement and apply such deceptive tactics as, for example, love-feigning or mate-poaching (Carter, Campbell, & Muncer, 2014; Jonason et al., 2009).

Such a short-term oriented mating strategy, however, might result in reproductive benefits, especially for men. Therefore, evolutionary psychologists have suggested that psychopathy might be dominantly a male mating strategy, given that promiscuity is more beneficial for men than for

women (Jonason et al., 2009; Schmitt, 2011; Schmitt et al., 2012). Besides, research has demonstrated sex differences in psychopathy (in the expected direction) that are nearly universal and moderate to large in size (Cale & Lilienfeld, 2002).

Recently, however, this theory has been challenged and research have suggested that short-term mating could be adaptive for women high in psychopathy, for example by gaining short-term access to highly desirable mates and by improving offspring quality (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004; Jennions & Petrie, 2000). Thus, DT, including psychopathy, may facilitate short term-mating styles similarly for women as for men (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004; Carter et al., 2014; Carter, Montanaro, Linney, & Campbell, 2015).

1.4 Manipulation strategies

One issue that has emerged in the DT literature is whether or not these three traits have the same style of manipulation (Jones & Paulhus, 2010). Theoretically, being unpredictable in deceiving others and, thus, applying multiple tactics of manipulation might be adaptive. Thus, in other words, a protean behavior might be advantageous for cheaters in order to avoid detection. Indeed, a recent study has demonstrated that each DT trait chose a different variety of tactics of social influence, and thus, making up a diverse toolbox of means to manipulate others (Jonason & Webster, 2012).

Further, research has found differences among the DT in their ways of telling lies. Specifically, narcissism was linked to lying for self-gain, Machiavellianism was linked to telling white lies, and psychopathy was linked to lying for no reason (Jonason, Lyons, Baughman, & Vernon, 2014).

Besides, Machiavellianism was associated with increased cognitive effort in deception and psychopathy was associated with experiencing positive emotions when lying (Baughman, Jonason, Lyons, & Vernon, 2014). Thus, it is possible that manipulation styles of the DT reflect to the unique emotional, cognitive and behavioral characteristics of each trait. Further, it is possible that these distinct manipulative styles might derive from different roots creating more than a single cheater strategy.

As a consequence, each DT member might exploit others in a unique social way, hence, in such a way wherein their unique type of exploitation fosters reproductive or survival success (Furnham et al., 2013). In this sense, behavioral similarities emerge despite different evolutionary adaptations. Thus, exploitative behavior common to the DT members may originate in different personality dynamics (Jones & Paulhus, 2011a). Next, I will introduce unique features of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy that might relate to distinct manipulation strategies of these traits.

1.4.1 *Self-centered charm*

Because of their egoistic style, positive impression-formation, and feelings of superiority (Paulhus, 2001), narcissistic individuals may be willing to please others in order to gain external validation (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pavlovic, 2004). For that reason, they might use such tactics as social comparison, reciprocity, and lying for self-gain or lying in order to appear more dominant (Jonason et al., 2014; Jonason & Webster, 2012).

In theory, narcissistic individuals might have an understanding of others' feelings and needs but use this knowledge to fulfil their own selfish needs (Raskin & Terry, 1988). In accordance with theory, research has established a link between narcissism and (self-reported) trait emotional intelligence (Petrides et al., 2011; Veselka et al., 2012). Further, research has introduced the concept of emotional manipulation, that is, the utilization of emotional skills in strategic and manipulative ways in order to influence others (Austin, Farrelly, Black, & Moore, 2007).

Unsurprisingly, all three DT traits were associated with using emotional manipulation tactics in "managing" others' emotions (Nagler, Reiter, Furter, & Rauthmann, 2014). In case of narcissism, however, such manipulation of others' emotions is used in order to facilitate access to the external validation these individuals need.

Another distinctive feature of the social strategy of narcissistic individuals is that they tend to utilize self-deceptive strategies of manipulation rather than overt and intentional deception (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). Thus, it is possible that they do not accurately assess emotional information

of others. Instead, they believe their self-enhancing stories at both conscious and unconscious levels (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). As a consequence, narcissistic individuals may use self-deception as a means of manipulation, which may not require an understanding of others' intentions (Paulhus et al., 2003).

In sum, findings are inconsistent in relation to the emotional and cognitive profile of narcissism. Thus, further research is needed to elaborate whether and how these individuals are able to accurately assess others' emotions and needs.

1.4.2 *Opportunistic flexibility*

Machiavellianism is related to a tendency to manipulate in multiple ways. As the most flexible trait among the DT, individuals high in Machiavellianism are prone to plan and construct original and detailed deception (Baughman et al., 2014). Thus, behavioral flexibility and strategic thinking makes them to recruit conditional strategies in their social relationships to achieve their desired goals (Bereczkei, 2017).

Machiavellian individuals prefer softer tactics of social influence such as persuasion or ingratiation (Fehr, Samson, & Paulhus, 1992; Grams & Rogers, 1990). However, if needed, they also engage in harder tactics, such as thought manipulation or guilt induction (Jonason, Slomski, & Partyka, 2012). Taken as a whole, the Machiavellian interpersonal orientation is strategic and calculative, and thus, it can be described as cognitive as opposed to emotional (Austin et al. 2007; Wastel & Booth, 2003). Such excess of cognitive orientation over the emotional orientation leaves them free to analyze the situation dispassionately, and makes them able to show a high sensitivity to the environmental cues related to the situation, rather than cues related to individuals (Bereczkei & Czibor, 2014; Geis & Levy 1970).

People, in general, are viewed by the Machiavellian with a distrust. Thus, people are expected to be insincere and having ill intentions (Geis & Christie, 1970; McIlwain, 2003; Pilch, 2008). Specifically, Machiavellian individuals do not believe what others say, believe that people are out to get each other, and see humanity in a negative light (McIlwain, 2003).

Considering that Machiavellians typically aim to reach quick success, they do probably not try to develop a closer acquaintance with the partner in a social interaction. They much rather base their actions on a picture formed by quickly appraisable information and impressions (McIlwain, 2003). Studies have shown that Machiavellian individuals are good at categorization based on inter-individual commonalities: due to their knowledge of people, they are able to decide how a certain type of people usually behaves in a certain type of situation (Bereczkei, 2017; Mealey, 1995, *this reflects a nomothetic approach, see further 4.2*).

This manipulation strategy is further facilitated by the Machiavellian worldview that is cynical on the one hand while it also provides a realistic picture of people and their characteristic traits on the other hand. This fundamental cynicism of the Machiavellians may result from childhood experiences. Thus, parental neglect has been linked to Machiavellianism in a family environment that is more detached and more chaotic, but less rigid and less cohesive (Lang & Birkas, 2014). In this sense, Machiavellian attitude can be considered as an adaptive response to neglectful environments (Lang & Lenard, 2015). In other words, the manipulative strategy of Machiavellian individuals may be viewed as a means of offensive defense.

Another study, using a retrospective parental care questionnaire, revealed that low maternal care led to the development of Machiavellianism via the fearful attachment as a possible mediating factor (Jonason, Lyons, & Bethell, 2014). It is not surprising, then, that even young Machiavellians were characterized by distrust, cynicism and a lack of faith in human benevolence (McIlwain, 2003). As a part of their cynical view, Machiavellians frequently view others as weak and vulnerable that would make their counterparts more exploitable.

Machiavellians often use their cynicism to justify manipulative behaviors through a sense of survival and necessity (Christie & Geis, 1970). Consequently, they often employ the means of pretended altruism when their activity is observed by others, in which case defection would incur high costs (Bereczkei, Birkas, Kerekes, 2010). Further, Machiavellian's behavior is influenced by the

number of altruists and defectors in the group as well as by whether group members act competitively or cooperatively (Bereczkei & Czibor, 2014; Bereczkei, Szabo, & Czibor 2015).

Moreover, they also tend to evaluate groupmates' willingness to cooperate in the public goods game, and abuse those with abundant offer to the community (Bereczkei, et al., 2015). Thus, it is possible that their manipulative strategy is strongly linked to their skill at detecting cooperators as potential victims. These findings suggest that Machiavellians' cognitive and social skills enable them to flexibly adapt to diverse situations of the social environment. Thus, their decisions are influenced by cues related to others' behavior (Bereczkei, 2017). Further, Machiavellian individuals only engage in manipulation when it serves their long-term interests unlike psychopathic individuals who seek immediate gratification (Jones, 2016).

1.4.3 *Full frontal offense*

In contrast to Machiavellians, flexibility was not likely to play a role in the evolution of psychopathic (or narcissistic) personality traits. Among the DT, psychopathy is the least sensitive to contextual variables, thus, manipulation tendencies of this personality trait are quite stable across contexts (Baughman et al., 2014; Jonason & Webster, 2012). Indeed, psychopathy is characterized by rigid patterns of responding and poor learning outcomes (Blair, 2010). Thus, individuals high in psychopathy may use an overly offensive, "first strike" tactic in the exploitation of others that implies impulsivity and aggression which are regarded as their main unique features (Jones & Paulhus, 2010). As a consequence, they frequently engage in destructive behaviors (for the self and for others) without considering the costs and magnitudes of their actions (Hare, 2003).

Because of their poor self-regulation, their behavior is closely related to the dysfunctional type of impulsivity (Jones & Paulhus, 2011b). As a consequence, lack of planning, fast action, and carelessness are related features of both the interpersonal and sexual style of the psychopath (Jonason, et al., 2009; Jonason & Schmitt, 2012). Thus, such individuals take advantage of their social and sexual partners with no regrets or negative feelings, such as shame or guilt, followed by their actions (Lyons, 2014; Mealey, 1995).

Therefore, an evolutionary argument has been proposed that the cheater strategy of the psychopath might be rooted in such emotional disabilities as, for example, limited empathy that provide a useful tool for the psychopath to exploit others (Jonason & Krause, 2013; Jonason & Kroll, 2015; Jonason et al., 2013). In this sense, a lack of affective empathy could be viewed as skill rather than disability when it comes to lying and manipulation (Lyons & Brockman, 2017). Moreover, in relation to emotional skills and deficits, research has demonstrated differences between primary and secondary psychopathy that might define their particular choices of manipulation tactics (Lyons, 2014).

More specifically, primary psychopathy has been addressed as a defect strategy that is emotionally stable and uncaring (Jonason et al., 2013). In contrast, secondary psychopathy is more prone to negative emotions, especially, anxiety. In line with this, secondary psychopathy (similarly to Machiavellianism) has been theorized to develop as a competitive strategy that emerged from bad socio-ecological environments and, thus, should be more under environmental influences (Lyons, 2014; Mealey, 1995).

In contrast to Machiavellianism, however, individuals high in psychopathy and narcissism are associated with grandiose worldviews (Hare, 1996; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001) and justify their behaviors through a sense of entitlement and egocentricity. In addition, such a self-entitled disposition coupled with callousness and fearlessness could made some psychopathic individuals able to achieve high status (Akhtar, Ahmetoglu, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2013; Mullins-Sweatt, Glover, Derefinko, Miller, & Widiger, 2010).

Overall, the manipulation strategy characterized by psychopathy reflects brutality and forcefulness that are not found in Machiavellians' or narcissists' tactics of manipulation (Jonason & Webster, 2012), and thus, providing further evidence for the diverse nature of cheater strategies.

2   Dark Triad & Interpersonal manipulation

It has been argued that successful manipulation must require some advanced emotional and/or cognitive skills for the correct assessment of potential targets (Brankley & Rule, 2014; McIlwain, 2003; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). Specifically, manipulation requires the ability to predict another person's emotional and mental states and to use this knowledge for one's own purposes. In this way, people who effectively engage these processes would achieve their interpersonal goals most efficiently (Lyons, Caldwell, & Schultz, 2010; McIlwain, 2003; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007).

However, in theory, successful manipulation requires an emotional detachment from the victim that restrains manipulators from empathizing with their targets (Jonason et al., 2013; Jonason & Krause, 2013). Such a cold attitude even in emotionally loaded situations could enable manipulators to take advantage of those individuals who are occupied with their own feelings (Bereczkei, 2017; Geis, Weinheimer, & Berger 1970; Sullivan & Allen, 1999). Thus, successful manipulators may understand the emotional states of others, but remain unresponsive to the emotional stimulus (Lyons & Brockman, 2017). However, empirical data suggests that none of the DT traits could entirely fit into this manipulator profile. Thus, research has demonstrated deficits in various emotional and cognitive abilities among narcissistic, Machiavellian, and psychopathic individuals (e.g. Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010; O'Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, & Story, 2013; Szijjarto & Bereczkei, 2015; Wastell & Booth, 2003).

Especially, for psychopathy, studies reported low impulse control suggesting a very different manipulation strategy from that of the cold minded manipulator (Figueredo et al., 2005, 2006; Jonason, Koenig, & Tost, 2010; Jonason & Tost, 2010). In sum, research suggests that social exploitation takes multiple forms among personalities of the DT with each trait characterized by different skills and deficits in social understanding.

2.1   Getting to know others

Social understanding enables individuals to adjust to the demands of a shared environment. Thus, abilities that serve for getting to know others in terms of their intentions, emotions, and actions

are needed to navigate in our social lives (Frith & Frith, 2007; Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). Over the past decades, theorists and empirical scientists have increasingly researched the social functions that might be related to human cognition (e.g. Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Frith & Frith, 2007; Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998).

It became an important goal within the research field called social cognition to identify what specific cognitive processes are responsible for the human abilities to interpret and explain others' behavior. Social cognition per definition refers to different forms of cognition about agents or groups of agents, and their intentions, emotions, and behavior, particularly in terms of their relation to other agents or the self (Jaegher, Di Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010). This chapter will focus on the different emotional, cognitive and behavioral components of social cognition that might relate to the manipulation strategies of DT traits.

2.1.1 *Social cognition*

Understanding others' mental states involves the attribution of emotions. Consequently, it is difficult to distinguish mental state assessment from the related and overlapping concepts, such as emotion perception, emotional intelligence, or empathy. The overlap stems from the fact that all three concepts involve in some sense the understanding of emotions. Thus, emotional and cognitive aspects of social cognition seem to be strongly related. First, I will introduce the cognitive components of social cognition and then I will address the above-mentioned emotional components with a brief overview on overlaps in concepts.

2.1.1.1 *Cognitive mapping of others*

In general, investigation of the relation between the self and others' minds has been in the focus of the "mainstream view" of social cognition research since 1978. This was the year when the term theory of mind was first introduced and established the so-called theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) or mindreading framework (Bowl & Gangopadhyay, 2013).

The question "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?" was proposed in the title of a seminal paper (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) that provoked interdisciplinary research on this ability,

i.e., the human ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. The authors stated that humans have a ToM that serves mental state attribution. They applied the label "theory" for two reasons. The first reason was that mental states are not directly observable. The second reason was that because of the first reason we need to make predictions about the behavior of other agents, thus, in other words, we need to form a "theory" about others' mental states.

Further, the authors were interested in whether chimpanzees may have (something analogous to) a ToM. This question has been widely investigated in the following years with the conclusion that there were only a few instances when great apes showed evidence of having some understanding of what another agent (a person or a chimpanzee) might know (Corballis, 2014).

Although in some cases chimpanzees appeared to be intentionally deceptive (Byrne & Byrne, 1995; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2006), there is no evidence that these animals based their actions on an understanding of other agents' minds (Corballis, 2014). An alternative explanation suggests that they simple responded on the basis of learned cues. Thus, in sum, chimpanzees might possess a primitive, implicit level of mindreading at the most.

However, besides the attempts to reveal limitations in social cognition of chimpanzees, the developmental and social consequences of having a ToM have been as well widely studied in humans (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Davis & Pratt, 1995; Kinderman et al, 1998; Sullivan, Winner, & Hopfield, 1995). Research has also shift in the clinical domain (Baron Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).

Deficits in mental state attribution were first demonstrated in autism, and helped to explain difficulties in communication and social relationships that are characteristic features of the disorder (Baron Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1994; Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe, 1994; Leslie, 1987; Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Bryant, 1997). Research of ToM on typically developing humans traditionally focused on children (Apperly, 2012). However, recent work expanded on infants and adults, adopting new methods to test social cognition and individual differences.

Since Premack and Woodruff's paper, research on mental state attribution has been primarily run under the label ToM. In the past decades, this label expanded its definition to include multiple concepts. As a result, this term has been used in at least three different meanings (Bowl, 2015).

First, it refers to a particular theory – so-called theory-theory – that explains mental state attribution as a theory-driven process. Second, it refers to the ability itself that ToM research wants to explain. Third, it is an umbrella term for the research paradigm that focuses on the human cognitive ability to explain and predict the behavior of others in terms of their mental states.

In addition to the diverse meanings of the same label, various other labels emerged in the literature in reference to mental state attribution. For example, mindreading and mentalizing, folk psychology and naïve psychology, common sense psychology and everyday psychology are all terms that aim to describe humans' ability to understand others' minds (Bowl, 2015; Kiss, 2005).

2.1.1.2   *Emotional mapping of others*

The most basic level of mental state attribution involves the understanding of the emotions of another person (Corballis, 2014). Emotion perception can be defined as the identification of emotionally salient information in the environment including verbal and nonverbal cues to emotions of other people (Phillips, 2003). In some respects, it's relation to mindreading is not consistent in the relevant literature (Mitchell & Phillips, 2015).

In particular, mindreading and emotion perception can be viewed as different concepts of a general ability (e.g. Adolphs, 2003), or as two separate abilities (e.g. Blair, 2005; Fortier, Besnard, & Allain, 2018), but some researchers describe emotion perception as a precursor to mindreading (e.g. Beer & Ochsner, 2006; Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen, 2006).

The second concept, emotional intelligence (EI) involves the ability to monitor one's own and others' feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to apply this information in one's thinking and actions (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Apparently, here is an overlap between EI and mindreading in terms of emotional state attribution.

Furthermore, EI is conceptualized by two approaches: trait EI and ability EI (*see also Chapter 3*). While trait EI is a series of emotional competencies that are closely related to such positive characteristics as optimism, self-awareness, and self-esteem (Bar-On, 1997; 2010), ability EI is a set of cognitive skills that include understanding of emotions and complex relationships between emotions and reasoning, and also utilizing this information in problem solving (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000; Montgomery, Stoesz, & McCrimmon, 2012). In addition, ability EI correlates with empathy (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000) and with successful social interactions (Lopes, Salovey, Cote, Beers, & Petty, 2005).

The third concept is empathy, with the most robust overlap with mindreading. Empathy is the ability that allows us to feel with another person, to understand others' emotions and to experience emotions that are triggered by others (Baron-Cohen & Weelwright, 2004). Further, empathy drives us to help others and stops us from hurt them.

According to the mainstream view of this concept, empathy is a response to someone else's emotion. Or, within a more cognitive viewpoint, empathy is any process in which a perception of another person's state creates a state in the agent that is more appropriate with the other person's state than to the agent's own prior state or situation (Hoffman, 2001; Koski & Sterck, 2009; Preston, 2007).

In this process, the agent matches her emotional state to the other's but then distinguishes it from the other's state, and adjusts the initial emotional resonance (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Koski & Sterck, 2009). Essentially, the agent sets aside her own perspective, attributes a mental state to the other person (Leslie, 1987), and infers the likely content of the mental state according to her understanding of that person (Baron-Cohen & Weelwright, 2004).

Thus, as it is argued in recent research, emotional and cognitive processes are both required for a fully functioning, i.e. mature human empathy (Blair, 2005; Koski & Sterck, 2009; Preston, 2007).

2.1.1.3 Hot & cold theories

In general, research on empathy can be distinguished by three approaches. Theorists either view empathy 1.) primarily in terms of affect, i.e. hot empathy 2.) or primarily in terms of cognition, i.e. cold empathy 3.) or argue that both are essential to define empathy. The affective approach puts emphasize on the observer's emotional response. This response should be appropriate, thus, for example feeling pleasure at another person's pain cannot be considered as being empathic. Quite the opposite, it should be excluded as an inappropriate response (Baron-Cohen & Weelwright, 2004).

Moreover, cognitive theories emphasize that empathy relies on the understanding of another person's emotions (Baron-Cohen & Weelwright, 2004; Kohler, 1929) followed by a response that is nonegocentrical (Piaget, 1932). However, other researchers define cognitive empathy as the ability to understand the emotional state of others but without experiencing it (Coricelli, 2005; Fortier, Besnard, & Allain, 2018). Finally, the third approach views empathy as a multi-component concept that consists of both the affective and cognitive components, which interact with each other (e.g. Blair, 2005; Davis, 1994; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Koski & Sterck, 2009).

Although it is clear that in the latter two approaches empathy is essentially related to mindreading, the nature of this relationship remains a little ambiguous as terminology is not always used in a consistent manner in the relevant literature (Bowl, 2015; Kalbea et al., 2010; Mitchell & Phillips, 2015). However, giving plausible explanations on how these concepts relate to each other is of great importance given that in many everyday situations it is likely that both affective and cognitive processing is needed for social understanding. For example, understanding social emotions such as guilt or shame, or complex mental states such as deception or sarcasm, likely involves the functioning of both emotional and cognitive processes (Mitchell & Phillips, 2015).

When explaining such multi-component internal states, in principle, researchers either refer to mindreading and empathy as two separate but related concepts (Kanske, Böckler, Trautwein, & Singer, 2015; Koski & Sterck, 2009), or as a single concept (Kalbea et al., 2010), or view

mindreading as a subcomponent—precisely, the cognitive subcomponent—of empathy (Baron-Cohen & Weelwright, 2004; Gonzalez-Liencres, Shamay-Tsoory, & Brune, 2013).

Furthermore, some researchers make distinctions between affective and cognitive (Kalbea et al., 2010), or, in other words, hot and cold mindreading (Brothers & Ring, 1992; McIlwain, 2003). In this respect, affective or hot mindreading refers to the understanding of emotions whereas cognitive or cold mindreading refers to the understanding of beliefs. In analogy with the above, hot/affective mindreading and cognitive empathy seem to refer to similar or even the same concept (Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014; Fortier et al., 2018).

Taking an even broader perspective, some researchers dissociate social cognition into hot (processing emotional states) and cold (attributing and processing mental states) social cognition (Brothers, 1996; Mitchell & Phillips, 2015). In this sense, the concepts of emotion perception, EI and empathy (especially its affective component) are related to hot social cognition, while mindreading and cognitive empathy belong to cold social cognition.

I argue to use this latter terminology and the distinction between hot and cold social cognition as this is the most permissive, thus, in other words, it enables to incorporate all the related concepts. The following chapters will focus on the different facets of hot and cold social cognition in their relation to manipulative strategies of the DT. My prime focus is that various cognitive abilities and deficits might relate to the emergence of unique manipulative strategies.

2.2 Getting control over others

Skillful manipulators are considered as clever observers of human nature who employ their impressions in order to get control over others and manipulate them. In this process, they might apply special cognitive skills—as part of a manipulative intelligence—that enable them to efficiently predict others' emotions, thoughts, and intentions (Bereczkei, 2017). Thus, in theory, manipulators might use emotional intelligence or "Machiavellian intelligence" in an attempt to understand others' behavior (Bereczkei, 2017, Paal & Bereczkei, 2012).

Empirical research has supported theory showing that DT traits have a disposition to use emotional manipulation for self-gain (Austin et al., 2007; Nagler et al., 2014). Thus, narcissistic, Machiavellian, and psychopathic individuals have been reported to employ strategies targeted to others' emotions in deceiving, confusing or influencing them.

However, studies have found negative associations with general emotional and cognitive skills such as trait EI, social intelligence, and ToM (Austin et al. 2007, Wai and Tiliopoulos 2012, Szijjarto & Bereczkei 2015, Pilch 2008, Vonk, Zeigler-Hill, Ewing, Mercer & Noser, 2015). Therefore, in fact, empirical data indicates that dark personalities have difficulties in understanding either their own or others' emotional and mental states.

Next, I will further elaborate the relationship between manipulation, DT traits and the proposed special cognitive skills—emotional intelligence and Machiavellian intelligence in specific—that might be useful for the development of a "manipulative intelligence".

2.2.1 *Emotional intelligence*

When investigating individual differences in EI in relation to dark personality traits, research has found inconsistent results. On the one hand, a positive relation has been established for narcissism (Petrides et al., 2011; Veselka et al., 2012). However, narcissism was linked to a limited empathy (e.g., Jonason et al., 2013; Paulhus & Williams, 2002).

These results constitute a theoretical ambiguity that stems from the fact that EI and empathy are strongly associated and partly overlapping concepts. On the other hand, research has demonstrated negative relationship with EI and Machiavellianism (Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2009; Austin et al., 2007; Szijjarto & Bereczkei 2015), and both negative (Copestake, Gray, & Snowden, 2013; Ermer, Kahn, Salovey, & Kiehl, 2012) and positive relationships (Petrides et al., 2011; Veselka et al., 2012) with psychopathy.

Positive links with EI for psychopathy, however, are especially ambiguous given that a lack of empathy is part of the construct definition of psychopathy (e.g. Furnham et al., 2013; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Overall, negative associations with EI are somewhat surprising because of the

theoretical expectation that manipulation should require an accurate assessment of targets' emotional and intentional states (Bereczkei, 2017, 2018).

There are several alternative explanations on these inconsistent findings in the literature. One possibility is that DT individuals employ manipulative tactics that do not require an advanced general level of EI. Thus, a rich emotional life and understanding of one's own and others' feelings might interfere with the active exploitation of others (Jonason et al., 2013; Jonason & Krause, 2013).

Taken an evolutionary perspective, although the inability to properly assess emotions leads to disadvantages in interpersonal relationships, the benefits of manipulative behavior might compensate for them and these two components have co-evolved as an adaptive behavioral complex (Bereczkei, 2017, 2018). However, it is also possible that dark personalities actually exhibit above average EI in context of manipulation.

Regardless, this assumption does not reflect in high scores on traditional EI measures presumably because such methods dominantly focus on the assessment of positive emotions that facilitate cooperative behaviors (Austin et al., 2007; Bar-On, 2010; Bereczkei, 2017; O'Connor & Athota, 2013). According to this explanation, DT individuals deploy tactics of emotional manipulation if they have the opportunity of taking advantage of others' emotions. Otherwise, they remain unconcerned with others' feelings. This would explain why Machiavellian and psychopathic individuals who generally score low on traditional EI scales exhibit high scores on an emotional manipulation scale (Austin et al., 2007; Nagler et al., 2014).

2.2.2 *Machiavellian intelligence*

The Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis was introduced by primatologists and evolutionary anthropologists as a theory for explaining the rapid evolution of the human brain (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Dunbar, 1998, Whiten & Byrne, 1997). This theory was based on the idea that skillful manipulation of others might be evolutionary advantageous. In particular, successful deception has facilitated the development of a more complex social intelligence (Bereczkei, 2017, 2018).

In this sense, intellectual abilities evolved via tactical deception and manipulation of conspecifics as such behavior appeared to be beneficial for the survival and reproduction of the manipulator (Krebs, & Davies, 2009). In consequence, because Machiavellianism as a behavioral strategy has proved favorable for at least some individuals in their social relationships, the underlying psychological mechanisms have been maintained over time (Bereczkei, 2017; Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996).

To explain this evolutionary process, it has been argued that the development of Machiavellian intelligence might have taken the form of an "arms race". Thus, more and more sophisticated manipulation tactics led to the development of more and more refined manipulation detection and vice versa (Goody 1997). Such a spiral of manipulation tactics and counteractions led to an increase in significant cognitive abilities and an expansion of brain size (Bereczkei, 2017, 2018; Lyons et al., 2010).

Therefore, evolutionary theorists assumed that human manipulative tendencies might have co-evolved with refined abilities for mindreading (Bereczkei, 2018; Lyons et al., 2010). This assumption would explain why manipulators appear to be always one step ahead of others in recognizing their targets' weak points. To accomplish this, manipulators must have a detailed and accurate understanding of others' intentions, goals, and knowledge (e.g. McIlwain, 2003; Mealey, 1995; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). Therefore, many authors assumed that without having an advanced ToM successful manipulation is very unlikely (Bereczkei, 2017, 2018; Esperger & Bereczkei, 2012; Lyons et al., 2010).

However, relevant studies have not confirmed these theoretical assumptions. Thus, research has found no link with above-average mindreading abilities or even demonstrated below-average abilities for DT individuals (e.g. Al Ain, Carré, Fantini-Hauwel, Baudouin, & Besche-Richard, 2013; Lyons et al., 2010; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007; Vonk, et al. 2015; *see also 5.2*).

These findings led several authors to conclude that the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis is less convincing in explaining successful manipulation in human social relationships (e.g. Lyons et

al. 2010; O'Boyle et al., 2013). However, there are several alternative explanations on why individuals high in DT score low or average on traditional tests for IQ and ToM.

First, the applied tests for measuring cognitive ability were focused on crystallized rather than fluid intelligence (Hick, Harrison, & Engle, 2015; Matthews & Lassiter, 2007). However, a recent study that examined the relation between DT traits and fluid intelligence demonstrated a positive link with Machiavellianism (Kowalski et al, 2018).

Second, traditional methods for ToM assessment were not designed to measure how people can detect manipulation from vivid social scenarios (*see detailed theoretical and empirical implications on this topic in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5*).

Third, it is possible that, instead of general cognitive abilities, various specific cognitive processes underlie the manipulation strategies of DT personalities (Bereczkei, 2017; 2018; Kowalski et al. 2018). According to this assumption, multiple successful exploitative strategies can co-exist in extracting resources from the social environment. Some of them rely more on certain emotional skills or the lack of proper emotional responding, however, others rely more on specific cognitive skills. Future research is needed to specify individual differences in emotional and cognitive abilities of the DT in relation to the specific manipulation strategies these traits apply.

Here, in this dissertation I will introduce two sets of studies (*in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5*) that were aimed at gaining deeper insights in the emotional and cognitive skills and deficits of DT individuals. Besides these abilities that might help manipulators to get control over others, however, another important question concerns whether and how they can maintain control over themselves. This issue will be discussed next.

2.3   Getting control over the self

As it was outlined previously in these introductory chapters, DT traits may exhibit evolutionary advantageous cheater strategies that are linked to self-serving, goal-driven behaviors. All three personalities of the DT, however, have the reputation of being undesirable in long-term relationships, and especially, in cooperation where mutual exchange would be required (Baughman

et al., 2014; Campbell & Foster, 2002; Foster, Shrira, & Campbell, 2006; Jonason et al., 2009). Thus, because of their selfishness and need for immediate gratification (e.g. Figueredo et al., 2005; Jonason et al., 2010), individuals high in DT are more successful in short-term considering both their sexual and manipulation styles (Jonason et al., 2009; 2011; Jonason & Webster, 2012).

Ironically, it seems that low levels of self-control and self-regulation are useful "deficits" for at least some of the cheater strategies of the DT in an attempt to get control over others. In line with this, theoretical work suggests that DT traits might follow a particular life history strategy that serves well such short-term motives.

Within the evolutionary framework of Life History Theory (LHT; e.g., Wilson, 1975), dark personalities have been linked to following fast life strategies (Figueredo et al., 2005, 2006; Gladden, Figueredo, & Jacobs, 2009; Jonason et al., 2010; Jonason & Tost, 2010; Troisi, 2005).

2.3.1 *Life History Theory – "Live fast, die whenever"*

LHT is a theory derived from evolutionary behavioral ecology that originally was applied to explain differences in acquired resources for survival and reproduction of living organisms (Mulder 1992; Wilson, 1975). Later, this theory has proved useful in understanding within-species differences in nonhumans and individual differences in humans (for a review see Rushton, 1985, 1996).

LHT proposes that the availability of resources is always limited, therefore, trade-offs must occur for different activities in the attempts of individuals to solve such adaptive problems as growth, reproduction, and parental investment (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005).

In particular, trade-offs are based on calculations of how much time and energy each activity costs for the individual. Individuals have relatively slow or fast life strategies that reflect on environmental effects, such as parental care and available resources during childhood, in an adaptive manner (Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Bereczkei, 2017; Figueredo et al., 2006). Thus, an unfavorable family environment, where resources are unpredictable and attachment is insecure, facilitates the development of a fast life strategy with a preference for short-term relationships (Belsky et al., 1991; Bereczkei & Csanaky, 2001; Del Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, 2015; Nettle,

Frankenhuis, & Rickard, 2013). In contrast, more favorable circumstances elicit a long-term strategy with more focus on intimate relationships and intense parental care (Bereczkei, 2017; Jonason et al., 2010).

In line with this distinction, LHT has been used as a framework to explain the emergence and survival of dark personality traits (Jonason & Webster, 2012; Kavanagh & Kahl, 2016, 2018). Thus, DT traits and particularly, psychopathy has been linked to a fast life history strategy (e.g. Figueredo et al., 2005, 2006; Jonason et al., 2010; Jonason & Tost, 2010; Valentova, Junior, Sterbova, Varella, & Fisher, 2020). This may be because a low impulse control embodied in psychopathy could be one of the key features of this strategy (Del Giudice, 2014; Lyons & Jonason, 2015; Lyons & Rice, 2014).

As for the other two DT traits, however, research has found inconsistent results in their relationship with fast life strategy as well as with impulsivity (Figueredo et al., 2005; Jonason et al., 2009; 2010; Jonason & Kavanagh, 2010; Jonason & Tost, 2010; McDonald, Donnellan, & Navarrete, 2012).

In particular, Machiavellianism is associated with a harsh and insecure childhood environment that should predict a fast strategy (Jonason, Lyons, & Bethell, 2014; Lang & Birkas, 2014). Indeed, research has shown a preference among Machiavellian individuals for short-term intimate relationships (e.g. Figueredo et al., 2005; McDonald et al., 2012). However, Machiavellianism is characterized by a long-term strategic orientation in social encounters (Bereczkei, 2017, 2018; Jones, 2016).

Similarly to Machiavellianism, some aspects of narcissism, in particular grandiose narcissism and the leadership/authority dimension are linked to a slow life strategy. In contrast, the entitlement/exploitativeness dimension is related to a fast life strategy and low self-control (McDonald et al., 2012). In sum, psychopathy appears to be the trait among the DT that best reflects a fast life history strategy. However, in some aspects all three traits are associated with short-term orientation. This will be further elaborated in *Chapter 6*.

3 How can you hurt if you can't feel?

Theory

This chapter will focus on the emotional profile of Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy. As emotional deficits are considered a fundamental aspect of the DT (e.g. Jonason & Krause, 2013; Petrides, Vernon, Schermer, & Veselka, 2011; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012), it is possible that their affective limitations contribute to the aversive characteristics and manipulative nature of these traits.

According to this theory, research has shown that individuals high in DT traits do not empathize with other people. Instead, they use their (moderate) emotional skills and empathic deficits in a manipulative way to influence others (Grieve & Mahar, 2010; Nagler et al., 2014; O'Connor & Athota, 2013). Consequently, they might be able to hurt others and ignore or overlook the harm they caused to them because they do not feel compassion with the victims (Jonason & Krause, 2013).

In general, two fields of emotional deficit have been described by the literature: 1.) low levels of EI (*see 2.2.1*) and 2.) limited empathy (*see 2.1.1*), both of which might engender exploitative social styles (Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010; Jonason & Krause, 2013; Petrides et al, 2011).

3.1 Empathy deficits of the DT

The major emotional difficulties of the DT traits have been found in relation to empathy. However, in terms of limited empathy research has found different correlations with the two basic dimensions for the DT. Thus, empathy as a two-dimensional construct consists of affective and cognitive components (Davis, 1994; *see also 2.1.1.3*). By definition, affective empathy refers to the capacity to experience emotions, while cognitive empathy is defined as the ability to understand others' emotional states (Al Ain et al., 2013; Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004).

When examining the empathic abilities of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, deficits appear to be oriented to the affective component (experiencing emotions), whereas little evidence was found of impairment in the cognitive component (understanding emotions) of empathy (Jonason & Krause, 2013; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012).

Moreover, it is possible that the nature and extent of emotional impairments differ between Machiavellian, psychopathic and narcissistic individuals. Although intercorrelated, these traits represent distinct elements of socially aversive behavior (*see Chapter 1*). In short, narcissism involves a grandiose self-concept, Machiavellianism involves cynicism and strategic interpersonal manipulation, psychopathy involves an antisocial behavioral style. Such individual characteristics are related to different emotional skills and deficits which I will briefly discuss next.

3.2   Emotional profile of narcissism

Research has demonstrated that individuals high in narcissism have a unique style of emotional deficits. Although narcissism was reported to display negative associations with affective empathy, it shows mixed results with respect to cognitive empathy (Delic, Novak, Kovacic, & Avsec, 2011; Vonk, Zeigler-Hill, Mayhew, & Mercer, 2013; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). Besides, several studies demonstrate a positive relationship between narcissism and trait EI (Nagler et al., 2014; Petrides et al., 2011; Veselka et al., 2012).

These findings indicate that some narcissists might be able to understand emotions of the self and others (based on their self-perception) but they are not motivated to express empathic concern for others. They rather use these emotional skills to serve their own ego-needs (Jonason & Kroll, 2015; Petrides et al., 2011).

However, not all narcissists demand constant attention and admiration. In a related study, Vonk and colleagues (2013) found that individuals high in grandiosity were positively, whereas other facets of narcissism, as well as the overall construct, were negatively associated with EI. Besides, Grandiose Exhibitionism predicted greater fantasy, while Leadership/Authority predicted

lower levels of fantasy suggesting that the various facets of narcissism may differ in their affective nature.

3.3   Emotional profile of psychopathy

Psychopathy, and especially, the primary factor of psychopathy appeared to be the main predictor of empathic deficits within the DT (Jonason et al., 2013; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). Furthermore, like Machiavellianism, psychopathy has been found to display negative associations with EI (Ali et al., 2009; Austin, Saklofske, Smith, & Tohver, 2014; Jauk, Freudenthaler, & Neubauer, 2016). However, some studies reported mixed (Nagler et al., 2014) or positive results (Veselka et al., 2012).

Interestingly, only a few studies addressed psychopathy as a multidimensional construct (Ali et al., 2009; Grieve & Mahar, 2010; Malterer et al., 2008) that can be differentiated into two related factors; primary and secondary psychopathy (Levenson et al., 1995). However, these studies revealed important differences between the two factors in their relation to emotionality.

The most notable difference between primary and secondary psychopathy has been found in their relation to negative affect. Thus, it was only secondary psychopathy that was linked to negative affect, and especially, anxiety (Ali et al., 2009; Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008; Grieve & Mahar, 2010). Further, primary psychopathy was associated with the lack of shame and guilt (Holmqvist, 2008; Lyons, 2015; Morrison & Gilbert, 2001). In contrast, secondary psychopathy was unrelated to guilt and shame proneness (Gudjonsson & Roberts, 1983; Lyons, 2015).

These findings are consistent with other findings demonstrating the strongest link between empathic deficits and primary psychopathy among the DT (Jonason et al., 2013; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). Further, primary psychopathic individuals have been found to experience aversive feelings in relation to others' feelings. More specifically, primary psychopaths had positive feelings after being exposed to others' sadness (Ali et al., 2009), but identified themselves with sad and fearful faces after watching a happy video clip (Lyons & Brockman, 2017).

Thus, overall, the emotionally cold cheater strategy of primary psychopathy can be supported by the fact that these individuals are not subject to the same negative emotions experienced by others. A related study found that, while primary psychopaths blamed others after a shameful event, secondary psychopaths were more likely to blame themselves (Campbell & Elison, 2005). However, despite this propensity to blame themselves, individuals high in secondary psychopathy might have a reactive type of cheater strategy that originates from their anxiety and other negative emotions.

In addition, it was mainly secondary psychopathy that negatively affected trait EI (Ali et al., 2009; Grieve & Mahar, 2010), whereas primary psychopathy showed weak or no significant association (Ali et al., 2009; Malterer, Glass, & Newman, 2008). Further, secondary psychopathy was found to be positively related to emotional concealment, while primary psychopathy was not (Grieve & Mahar, 2010). Thus, results indicate that primary and secondary psychopaths do not experience the same levels of emotion.

3.4 Emotional profile of Machiavellianism

Machiavellianism, besides its foregoing association with limited affective empathy, has consistently shown a negative relationship with EI (Ali et al., 2009; Bereczkei, 2015; Szijjarto & Bereczkei, 2015). However, Austin and colleagues (2007) found a positive correlation between Machiavellianism and emotional manipulation when they extended the existing concept of EI with a malicious aspect. Although it should be noted that a more recent study demonstrated positive associations between emotional manipulation and all three DT traits (Nagler et al., 2014), suggesting that dark personalities use their knowledge about emotions as a tool to a selfish, manipulative end.

Research has also shown that after distinguishing two sub-dimensions (O'Connor & Athota, 2013), the negative relationship between trait EI and Machiavellianism remained in regard of such positive components as managing others' emotions (generally with the inclination to help others), but not in regard of a neutral component: perceived emotional competence (the perceived ability to understand and use emotions). Further, at low levels of Agreeableness Machiavellianism showed a

positive association with the other dimension of emotional intelligence, the subtype called as perceived emotional competence (the perceived ability to understand and use emotions).

A similar ambiguity characterizes the findings on Machiavellians' anxiety (Bereczkei, 2017). Some studies revealed a positive relationship (e.g. Fehr et al., 1992; Al Ain et al., 2013), other studies reported no link between Machiavellianism and anxiety (e.g. Ali et al., 2009; Birkas et al., 2015). More specifically, Machiavellians have been found to be afraid of being rejected or negatively judged by others, thus, in more general, they were anxious because of negative social consequences of their behavior (Birkas et al., 2015). This suggests, however, that Machiavellian individuals make great efforts in order to conceal their negative feelings and control the visible signs of their anxiety (Geis & Moon, 1981). In consequence, regardless of experiencing high anxiety or not, they maintain the picture of the cold-minded manipulator (Bereczkei, 2017).

Research

3.5   Introduction

Emotional deficits, such as limited empathy, are considered a fundamental aspect of the DT, however, the nature and extent of such deficiencies seem to vary among dark personalities (Jonason & Krause, 2013; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). By applying multidimensional measures of empathy, EI, and the DT, the empirical study in this chapter is aimed to investigate in more detail how individuals high in DT traits understand and evaluate emotions.

Considering that emotional deficiencies are likely to contribute to the aversive and manipulative nature of these traits, low levels of EI and empathy might engender exploitative social styles (Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010; Jonason & Krause, 2013). In accordance with theory, results indicated that each trait, moreover, each facet of the DT traits entailed unique emotional deficiencies.

To sum the relevant findings, narcissism was positively, whereas secondary psychopathy negatively, associated with EI. With respect to empathy, only primary psychopathy was linked to an overall deficit, while a positive relationship was found between Machiavellianism and the perspective-taking facet of cognitive empathy.

These results suggest that the specific emotional limitations of these traits might contribute to the successful deployment of different socially aversive strategies. Considering their specific characters, the first experimental study of this thesis was aimed to investigate in more detail how the DT traits are linked to individual differences in understanding and evaluating emotions in order to highlight possible patterns in their manipulative behaviors.

3.5.1   *Present research and predictions*

Only a few studies have examined the different facets of DT traits in reference to their relationship with empathy and EI. Besides, many of the relevant studies did not include all three members of the DT or failed to assess the heterogeneous nature of empathy and EI. For these reasons

multidimensional measures were applied in the present study to investigate the links between empathy, trait EI, and the DT in order to better detail the emotional motivations of dark personalities.

The goal here was to expand previous research by providing more focus on the multi-faceted nature of these constructs. Therefore, cognitive (perspective-taking) and affective (fantasy, empathic concern, and personal distress) dimensions of empathy were assessed (Davis, 1980; Kulcsar, 2002).

In terms of EI, trait emotional intelligence was measured, i.e. trait emotional self-efficacy, a construct that refers to emotion-related behavioral dispositions and self-perceptions (Davis & Nichols, 2016; Petrides, Pita, & Kokkinaki, 2007; Zhang, Zou, Wang, & Finy, 2015). In contrast, ability EI refers to emotion-related cognitive abilities (e.g. emotion perception or understanding).

Further, a four-factor model of trait EI was applied that contained appraisal, regulation, and utilization of emotions (Nagy, 2010; Schutte et al., 1998). Besides, a two-factor model was also implied as introduced by O'Connor and Athota (2013) in order to investigate whether emotional deficits of all DT traits appear only in relation to positive, pro-social aspects of EI but not in relation to neutral aspects. Thus, this two-factor model was employed to differentiate between perceived emotional competence and managing emotions in others. In particular, the former can be related to emotional manipulation, in contrast, however, the latter reflects to the pro-social nature of EI characterized by a positive emotional functioning.

By applying such a distinction this study was aimed to determine whether emotional deficits of all DT traits appear in relation to positive, pro-social aspects of EI but not in relation to such neutral aspects as perceived emotional competence.

Based on prior research and theoretical assumptions, the following predictions were set up:

1. The different facets of DT traits are expected to reveal unique emotional profiles.

2. Subscales of trait EI are expected to negatively correlate with secondary psychopathy, but positively correlate with narcissism.

3. Grandiose Exhibitionism is predicted to reveal a positive relation, whereas leadership-oriented narcissism a negative relation with the fantasy factor of empathy. Further, the subscales of

empathy are expected to show strong negative relationships with primary psychopathy, and weaker negative associations with Machiavellianism and the rest of the DT.

3.6 Method

3.6.1 *Participants and procedure*

Students of the University of Pecs were recruited as participants via the university's mailing list, without any preselection of participants. Participants ($N = 143$; 103 female) aged 18–33 years ($M = 21.89$, $SD = 2.77$) completed an online survey with a series of self-report questionnaires that assessed the variables of interest. Questionnaires were answered anonymously. All participants volunteered to participate in the study. After being directed to the survey webpage, participants could complete the survey at their own pace.

3.6.2 *Materials*

Subclinical narcissism was assessed with the *Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI;* Raskin & Hall, 1979; Hungarian translation by Bandi, 2014; Kelemen, 2010). This measure consists of 40 forced-choice items. Responses are scored positively, that is, the higher the score, the greater the narcissism. For analyzing the subscales of the NPI the three-factor structure was used (Ackerman et al., 2011) that consists of the dimensions of Leadership/Authority, Grandiose Exhibitionism, and Entitlement/Exploitativeness. As the third subscale had unacceptable internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .33), it was omitted from further analyses. The remaining Cronbach's alpha values are shown in *Table 3.1*.

Machiavellianism was measured with the *Mach-IV* (Christie & Geis, 1970; Hungarian translation by Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). The scale has 20 items covering the use of manipulation in interpersonal relationships, a cynical worldview, and a lack of concern for conventional morality. Participants rate how much they agree with each item on a seven-point Likert scale, with higher scores indicating higher levels of Machiavellianism.

The *Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale* (*LSRP;* Levenson et al., 1995; Hungarian translation by Kokonyei, 2004) was used to assess subclinical psychopathy. Responses are given in a

four-point Likert format. The primary psychopathy scale consists of 16 items, designed to assess the selfish and uncaring manifestation of psychopathy. The secondary psychopathy scale consists of 10 items assessing a self-defeating lifestyle and impulsivity.

Empathy was assessed with the *Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI*; Davis, 1980; Hungarian translation by Kulcsar, 2002). Participants reported the extent they agreed (0 = *strongly disagree*; 4 = *strongly agree*) with 28 statements. The scale measures four dimensions of empathy with each subscale comprising of seven items: perspective-taking, fantasy, empathic concern, and personal distress. All subscales showed good internal consistency (Cronbach's alphas of .72 to .86).

A modified Hungarian translation was used of the *Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test* (*SREIT/EIS;* Nagy, 2010; Schutte et al., 1998) to measure EI. Responses are given on a five-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*). The scale consists of 28 items. The subscales of the measure cover the appraisal of emotions in the self (*AES*), the appraisal of emotions in others (*AEO*), emotional regulation of the self (*ERS*), and the utilization of emotions in problem solving (*UEPS*). Cronbach's alphas fall within the range of .66 to .86.

Two subscales were left out of the Hungarian validation of the questionnaire (Nagy, 2010), emotional expression (*EE*) and emotional regulation of others (*ERO*) respectively, due to a low level of internal consistency. A two-factor model of SREIT (O'Connor & Athota, 2013) was also applied that contained the factors of perceived emotional competence (*PEC*) and positive emotional functioning (*PEF*). Internal consistency for both factors was high (alpha greater than .80).

3.7   Results

Intercorrelations among the DT, trait EI, and empathy are shown in *Table 3.1*. Men scored higher than women in Machiavellianism, but not in other DT traits. Women scored higher in global empathy. Machiavellianism correlated with primary psychopathy, and both correlated with secondary psychopathy and the Leadership/Authority facet of narcissism. Narcissism correlated with primary psychopathy.

Table 3.1

Descriptives, Cronbach's alphas, and Pearson's correlation coefficients between the Dark Triad, empathy, trait emotional intelligence, and gender.

	M	SD	α	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Gender					-.16*	-.12	-.11	-.03	-.06	.03	.09	.29***
2. Machiavellianism	96.82	15.60	.81			.12	.19*	.04	.62***	.35***	-.13	-.16*
3. Narcissism	15.08	5.50	.75				.78***	.60***	.34***	-.03	.29***	-.17*
4. Leadership/ Authority	3.43	2.16	.61					.26**	.37***	.06	.21*	-.26**
5. Grandiose Exhibitionism	3.22	2.18	.67						.16*	-.02	.19*	.05
6. Primary psychopathy	30.10	7.42	.83							.32***	-.12	-.39***
7. Secondary psychopathy	20.59	4.57	.65								-.38***	-.11
8. Global Trait EI	3.71	.48	.86									.30***
9. Global empathy	68.52	14.51	.86									

Males = 1; *Females* = 2. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

At first, correlations were tested for the relationships between the DT traits and the subscales of empathy and EI. The shared variance was controlled for among the traits through multiple regressions, as shown in *Table 3.2* and *Table 3.3*. The regression analyses were used to unveil the unique effects of each trait in their links with empathy and trait EI (e.g., the effect of narcissism controlling for Machiavellianism and psychopathy).

Narcissism was positively ($\beta = .33$, $t = 4.08$, $p < .001$), whereas secondary psychopathy negatively ($\beta = -.33$, $t = -4.09$, $p < .001$), associated with global trait EI (*Table 3.2*). Narcissism positively correlated with three factors of the four-factor model (appraisal of emotions in others, AEO; emotional regulation of the self, ERS; utilization of emotions in problem solving, UEPS), and also with both factors of the two-factor model (positive emotional functioning, PEF; perceived emotional competence; PEC). The Leadership/Authority facet was positively related to the emotional regulation of the self (ERS) and perceived emotional competence (PEC), while Grandiose Exhibitionism was positively associated with ERS and positive emotional functioning (PEF).

Machiavellianism correlated negatively with ERS and PEF, but these associations disappeared in regression analysis. Primary psychopathy was negatively related to PEF. Secondary psychopathy showed negative relationships with three factors out of four (appraisal of emotions in the self AES; appraisal of emotions in others, AEO; emotional regulation of the self, ERS) and with both factors of the two-factor model (PEF, PEC).

Table 3.2

Zero-order correlations and standardized regression coefficients using the Dark Triad to predict subdimensions of Trait EI.

				$r\ (\beta)$			
Dark Triad	Trait EI	AES	AEO	ERS	UEPS	PEF	PEC
Machiavellianism	-.13 (.05)	-.10 (.02)	.01 (.10)	-.23** (-.13)	-.01 (.17)	-.18* (.03)	.01 (.07)
Narcissism	.29*** (.33***)	.07 (.06)	.28*** (.25**)	.29*** (.33***)	.20* (.28***)	.27*** (.34***)	.26** (.21*)
Leadership/ Authority	.21* (.17*)	.02 (.02)	.30*** (.29***)	.15* (.10)	.07 (.04)	.14 (.10)	.28*** (.27***)
Grandiose Exhibitionism	.19* (.14)	.03 (.02)	.11 (.04)	.23** (.20*)	.15* (.14)	.20* (.17*)	.11 (.04)
Primary psychopathy	-.12 (-.16)	-.09 (-.01)	.05 (.02)	-.13 (-.08)	-.13 (-.31**)	-.20* (-.25*)	.06 (.07)
Secondary psychopathy	-.38*** (-.33***)	-.35*** (-.35***)	-.35*** (-.38***)	-.33*** (-.25**)	-.11 (-.07)	-.34*** (-.26**)	-.35*** (-.39***)

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

In their relationship with global empathy, with the exception of secondary psychopathy, all DT traits had negative correlations. However, after controlling for the shared variance, only primary psychopathy ($\beta = -.45$, $t = -4.24$, $p < .001$) and the Leadership/Authority facet of narcissism ($\beta = -.30$, $t = -3.52$, $p < .01$) predicted lower overall empathy (*Table 3.3*).

Further, primary psychopathy showed negative associations in relation to all subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). Narcissism and Leadership/Authority had lower personal distress (PD). Leadership/Authority was negatively, whereas Grandiose Exhibitionism positively related to the fantasy scale (FS).

Secondary psychopathy had a negative relationship with perspective-taking (PT) and empathic concern (EC), but a positive relationship with personal distress (PD). Although there was a negative correlation between Machiavellianism and empathic concern (EC), this association was not present in regression analysis. Nevertheless, regression revealed a positive relationship between Machiavellianism and perspective-taking (PT) ($\beta = .20$, $t = 1.96$, $p = .05$).

Table 3.3

Zero-order correlations and standardized regression coefficients using the Dark Triad to predict subdimensions of empathy.

	Empathy	PT	FS	EC	PD
			r (β)		
Dark Triad					
Machiavellianism	-.16* (.13)	-.11 (.20*)	-.01 (.16)	-.29*** (-.03)	-.06 (-.01)
Narcissism	-.17* (-.03)	-.08 (.02)	-.01 (.07)	-.07 (.06)	-.32*** (-.25**)
Leadership/Authority	-.26** (-.30***)	-.14 (-.16*)	-.12 (-.18*)	-.13 (-.14)	-.33*** (-.34***)
Grandiose Exhibitionism	.05 (.13)	.03 (.07)	.15* (.20*)	.01 (.04)	-.06 (.03)
Primary psychopathy	-.39*** (-.45***)	-.32*** (-.39***)	-.15* (-.27*)	-.41*** (-.38***)	-.19* (-.19*)
Secondary psychopathy	-.11 (-.01)	-.25** (-.19*)	-.06 (-.03)	-.21* (-.08)	.22** (.28***)

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

3.8   Discussion

Results from the present study provide support for the proposed hypothesis that each DT trait, moreover, each facet of each trait, reflect a unique pattern of emotional deficiencies. Consistent with predictions and previous research, narcissism was associated with enhanced trait EI and with low levels of personal distress. Primary psychopathy showed an overall empathy deficit, while secondary psychopathy was linked to an overall trait EI deficit. As for Machiavellianism, the only significant relationship that remained after controlling for the other DT traits was a weak positive association with perspective-taking.

3.8.1   *Narcissism: High emotional intelligence, no distress*

There are at least two possible explanations for the finding that narcissistic individuals showed higher levels of trait EI. First, this result may be due to the positive self-presentation, excessive belief in self-worth, and self-enhancement, which lead narcissistic individuals to consistently overrate their abilities. Supporting this idea, narcissism has been found to show lower levels of ability EI, particularly in men (Jauk et al., 2016), and adolescents (Zhang et al., 2015). Second, it is possible that individuals high in narcissism possess elevated trait EI and use it to satisfy their desire for attention and adulation in their social interactions.

This way trait EI can serve as a tool for narcissists to exploit and manipulate their environment (Delic et al., 2011; Jonason & Kroll, 2015; Raskin & Terry, 1988). Overrating their abilities and using emotional manipulation in seeking for others' admiration might be evolutionary advantageous for such individuals in their mating behavior, therefore selection could favor the development of trait EI.

The fact that individuals high in narcissism did not show empathy and had lower levels of personal distress provided further support to the idea that narcissistic individuals do not care about others' emotions in a socially expected way. In contrast, they seem to use their understanding about the needs and feelings of others to serve their own ego; to get what they want from others and to bolster their own feelings of self-worth (Paulhus & Jones, 2015; Petrides et al. 2011).

Our results revealed differences between the particular facets of narcissism. Leadership/Authority showed lower levels of general empathy and personal distress. Consistent with our prediction, Leadership/Authority had lower levels of fantasy, while Grandiose Exhibitionism was associated with higher levels of fantasy. The grandiose facet of narcissism also had a positive relationship with positive emotional functioning. On the contrary, leadership-oriented narcissism was related to perceived emotional competence.

One potential explanation for these results may be that grandiose narcissists pretend to care about others in order to fulfill their need for admiring attention from others (Houlcroft et al., 2012; Jonason & Kroll, 2015). On the other hand, leadership-oriented narcissists might not fantasize about being admired by others, instead, their low levels of distress and high levels of emotional competence facilitate their social success. These results emphasize the importance of putting more focus on the heterogeneous nature of narcissism in further research.

3.8.2 *Machiavellianism: Motivated to take the perspective of others*

Although correlation analyses showed some emotional and empathy deficiencies of Machiavellian individuals, after controlling for the shared variance among the DT traits these associations disappeared, and regression revealed a single positive relationship between perspective-taking and Machiavellianism.

A previous study has suggested that those high in Machiavellianism, unlike those high in psychopathy, can see others' perspectives, but tend to act selfishly nonetheless (Jones & Paulhus, 2011). Another study has shown that Machiavellian individuals were more motivated to take others' perspectives in a picture task depicting social scenarios (Esperger & Bereczkei, 2012). As it will be discussed later, although Machiavellians' mindreading ability in general does not exceed the average of a population, in particular, perspective taking may play an important role in making predictions on partners' probable behavior. This could be part of the cognitive device of manipulation skills Machiavellians might apply, as the Machiavellian Intelligence hypothesis proposes (Bereczkei, 2018; *see also 2.2.2*).

This finding of Machiavellians' propensity for perspective-taking appears to be consistent with the results of neuroimaging studies that found elevated activity in Machiavellian individuals' inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), in the phase when they made their decisions in a social dilemma task (Bereczkei, Deak, Papp, Perlaki, & Orsi, 2013; Bereczkei et al., 2015). The IFG is known to play a role in cognitive processes that are related to perspective-taking and analyzing the intentionality of the partners' behavior. Furthermore, Machiavellians were found to permanently monitor their partners in a social dilemma situation and adjust their decisions to other players' actual behavior (Bereczkei & Czibor, 2014; Czibor & Bereczkei, 2012).

3.8.3 *Primary psychopathy: Lack of empathy, no distress*

In accordance with previous studies and the predictions in this study, results confirmed the major importance of primary psychopathy to empathy. Analyses revealed an overall empathy deficit, that is, failures in both cognitive and affective dimensions. It is possible that the lack of empathy facilitates the harmful behavior of primary psychopaths, because responding emotionally to the victims would inhibit their successful exploitation (Ali et al., 2009; Jonason & Krause, 2013).

Further, our results revealed that those high in primary psychopathy did not exhibit personal distress, as did those high in secondary psychopathy, which is consistent with the idea that primary psychopaths do not experience negative emotions. Research has also demonstrated that primary psychopathic individuals not only failed to show distress, but, unlike secondary psychopaths, they also responded with positive affect to pictures of sad faces (Ali et al., 2009).

Although the lack of empathy may be a kind of deficit, it can be advantageous in deceiving and exploiting others. Thus, the inability to share emotions with others may help psychopaths to ignore or inhibit their own emotions, which can serve for others' exploitation.

3.8.4 *Secondary psychopathy: Low emotional intelligence, high distress*

Contrary to primary psychopathy, the secondary facet of psychopathy showed an overall deficit in EI. This finding has important implications. Poor emotion perception and recognition might

evoke such negative outcomes as aggression and impulsivity, that is, features characteristic of the construct of secondary psychopathy (Ali et al., 2009; Jones & Paulhus, 2011).

Secondary psychopaths also showed low levels of empathy with respect to perspective-taking and empathic concern, although they possessed elevated levels of personal distress. Supporting research has demonstrated that secondary psychopathic individuals have difficulties in regulating their moods and repairing negative emotions (Malterer et al., 2008).

On this basis, I can argue that the limited emotional capacities of these individuals may result in hostile reactivity (Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008; Poythress & Skeem, 2005). In other words, those high in secondary psychopathy may cause harm to others as a reaction, in response to their negative emotion. To summarize the above findings of the two facets of psychopathy, evidence supports that primary and secondary traits are uniquely related to emotionality.

3.8.5 *Evidence for positive and neutral EI*

In this study, no link has been found between Machiavellianism and the positive/neutral dimensions—positive emotional functioning/perceived emotional competence—of trait EI. The present study extended previous work of O'Connor and Athota (2013) by utilizing their two-factor model, employing the measure to all dark personalities. Although Machiavellianism was unrelated, primary psychopathy showed a deficit in the positive component but not in the neutral component, indicating that primary psychopathic individuals did not have major difficulties in emotion recognition (Ali et al., 2009; Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008).

In contrast, secondary psychopathy affected both components of trait EI negatively, whereas narcissism positively. These findings clearly demonstrate different patterns between the emotionally confused secondary psychopaths and the emotionally (over)confident narcissists. Taken together, the current research provides support for the theory that the various DT traits manage their interpersonal relations in different socially aversive ways.

3.8.6   *Limitations and future directions*

Some limitations of this study should be noted regarding the use of a small, majority female, undergraduate sample. Further, self-report measures were applied that relate to the self-reported frequency of perceived emotional capabilities and willingness to empathize with others or to see situations from others' perspectives, but cannot reveal the actual abilities. Only two dimensions of the NPI were involved in the analysis of the results because of the poor psychometric properties of the third dimension.

Future studies should examine how individuals high in DT traits differ in their exploitative behavior. Examination of EI in realistic contexts would be necessary to better understand how and in which situations EI and emotional manipulation is deployed. Thus, future research should include tests that provide a measure of performance-based EI or empathy by applying various types of visual stimuli, short videos, silent films, or sound recordings (e.g. Banziger, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2009; Schlegel, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2014). It is also important to examine the relationships between the different traits and subfacets of DT and ability EI. Also, the role of gender in emotional competences of dark personalities should be further explored.

In conclusion, we have demonstrated that unique emotional shortages of dark personality traits are, even on the facet level, distinguishable. The different ways on how primary and secondary psychopathic individuals or grandiose and leadership-oriented narcissists experience emotions may underlie the various manipulative strategies of the DT traits.

4   Sounds like manipulation

Theory

The primary purpose of the study that was introduced in the previous chapter was to further discover the potential individual differences among DT traits in their relation to emotionality. Previous research has repeatedly demonstrated emotional deficiencies, such as a lack of empathy (Jonason & Krause, 2013; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012), although evidence has also shown a tendency for dark personalities to utilize emotional skills in service of their manipulative acts (Austin et al., 2007; Nagler et al., 2014).

I therefore argued that the relationships between EI, empathy, and the various dimensions of DT traits should be more complex. Consequently, dark personalities could display different forms of emotional skills and impairments. Another set of abilities concerns the cognitive assessment of others' intentions that will be investigated in the next two chapters.

4.1   Reading minds to manipulate

Mindreading, or theory of mind (ToM), is the ability to read the thoughts and emotions of others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; *see also 2.1.1*). This ability may be particularly advantageous in situations when individuals have selfish goals. Theoretically speaking, understanding others' emotional and mental states would have benefits for those who want to successfully cooperate with others, but also for those who want to manipulate others in social interactions (Cheney, & Seyfarth, 2008).

In general, this assumption suggests that reading others' minds from behavioral cues is an effective social tool to predict other people's future behavior in order to use this understanding to take advantage on them. Although mentally connecting with others is useful for empathy, it may also be useful in serving one's own selfish needs. People who effectively engage ToM processes would achieve their interpersonal goals most efficiently. In this way, efficient mindreaders would remain one step ahead of others and successfully mislead them in their interpersonal interactions (Bereczkei, 2017; Esperger & Bereczkei, 2012).

Therefore, many authors assumed that without advanced ToM successful manipulation is unlikely (Lyons et al., 2010; McIlwain, 2003; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007).

Evolutionary theorists have discussed the origins of mindreading in relation to both cooperative and manipulative behaviors. For example, Humphrey (1976, 1983) argued that mindreading evolved in humans to enable to make predictions about others' behavior. This evolved ability further enabled them to choose the most adaptive strategy in social interactions. Byrne and Whiten (1988; Byrne, 2018) called this kind of social intelligence "Machiavellian intelligence" (*for a review see 2.2.2*).

Similarly, theorists have argued that the coexistence of cooperative and deceptive strategies leads to a coevolutionary "arms race" (Dawkins & Krebs, 1979; Trivers, 1985). Thus, the emergence of more finely tuned deceptive skills generate of more finely tuned ways to identify deception. Furthermore, as Mealey (1995) has argued, a manipulative strategy can be successful using only ToM, without emotional empathizing. This latter argument highlights the importance of distinguishing between different components of mindreading ability.

4.2   A nomothetic approach

It is important to distinguish between the two basic dimensions of social cognition (e.g. Kalbe et al., 2010; Lyons et al., 2010; *see also Chapter 2*). In brief, hot cognition refers to the capacity to make inferences about others' feelings and emotional states, i.e. empathizing (Baron-Cohen & Weelwright, 2004), whereas cold cognition refers to the capacity to make inferences about others' knowledge and mental states, i.e. mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 2006).

Theory suggests that there are individual differences in how people use their mindreading ability along these two dimensions (McIlwain, 2003; Mealey, 1995; Stietz, Jauk, Krach, & Kanske, 2019). Thus, an idiographic, empathizing approach to others might be effective in cooperative long-term partnerships (Mealey, 1995). However, this approach is also likely to make people vulnerable to exploitation by others who use a nomothetic, mentalizing approach in their personal relationships to pursue selfish needs.

This argument is in line with those theoretical arguments that suggest that motivational and situational variables highly determine how people take others' perspectives and mental states (Apperly, 2012; Stietz et al., 2019). Taken together, these arguments suggest that individuals vary in their ability to attribute mental states to others, depending on their preference to use a more emotional or a more cognitive approach in predicting others' behaviors.

4.3 Understanding manipulative intentions

In accordance with theory, research has found that mindreading ability is important in building social relationships, such as by enhancing connections with EI and empathy (Ferguson & Austin, 2010; Nettle & Liddle, 2008). However, research on the relationship between ToM and manipulative behavior has either found negative or null results (Lyons et al., 2010; McIlwain, 2003; Vonk et al., 2015). Thus, although theory suggests that our ability to attribute mental states to others can serve both coalitional and selfish goals, empirical research has only found strong support for the former relationship. For example, research has demonstrated positive correlations with empathy (Ibanez et al., 2013), EI (Ferguson & Austin, 2010), cooperation (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007), and agreeableness (Nettle & Liddle, 2008).

In contrast, the relationship between ToM and manipulative behavior is equivocal. For example, the majority of research examining dark personality traits have not demonstrated any positive link in spite of a logical and theoretical link that should exist between successful mindreading and manipulation (e.g. Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010; Ames & Kammrath, 2004; Dolan & Fullam, 2004; Esperger & Bereczkei, 2012; Lyons et al., 2010, Richell et al., 2003; Stellwagen & Kerig, 2013; Vonk et al., 2015).

Despite mixed evidence on these ability tests, however, individuals high in DT have reported superior skills in emotional manipulation measured by self-reported questionnaires (Austin et al., 2007; Nagler et al., 2014). Further, studies on children have found some evidence that suggests a link between manipulation (bullying) and social cognition (Andreou, 2004; Hawley, 2003; Sutton & Keogh, 2000; Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 1999).

Taken together, research on the relationship between mindreading and manipulation has not found a positive link when applying methods for assessment of "general" or prosocial ToM abilities. However, it is possible that such ToM tests have failed to activate the specific cognitive processes that normally serve manipulation. This perspective raises the question how the assessment of mental state attribution could be refined in order to gain a deeper insight into the relationship between manipulation and mindreading.

4.4 Measures for mindreading

4.4.1 *Emotion recognition*

There are a number of methods to test more advanced ToM abilities and individual differences among neuro-typical adults. For example, the perception of eye gaze cues (Byom & Mutlu, 2013; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010). In a standard gaze perception task, individuals are shown a face or the eye region of a face and are asked to make inferences about the emotions or mental states of others (*RMET*; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007).

Vocal emotion recognition can also be evaluated with similar tasks using emotional prosody (Trimmer, & Cuddy, 2008). Although such methods are sensitive to variation in neuro-typical adults, they only test a specific dimension of ToM, which is emotion recognition (Oakley, Brewer, Bird, & Catmur, 2016; Turner & Felisberti, 2017).

4.4.2 *Story Tasks*

Other popular methods include story tasks that measure higher-order modalities of mindreading. These tasks require individuals to make judgements about the mental states of story characters. Thus, they are designed to assess more complex ToM concepts in a context-sensitive manner (e.g. *IMT*; Kinderman et al., 1998; *Short Story Task / SST*; Dodell-Feder, Lincoln, Coulson, & Hooker, 2013; *Strange Stories*; Happe, 1994). By putting ToM ability in practical use, these methods are able to capture individual differences. However, the presented stories are typically written in a narrative or descriptive format. Thus, they contain several mental state markers that directly reveal characters' feelings, thoughts, and intentions.

This approach, however, raises several problems for the assessment of ToM. First, mental state terms provide cues for subjects as to what to think about the relationships among characters. Second, these stories contain two levels of mentalization: references to mental states and the subjects' interpretation of the stories. These two levels may lead to confusion.

Further, by providing the narrators' interpretations for participants, such terms prevent them from exclusively relying on their own understanding to perform the task. More specifically, in addition to their own considerations, participants need to rely on the storytellers' interpretation to solve the mindreading tasks.

However, these stories typically present third person omniscient narrators as storytellers. Such storytellers, however, cannot be identified, thus, it is unknown whether narrators within these stories are reliable or not. This may lead to further confusion.

Finally, in order to increase difficulty within such paradigms, researchers apply more difficult tasks and questions. Thus, instead of applying more challenging stimulus materials, such methods target the tasks and increase task difficulty through syntax complexity. However, such tasks impose substantial cognitive demands on working memory and linguistic processing (Apperly, 2010; Byom, & Mutlu, 2013) by using syntactically recursive, embedded thoughts in the assessment of story characters' mental states. Further, these tasks do not typically allow participants to formulate appropriate responses as if they were involved in the situation (Byom, & Mutlu, 2013).

4.4.3   *Realistic presentations*

In an attempt to apply more realistic stimulus materials, more novel methods started to include scripted texts or film stimuli that enable the presentation of dynamic social scenarios (e.g. *The Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition / MASC*; Dziobek et al., 2006; O'Grady, Kliesch, Smith, & Scott-Phillips, 2015). By applying interactive social scenarios, these methods facilitate the mental state assessment of characters in a more realistic way (Turner & Felisberti, 2017). Such tasks typically display everyday social interactions, with prominent themes such as friendship and romance (e.g. Dziobek et al., 2006; O'Grady et al., 2015).

Generally speaking, with the focus on such social themes, the existing methods examine basic and cooperative features of ToM. Thus, no method examines how people detect manipulation in various social interactions. However, testing individual differences in ToM for the assessment of manipulation requires the application of a measure that provides realistic social stimuli as motivation.

4.5 The role of motivation

Most research on mindreading has either focused on sub-level mindreading abilities such as emotion recognition (e.g., *Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test / RMET*; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) or applied more sensitive higher-order tasks that require increased working memory and executive function (e.g. *Imposing Memory Task / IMT;* Kinderman et al., 1998). However, none of these applied methods have focused on the detection of manipulation. Thus, it is likely that previous tasks did not activate specific cognitive processes that normally serve in manipulation.

In particular, allowing participants to freely attend to the mental states of story characters or human actors does not necessary imply that they will do so (Apperly, 2012; Stietz et al., 2019). Thus, an absence of motivation or attention may be a reason why some individuals do not correctly identify the mental states of others. As a consequence, it is possible that individuals dispositionally vary in paying attention to what other people think or feel (Apperly, 2012; Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, & Wheelwright, 2003). Thus, motivation and attention might be important factors to consider in assessing individual differences in mindreading.

Research

4.6   Introduction

Advanced mindreading abilities are involved in understanding various social behaviors, including cooperation, conflict, and manipulation. However, the majority of methods that are used to assess mindreading examine generalized individual differences with cooperative mindreading. Thus, no existing measure assesses how people understand conflicting situations and manipulation in social interactions.

In this chapter the development and validation of the *Conflict Stories Task (CST)* measure is introduced. This audio-based mindreading task involves listening to recordings of dialogue-based stories and answering questions referring to the characters' mental states. The structure, reliability, and validity of this assessment was examined in two samples ($N = 591$).

In both samples theory-driven Confirmatory Factor Analyses revealed that a three factor model with eight stories was the best fit to the data. Together, these results indicate that the *CST* provides efficient, reliable, and valid measure of mindreading ability in relation to conflict and manipulation.

4.6.1   *Present research*

The purpose of this research is to examine mental state assessment in relation to conflict and manipulation. For this purpose, we use a method—the *Conflict Stories Task (CST)*—that enables the detection of manipulation by modeling real social interactions. For this reason, the *CST* applies stories—so-called scripted stories—that contain dialogues with no mental state markers. In this way, no description is provided of characters' mental states (*see Appendix*).

These stories, similarly to typical narrative stories, apply third person omniscient narration. However, this narration only informs subjects of the settings in the stories. In contrast to narrative stories, in scripted stories only the dialogues (conversations among story characters) provide information for the task of mental state assessment.

In addition to the inclusion of the scripted story format, stories of manipulative scenarios are also included. Such manipulative stories provide explicit manipulation tactics specifically serving the exploitation of others. Thus, participants are presented with situations of manipulation involving tricks and tactics which typically lead to successful deception. In this presentation, stimulus materials of the *CST* provide relevant information for mental state assessment in various conflict- and manipulation-related social scenarios.

Consistent with prior theory, empirical results in this study show that the *CST* is an ecologically valid method that is sensitive to individual variation in mindreading. Thus, it may be a valuable addition to measure ToM ability for the detection of manipulative intentions.

4.7 Method

4.7.1 *Participants*

All participants were recruited from the student population of two universities in the United States. Participants were screened to ensure that they were native English speakers. All participants gave informed written consent and received course credit for their participation. The research protocol was approved by the IRB at both universities.

Sample 1. Initially, 411 participants were recruited. After conducting attention checks, 56 participants were excluded from Sample 1 ($N = 355$; women = 116, men = 110; Mean age = 21.50; $SD = 3.37$).

Sample 2. Another 273 participants were recruited. After conducting attention checks, 37 participants were excluded from Sample 2 ($N = 236$; women = 251, men = 104; Mean age = 21.50; $SD = 3.74$).

4.7.2 *Materials*

The *Conflict Stories Task (CST)*. The *CST* measures social cognition through audio stimuli, approaching social interactions in a similar form as they occur in everyday life. Scenes of different complexity were created presenting interactions of two to five characters. Further, no distracting stimuli, such as music or background noise were included.

The stimulus material consisted of fifteen stories. Stories involved complex social situations of conflict and required listeners to understand the perspectives and intentions of the characters. While listening to each story audio, participants could see only the list of characters of the current recording on a screen. Questions concerning story facts and characters' mental states were asked after each story audio.

The *CST* was developed for research in Hungarian language, and exists in the same format in English and in Hungarian (*see Appendix*). The measure is currently used to assess social cognition in relation to dark personality traits in both languages.

4.7.2.1   Types of stories

The stories were presented in two different formats. Narratives were read by a story-teller, and as scripts, acted by multiple story characters. The scripts and narratives were performed by actors and audio-recorded. Scripted stories were divided by type. Each story presented a series of situations involving some kind of conflict, i.e. intentional or unintentional deception or misunderstanding. The presented stories implied different levels of intentionality, thus, understanding required different levels of mindreading according to the complexity of the story.

Narrative Conflict Stories. Five stories of this type were used, taken from previous studies in their original form (Happé, 1994; Kinderman et al., 1998; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). These stories are presented in a descriptive format, thus, they are based on narration. Narrative stories contain no or only occasional dialogues. These stories, however, include several mental state markers (Malle, 1999). Thus, narration explicitly describes characters' thoughts, feelings, and intentions (e.g. "*Esther did not believe this excuse*"; "*They knew that the prisoner did not want to betray his fellows*"). With the application of mental state markers, narrative stories directly reveal the mental states of story characters describing their specific roles in every situation.

Basic Conflict Stories. Five stories of this type were used, also taken from previous studies but subjected to fundamental modifications. Each story was rewritten in a scripted format such that the stories unfolded from dialogues instead of narration. Dialogues were designed to have the

minimum required narration. Consequently, narration in scripted stories objectively describes the settings. No mental state markers were used within any of these stories. Thus, the mental states of story characters were not explicitly described. These stories inform subjects only about characters' communication and their accompanying behavior, similar to everyday experiences. With these modifications, scripted stories provided more realistic stimuli than narrative stories.

Manipulative Conflict Stories. Five stories of this type were created for the present study. These stories were also presented in a scripted format. However, manipulative conflict stories differ from basic conflict stories in that they include a typical tactic of purposeful manipulation. These stories present manipulative tactics, such as flattery, offensive defense, self-victimization and/or rationalization, all of which served the purpose of deception within story characters (Buss, Gomes, Higgins, & Lauterbach, 1987). Manipulative tactics tap various levels of difficulty ranging from explicit lies to multi-level swindles.

4.7.2.2   Types of tasks

Participants were given a questionnaire following each story, which contained tasks assessing participants' understanding of story facts and characters. Questions were designed to assess three modalities: comprehension of story events (i.e., non-mental state content), explicit mental state reasoning regarding story characters' relationships, and cynical versus naïve mental state reasoning regarding participants' attitude to story characters. Further, questions differed in complexity. All questions were presented in a forced-choice format, with each consisting of two alternatives.

Factual Questions. These questions were designed to test participants' ability to remember details of the stories that are unrelated to mental states (N = 28). Thus, the facts of the story and characters' actions were the subjects of questions, without any ToM component.

Control Questions. This factual type of question was used as a baseline measure for general comprehension (e.g. "A) *Lily and Ann were cousins.* B) *Lily and Ann were friends.*").

Memory Questions. This type of question was used to assess memory of factual relationships that required increased attention to story details. Thus, these questions placed higher demands on

memory. (E.g. "A) *Katie, from what she said, had seen Grace with Paul on Thursday.* B) *Katie, from what she said, had seen Grace with Paul on Friday.*").

Mental Questions. These questions required participants to make inferences about story characters' mental states (N = 81). Therefore, the only differences between correct and incorrect statements involved differences in ToM attribution (e.g. 'wanted' vs. 'didn't want'). Mental questions, similarly to memory questions, tapped various levels of difficulty. First order questions referred to what one story character thought about another character's mental state. Second order questions referred to what multiple characters thought about each other.

Recursive Questions. This type of mental questions specified characters by name and presented their mental states by revealing their individual perspectives. In their presentation, multiple characters' perspectives were combined and embedded into each other in recursion. Recursion by definition, is the repetition of a given feature, with each repetition embedded inside the previous one (Karlsson, 2010). Recursive questions were applied because they are typical type of questions for ToM assessment (e.g. Kinderman et al., 1998; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). (E.g. "A) *John thought that Penny knew what Sheila wanted to do*. B) *John thought that Penny did not know what Sheila wanted to do.*").

Reasoning Questions. These mental questions were created in order to assess reason explanations. Such explanations are the most commonly used form of how people explain intentional actions in everyday scenarios (Malle, 1999). Thus, story characters' mental states were assessed in reference to the situation itself by using reasoning statements. In order to place fewer demands on working memory, reasoning questions only named the protagonist. Other characters were specified by their role played in the situation. (E.g. „A) *Andrea was relieved because her mother did not punish her severely for damaging her car.* B) *Andrea was relieved because her mother did not come to realize that she had damaged her car.*")

Cynical Questions. Finally, a measure of participants' attitudes to story characters was introduced (N = 8). In particular, these questions were designed to assess participants' willingness to

exonerate or forgive the manipulator. Thus, one of the presented statements reflected a sincere attitude towards the protagonist and the situation, whereas the other statement represented a suspicious view. However, either choice may be seen as valid according to the presented story. (E.g. "A) *Andrea was threatening and accusing her mother because she wanted to get a smaller punishment.* B) *Andrea was threatening and accusing her mother because she wanted her mother to pay more attention to her.*").

4.7.3 Procedure

For Sample 1, data collection was conducted both in a lab and via online as part of larger ongoing studies investigating social cognition in neuro-typical student samples. After these tasks, participants completed general demographics and personality questionnaires. However, because of the focus on refining the ToM tasks, here these measures will not be discussed further *(see Chapter 5)*.

After completing all procedures, participants were debriefed and compensated for their time. Each participant listened to, and was tested on, all fifteen stories in Sample 1 and on all ten *CST* stories in Sample 2. Thus, Sample 2 consisted only of dialogue-based stories. Participants were first presented with the audio stimulus. They were allowed to listen to the stories as many times as they wanted before proceeding to the questions. However, after the questions were displayed, participants could not go back to the story again.

The stories were presented in randomized order. For each question, two statements were shown on the screen, presenting the two forced choice options for that question. After making a selection and moving on to the next story audio, participants were not able to return to the questions.

4.7.4 Data analysis

Narrative stories (Stories 1, 7, 9, 12, 15) served for comparison purposes only, given that they are the established and most frequently used approach to ToM assessment. Scripted stories were hypothesized to fall into one of two categories: basic conflict (Stories 2, 3, 5, 11, 14), and manipulative (Stories 4, 6, 8, 10, 13). Thus, the primary interest was in differentiating manipulative

from basic conflict stories. As a result, narrative stories were not included in our Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) approach.

Performance in the factual and mental tasks was measured through the number of correct answers with the exception of the cynical mental task. This task was analyzed separately because it did not include true and false statements. Instead, the frequencies of chosen cynical statements were calculated. The time spent listening to each story was recorded. Similarly, the number of clicks on each page of the questionnaire was also recorded. Cases where participants spent less time listening to the story audio than the length of the given recording were excluded.

4.8   Results

Alpha reliabilities for the *CST* were .69 and .77 in the two samples. Means and standard deviations for factual and mental questions of each story are reported in *Table 4.1*. In order to evaluate concurrent validity of the *CST*, performance on factual and mental questions was examined with the narrative conflict stories in Sample 1. As expected, correlations among all types of factual and mental questions were statistically significant (*Table 4.2*).

The frequency of chosen cynical statements was also positively correlated with the performance on factual and mental questions of narrative stories and *CST* stories, with only one exception. Specifically, performance on the recursive questions of narrative stories was unrelated to the frequency of chosen cynical answers.

Table 4.1

Descriptive Statistics for all CST Stories in two Samples (Sample 2)

	N	Factual questions				Recursive mental questions				Reasoning mental questions			
		Min	Max	Mean	Std	Min	Max	Mean	Std	Min	Max	Mean	Std
Story 2	349 (236)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.80 (1.70)	0.42 (0.54)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.93 (1.79)	0.30 (0.49)	1 (0)	3 (3)	2.96 (2.70)	0.22 (0.65)
Story 3	346 (234)	0 (0)	1 (1)	0.38 (0.44)	0.49 (0.50)	0 (0)	3 (3)	2.38 (2.33)	0.71 (0.73)	0 (0)	3 (3)	2.67 (2.53)	0.78 (0.87)
Story 4	332 (233)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.60 (1.47)	0.58 (0.66)	0 (0)	3 (3)	1.94 (1.82)	0.77 (0.89)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.38 (1.38)	0.60 (0.66)
Story 5	337 (233)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.51 (1.33)	0.63 (0.72)	0 (0)	3 (3)	2.42 (2.27)	0.76 (0.90)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.60 (1.39)	0.57 (0.65)
Story 6	328 (232)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.25 (1.24)	0.55 (0.65)	0 (0)	3 (3)	1.02 (1.49)	1.05 (1.10)	0 (0)	3 (3)	1.42 (1.63)	0.83 (0.91)
Story 8	314 (231)	0 (0)	3 (3)	2.26 (2.17)	0.76 (0.82)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.59 (1.49)	0.59 (0.65)	0 (0)	3 (3)	2.49 (2.03)	0.77 (1.00)
Story 10	312 (230)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.79 (1.57)	0.43 (0.65)	0 (0)	3 (3)	1.94 (1.87)	0.85 (0.89)	0 (0)	3 (3)	1.88 (1.85)	0.85 (0.86)
Story 11	315 (229)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.56 (1.26)	0.61 (0.74)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.78 (1.53)	0.46 (0.66)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.65 (1.44)	0.61 (0.71)
Story 13	302 (229)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.80 (1.50)	0.49 (0.67)	0 (0)	3 (3)	1.98 (1.89)	0.88 (0.88)	0 (0)	3 (3)	2.72 (2.21)	0.62 (1.00)
Story 14	304 (229)	0 (0)	2 (2)	1.71 (1.40)	0.42 (0.73)	0 (0)	3 (3)	2.60 (2.32)	0.68 (0.87)	0 (0)	3 (3)	2.43 (2.12)	0.73 (0.96)
Cronbach's alphas	.69 (.77)												

Table 4.2

Correlations between factual and mental questions of CST Stories and Narrative Conflict Stories in Sample 1

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Narrative Factual (control, memory)					
2. Narrative Mental (recursive, reasoning)	.31** (.23**, .29**)				
3. CST Factual (control, memory)	.22** (.23**, .16**)	.38** (.27**, .33**)			
4. CST Mental (recursive, reasoning)	.16** (.13*, .16**)	.39** (.25**, .37**)	.45** (.37**, .42**)		
5. CST Cynical choices	.19** (.24**, .15**)	.19** (.07, .28**)	.25** (.19**, .18**)	.26** (.18**, .28**)	

*p < .05. **p < .01.

4.8.1 *Three factor structure*

Because of *a priori* predictions with respect to the factor structure of the two types of scripted stories, an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) would be here inappropriate. As a result, the two-factor model was directly tested using a CFA with the predicted two-factor solution. As can be seen in *Table 4.3*, the fit of two items were low and non-significant. Specifically, Story 4 in the manipulative set, and Story 2 in the basic conflict set. Further, the loadings of stories 6 and 10, although significant, loaded sub-optimally (i.e., less than .32) on the manipulative factor. Modification indices suggested that Stories 6 and 10 belonged on a separate factor. Thus, the model was re-run with three factors.

The resulting model was a fit (*see Tables 4.4 and 4.5*), with four Basic Conflict and four Manipulative Conflict Stories. Each two of the manipulative stories shared a common core of difficulty, and were placed on separate factors: Easy Manipulative (Stories 8 & 13) and Hard Manipulative (Stories 6 & 10). Thus, the results indicate that scripted stories broke into distinctive factors that, although correlated, tapped different aspects of mindreading, with further distinctions between manipulative stories by difficulty.

Table 4.3

Reasoning Mental Tasks: Theory Based Confirmatory Factor Analysis.

	Manipulative	Basic Conflict
Manipulative Story 6	.23*	
Manipulative Story 10	.25*	
Manipulative Story 8	.48*	
Manipulative Story 13	.50*	
Manipulative Story 4	.13	
Basic Conflict Story 3		.32*
Basic Conflict Story 5		.36*
Basic Conflict Story 11		.50*
Basic Conflict Story 14		.47*
Basic Conflict Story 2		.06

Note: *$p < .05$ for loadings. $\chi^2 = 36.97$, $p = .333$

Table 4.4

Reasoning Mental Tasks: Confirmatory Factor Analyses.

	Hard Manipulative	Easy Manipulative	Basic Conflict
Manipulative Story 6	.32* (.52*)		
Manipulative Story 10	.34* (.53*)		
Manipulative Story 8		.44* (.69*)	
Manipulative Story 13		.49* (.77*)	
Basic Conflict Story 3			.35* (.28*)
Basic Conflict Story 5			.37* (.41*)
Basic Conflict Story 11			.49* (.55*)
Basic Conflict Story 14			.45* (.69*)

Note: Exploratory sample $\chi^2 = 17.55$, $p = .418$; Confirmatory Sample $\chi^2 = 25.84$, $p = .077$. Confirmatory sample is in parentheses.

Table 4.5

Recursive Mental Tasks: Confirmatory Factor Analyses

	Hard Manipulative	Easy Manipulative	Basic Conflict
Manipulative Story 6	.11 (.20)		
Manipulative Story 10	.30* (.53*)		
Manipulative Story 8		.42* (.52*)	
Manipulative Story 13		.21 (.40*)	
Basic Conflict Story 3			.23* (.15)
Basic Conflict Story 5			.42* (.43*)
Basic Conflict Story 11			.40* (.50*)
Basic Conflict Story 14			.57* (.57*)

Note: Exploratory sample $\chi^2 = 17.55$, $p = .418$; Confirmatory Sample $\chi^2 = 25.84$, $p = .077$. Confirmatory sample is in parentheses.

We then merged the two samples. First, we analyzed factual and mental scores in relation to gender. Scores for factual questions had no significant correlation with gender (Basic Conflict Stories: $r = .03$, $p = .44$; Easy Manipulative Stories: $r = .01$, $p = .92$; Hard Manipulative Stories: $r = .05$, $p = .21$). As for mental questions, women scored significantly higher on tasks of the Easy Manipulative Stories (recursive questions: $r = .14$, $p = 0.01$; reasoning questions: $r = .09$, $p = 0.3$). Similarly, women scored higher on the recursive questions of the Basic Conflict Stories ($r = .12$, $p = 0.04$). Next, performance on recursive and reasoning questions was further analyzed at each levels of mindreading (first order to third order; *see Figure 4.1*).

Basic Conflict Stories

Manipulative Stories

Figure 4.1.   *Mean mental scores for recursive and reasoning questions at each level of mindreading.*

Error bars depict standard error of the mean. All interactions are significant.

Mean scores were lower for manipulative stories than for basic conflict stories. Mean scores were generally lower for recursive questions than for reasoning questions. Performance on the factual and mental questions of the three types of stories were correlated with each other, with the strongest relationships between the mental questions of easy manipulative and basic conflict stories (*see Table 4.6*). Further, frequencies of cynical answers were analyzed in relation to mental performance (*Table 4.6*). The strongest relationships were found between cynical answers and mental scores of the two types of manipulative stories (easy and hard).

Table 4.6

Correlations between factual and mental questions for different types of CST Stories

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Factual HM (control, memory)									
2. Factual EM (control, memory)	.29** (.14*, .18**)								
3. Factual BC (control, memory)	.39** (.36**, .26**)	.39** (.22**, .33**)							
4. Mental HM (recursive, reasoning)	.13* (.07, .15**)	.17** (.12*, .18**)	.10* (.02, .15**)						
5. Mental EM (recursive, reasoning)	.42** (.20**, .44**)	.43** (.28**, .40**)	.51** (.30**, .50**)	.19** (.15**, .20**)					
6. Mental BC (recursive, reasoning)	.47** (.43**, .41**)	.39** (.35**, .36**)	.44** (.35**, .44**)	.15** (.06, .21**)	.58** (.30**, .54**)				
7. Cynical HM	.22** (.21**, .17**)	.25** (.12*, .25**)	.34** (.30**, .27**)	.33** (.20**, .32**)	.33** (.20**, .32**)	.26** (.19**, .27**)			
8. Cynical EM	.26** (.27**, .20**)	.21** (.14*, .20**)	.32** (.28**, .26**)	.43** (.23**, .44**)	.43** (.23**, .44**)	.35** (.26**, .36**)	.32**		
9. Cynical BC	.13* (.10*, .12*)	.02 (.03, .02)	.13* (.11*, .06)	-.04 (-.06, -.01)	.15** (.05, .18**)	.17** (.14*, .16**)	.02	.10*	

*p < .05. **p < .001. BC = basic conflict. EM = easy manipulative. HM = hard manipulative.

4.9 Discussion

In the present study, the descriptive and psychometric properties of a new assessment of mindreading were demonstrated. Unlike previous narrative story approaches, the *CST* measure includes voice recordings of scripted stories that provide realistic stimuli, including those with explicit manipulation. Thus, compared to narrative approaches, this measure relies more heavily on individuals' ability to assess mental states from conversations among story characters.

By avoiding the usage of mental state markers in scripted stories, instead of explicitly telling mental states of characters, only their interactions are presented. As a consequence, participants need to rely exclusively on their own understanding to perform the ToM tasks.

4.9.1 *The complexity of manipulative intentions*

In factor analyses it was further demonstrated that scripted stories systematically fell into discrete categories that are theoretically coherent: Basic Conflict Stories and Manipulative Conflict Stories. Manipulative stories further cluster based on difficulty, with the two more difficult stories (Stories 6 & 10) falling on one factor, and the less complicated stories (more easily detectable manipulative tactics) falling on a second factor (Stories 8 &13). Thus, these stories imply different levels of complexity with regard to manipulative intentions.

This addition of manipulation assessment further expands our knowledge of ToM by expanding it into the realm of detecting intentional deception. Thus, these findings have implications for using this approach in understanding which individuals may be most able to correctly identify others' intentions in conflict situations and detect a manipulation attempt.

4.9.2 *Cynicism and manipulation*

The current data provide additional evidence that individuals who have a cynical attitude towards story characters perform better on conflict-related ToM tasks. This empirical evidence supports the theory that motivation might play an important role in advanced mindreading (Apperly, 2012; Baron-Cohen et al., 2003). In particular, those who approach conflict situations with a cynical

attitude might be able to recognize others' selfish and manipulative intentions more readily. Specifically, some individuals may be better at detecting manipulation, even if the task requires participants to identify subtle manipulation in dialogues.

4.9.3 *Recursive vs reasoning questions*

Differing associations were observed between recursive and reasoning mental questions. As expected, the overall performance was increased for reasoning questions. Depending on these results and former theory I argue that this finding is because reasoning questions were designed to impose fewer cognitive demands on working memory and cognitive processing. In particular, reason explanations can directly answer the question: What was the reason behind the act? When providing reason explanations, people recall those mental states that, according to their best knowledge, motivated the agent to form the intentional act (Malle, 2001). Thus, the application of reasoning questions provides a more naturalistic way of mental state assessment.

4.9.4 *Limitations and future directions*

Some of the limitations to the present research are that only student samples were used that represent a subgroup of healthy neuro-typical adults. Another possible limitation is that in the absence of a "gold standard" measure of ToM ability, the *CST* was compared to other story tasks that measure higher-order modalities, but no sub-level ToM abilities like emotion recognition. Future research should investigate the relationship between conflict-related ToM and dark personality traits (*see Chapter 5*).

Possible future application of the *CST* involves research on different age groups of neuro-typical adults, and also clinical populations such as individuals with Asperger syndrome, schizophrenia, or borderline personality disorder. Future research should examine convergent and discriminant correlations of ToM, verbal IQ, and working memory with existing measures.

In sum, the *CST* represents a new task for assessing ToM ability in relation to various conflict situations, including explicit manipulation. By applying story audio, the task provides realistic stimulus for the mental state assessment of story characters. The present study demonstrated

that the *CST* is sensitive to individual differences, and correlates with other well-established

measures—narrative story tasks and recursive tasks—of ToM ability.

5   Who knows who is being manipulated?

Theory

Although the traits that make up the DT—Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy—have unique features, they share some common characteristics (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Chief among these characteristics is a propensity to manipulate (Jones & Figueredo, 2013), deceive (Jones & Paulhus, 2017), and exploit others (Jonason et al., 2009; Jonason & Webster, 2010). Since manipulation is one of the core features of all members of the DT, a crucial empirical question concerns the relationship between ToM and Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism.

However, one issue that has emerged in the DT literature is whether or not these three traits have the same style of manipulation (Jonason & Webster, 2012; Jones & Paulhus, 2010; Szabo & Bereczkei, 2017, *see also Chapter 2 and Chapter 3*). And, more specifically, different theoretical implications emerged on whether manipulation requires the ability to predict another person's mental state or not. Therefore, the following research was aimed to investigate the human ability for mental state attribution—i.e. mindreading or ToM (Apperly, 2010; Premack & Woodruff, 1978)—among dark personality traits.

5.1   Manipulation skills – or deficits?

There have been two conflicting theoretical implications for the role that mindreading plays in manipulation in line with the attempt to establish the cognitive basis of manipulative behavior. On the one hand, theory suggests that interpersonal manipulation should require some aptitude towards understanding others' mental states in order for successful manipulation to occur (Lyons et al., 2010; McIlwain, 2003; Mealey, 1995). Further, this aptitude should be most present in those high in Machiavellianism, given that they are, theoretically, the most strategic of the three DT traits (Jones, 2016; Jones & Paulhus, 2011b).

On the other hand, however, theory suggests that a deficient understanding of others' mental states might lead to manipulation (Feshbach, 1978; Vonk et al., 2015). Thus, individuals who fail to take others' perspectives are less likely to empathize and therefore more likely to engage in

antisocial behaviors (*see Chapter 2*). Such cognitive deficits should be most present in psychopathy, as this trait is best characterized by reckless or impulsive forms of manipulation (Curtis, Rajivan, Jones, & Gonzalez, 2018).

5.2   Conflicting results for DT

Previous studies on the DT traits showed mixed results when examined the cognitive capacities that are assumingly required for mindreading in manipulation. The failure to find consistent individual differences in these studies may reflect issues of the applied measures for mental state assessment (*see also Chapter 4*).

More specifically, prior empirical work applying general methods for mindreading might have failed to target the specific cognitive skills that are used in assessing manipulation (e.g. Lyons et al., 2010; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007; Vonk et al., 2015). Further, this theoretical implication is supported by evidence based on self-report questionnaires that found increased social cognition in individuals high in DT traits in terms of emotional manipulation (Austin et al., 2007; Nagler et al., 2014).

5.2.1   *Mindreading in Machiavellianism*

The most intensively studied DT member with respect to ToM is Machiavellianism, due to its obvious association with manipulation (McIlwain, 2003). Studies applying various methodologies concluded that, when compared to individuals low in Machiavellianism, individuals high in Machiavellianism have decreased performance on both emotional and cognitive mindreading tasks. For example, subjects were asked to identify the emotions of a person they could see or hear (Al Ain et al., 2013; Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010; Lyons et al., 2010), or to accurately interpret the thoughts, desires, and intentions of characters of various stories (Lyons et al., 2010; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007; Vonk et al., 2015). However, none of these studies suggested that Machiavellians possess above-average abilities in mindreading.

Other research also found that those high in Machiavellianism had average or below average EI and a diminished ability to understand emotions (Austin et al, 2007; Nagler et al., 2014; Szabo & Bereczkei, 2017, *see also Chapter 3*). All these observations led to the theoretical conclusion that

Machiavellianism shows no link with enhanced mindreading abilities. In fact, research has suggested the contrary: Machiavellianism is characterized by cognitive deficits in certain areas of social cognition.

In spite of these cognitive deficits, however, several studies demonstrate that Machiavellians are definitely successful in deceiving others, primarily due to their flexible adaptation to diverse situations of the social environment (Bereczkei, 2017; Bereczkei & Czibor, 2014; Czibor & Bereczkei, 2012; Jones & Paulhus, 2011b).

5.2.2 *Mindreading in psychopathy*

Similar conclusions have been made about the rest of the DT (e.g. Ames & Kammrath, 2004; Dziobek et al., 2006; Richell et al., 2003; Vonk et al., 2015), although psychopathy and narcissism have received less attention on the topic of mindreading. Nevertheless, research has also demonstrated a negative association between psychopathy (both primary and secondary) and mindreading abilities, such as the ability to decipher a mental state from facial expressions, eye regions, and voices (Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010). A more recent study, using tests for measuring different levels of mentalization, has confirmed a negative relationship between scores on the scales of both types of psychopathy and scores of mindreading ability (Vonk et al., 2015).

However, studies that examined clinical populations found no general impairments in mental state attribution for psychopathic individuals (Blair et al., 1996; Richell et al., 2003). In a more recent study, clinical psychopathy in adolescents was only related to reduced levels of automatic ToM, but not of controlled ToM (Sharp & Vanwoerden, 2014).

5.2.3 *Mindreading in narcissism*

Similarly to psychopathy, research found either negative or null-associations between narcissism and ToM. For example, Vonk and colleagues (2015) found a negative association between narcissism (as an overall construct) and mindreading. It is important to note however, that grandiose narcissism had a weak but positive correlation with one index of ToM (*The Hinting Test*). This test measures the ability to assess the lower-order mental states of the speakers.

Nevertheless, narcissism was still not associated with actual performance in either emotion-reading or intention-reading, as measured by the partner's intentions and feelings during interaction (Ames & Kammrath, 2004).

5.3 The role of manipulation strategies

One issue that has emerged in the DT literature to explain conflicting findings related the social skills of this traits is whether or not they have the same style of manipulation (Jones & Paulhus, 2010). Research has shown that Machiavellianism is a more flexible trait than is psychopathy or narcissism (Bereczkei, 2015). Thus, it is entirely possible that Machiavellian individuals respond to situational contexts more readily than do individuals high in the other two DT traits.

5.3.1 *Strategic manipulation*

Machiavellian individuals only engage in manipulation when it serves their long-term interests unlike psychopathic individuals who seek immediate gratification (Jones, 2016; *see also 1.4.2*). Besides, findings suggest that Machiavellians are definitely successful in deceiving others. Early studies already pointed out that Machiavellians are also highly successful in tasks which offer the opportunity to make a profitable deal, form a beneficial coalition or take on a leadership role (Christie & Geis, 1970; Cherulnik & Way, 1981).

Recent studies suggest that Machiavellianism—but not narcissism or psychopathy—is linked to long-term strategy, planning and flexibility (Jones and Paulhus, 2011b; *see also 2.3.1*). Indeed, research has found evidence for strategic manipulation among Machiavellian individuals. For example, Esperger and Bereczkei (2012) found positive associations between spontaneous mentalization and Machiavellianism such that those high in Machiavellianism were more inclined to employ mental terms to describe pictures depicting everyday scenarios.

Further, Machiavellian individuals appear to be more sensitive to cues of social situations. For example, in the Public Goods Game, they calculate with others' previous contributions to the public goods and adjust their own decisions to the behavior of others (Czibor & Bereczkei, 2014).

Moreover, Machiavellian individuals coordinate their behavior depending on the number of altruists and defectors in the group and according to the cooperative or competitive moves of other group members (Bereczkei & Czibor, 2014, Bereczkei et al., 2015).

In sum, these findings suggest that Machiavellians' cognitive and social skills enable them to flexibly adapt to diverse situations of the social environment. Thus, based on these findings and theoretical assumptions, Machiavellian's manipulation strategy is related to the assessment of others' behavior.

5.3.2 *Impulsive manipulation*

In contrast to Machiavellians, individuals high in psychopathy (and narcissism) are associated with grandiose worldviews (Hare, 1996; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001) and justify their behaviors through a sense of entitlement and egocentricity. Compared to individuals high in Machiavellianism, psychopathic individuals do not show advanced expertise in appraising social stimuli and their decisions are less influenced by cues related to others' behavior. Thus, psychopathy, and narcissism, have no theoretical or empirical links with strategic manipulation (Jones & Paulhus, 2017).

Psychopathy is best characterized by reckless or impulsive forms of manipulation aimed at reaching many victims, rather than strategic forms of targeted manipulation (Curtis et al., 2018). Further, psychopathy is related to violent behaviors, short-term thinking and rigidity (Jones & Paulhus, 2011b). According to their emotional deficits, psychopathic individuals are not able to deliberate and choose according to societal norms (Glannon, 1997). Thus, it is less surprising that studies have found a negative association between psychopathy (both primary and secondary) and mindreading abilities. In sum, the manipulative strategy of primary or secondary psychopathic individuals is unlikely to relate to the precise assessment of others' behavior.

5.3.3 *Self-deceptive manipulation*

Similarly to psychopathy, narcissism has no theoretical ties with strategic manipulation. In contrast, narcissistic exploitativeness might be associated with the emotional skills of these

individuals, for example, high trait EI (*see Chapter 3*). In this sense, reading others' emotions could be a useful tool for narcissistic individuals to get what they want. However, it is also possible that they only claim to be emotionally gifted but in fact they are not (e.g. Konrath, Corneille, Bushman, & Luminet, 2013). Thus, their egoistic motivation entails confirming their intellectual superiority (Jones & Paulhus, 2011a; Jones & Paulhus, 2017). Therefore, they are not able to realistically judge their own or others' abilities.

Rather than an instrumental motivation to obtain resources, narcissistic individuals are motivated by self-promotional gains (Jones & Paulhus, 2011a). Moreover, it is possible that these individuals actually believe in their self-biased version of reality (Lockard & Paulhus, 1988; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). As a consequence, their dishonesty is self-deceptive in nature (Grijalva & Zhang, 2016; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003; Paulhus & John, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001). However, such belief in their own lies might facilitate deceiving others (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011).

In line with this, a recent study demonstrated that those high in narcissism were the most self-deceptive individuals and the least dishonest to others among the DT (Jones & Paulhus, 2017). Thus, in sum, the manipulative strategy of narcissistic individuals is strongly related to their self-deceptive bias.

Research

5.4 Introduction

Manipulation and callousness are core elements underlying the DT. However, an important question concerns the role of mindreading, i.e. an understanding of others' mental states, in manipulation. Prior research applying traditional methods has found mixed evidence for the relationship between mindreading and the DT traits. However, a critical issue with such methods is that they may not capture the settings in which manipulative individuals are best conditioned to operate: conversations.

In the series of studies that will be introduced in this chapter, a dialogue-based approach—the *Conflict Stories Task (CST*; *see Chapter 4)*—was applied for mental state assessment. This approach calls for the detection of manipulation. Across three studies (2 lab, 1 online), participants listened to dialogue-based, e.g. scripted stories that presented various situations of conflict and, among them, manipulation.

Regardless of study type (online vs. lab) and culture (Hungarian vs. USA), results showed negative relationships for psychopathy, and especially for primary psychopathy in mental state assessment. However, a significant positive interaction emerged for Machiavellianism, such that those high in both factual accuracy and Machiavellianism recorded increased mentalization performance. Narcissism showed no consistent relationship with mindreading.

The present findings are in line with theoretical indications on different manipulation styles adapted by the three DT traits. Accordingly, these results are in line with the basic assumption of this thesis, i.e. various manipulation strategies of the DT traits might require different cognitive skills and capacities.

5.4.1 *Present research*

The purpose of the studies presented in this chapter is to examine the relationship between manipulation and mindreading. Therefore, a story-audio based method—the *CST*—was applied that enables the detection of manipulation by modeling real social interactions. The *CST* contains stories

that inform participants of what characters say or do and how they behave in a certain situation. However, no description is provided concerning their feelings or thoughts. In this way, situations are presented in a form similar to everyday social contexts. Thus, they approach real-life conditions of mindreading that exist when people engage in actual social interactions.

All stories of the *CST* present a series of situations involving some kind of conflict, i.e. intentional or unintentional deception or misunderstanding. The *CST* also includes so-called manipulative stories, thus, stories that provide explicit manipulation tactics that specifically serve the exploitation of others. In these stories situations of manipulation are presented that involve tricks and tactics which typically lead to successful deception.

5.5   General method

5.5.1   *Materials*

5.5.1.1   *The Conflict Stories Task*

Mental state attribution was assessed by a story task—the *CST*—that was designed to measure mental state attribution in different situations of conflict and manipulation (*see Chapter 4*). The stimulus material consists of eight stories, followed by questions related to the stories. Stories were divided by type and difficulty: basic conflict stories (N = 4), easy manipulative conflict stories (N = 2) and hard manipulative conflict stories (N = 2).

Besides *CST* stories, in Study 1 and Study 2 narrative stories (N = 5) were also included for comparison purposes. Conflict-related narrative stories were used taken from previous studies that assessed mindreading ability (Kinderman et al., 1998; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). These stories were also recorded, read by a storyteller narrator. Both *CST* and narrative stories were followed by the same types of tasks (*Chapter 4*).

5.5.1.2   *Dark Triad Assessments*

Standard Measures. Machiavellianism was assessed with the *Mach-IV* questionnaire (Christie & Geis, 1970). Subclinical psychopathy was measured by the *Levenson Self-Report*

Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995) and subclinical narcissism was assessed by the *Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI*; Raskin & Hall, 1979; see 3.3.2).

Short Dark Triad. In Studies 2 and 3, we also included the *Short Dark Triad (SD3*; Jones & Paulhus, 2014) assessment of the DT. The *SD3* is a 27-item inventory that measures individual levels of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (9 items per factor). Responses are collected on 5-point Likert-scales ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).

5.5.2   *Procedure*

Data collection was conducted in the lab or online. Participants were first presented with the story audio plays. Stories were presented in a fully counterbalanced design. After listening to each story audio, participants moved on to the related tasks. Once the questions were presented, participants could not go back to the story again.

For each question, two statements were shown on the screen, presenting the two forced choice options for that question. After making a selection and moving on to the next story audio, participants were not able to return to the questions. Performance in the factual and mental tasks was measured by the number of correct answers. Participants also completed general demographic and personality questionnaires. After completing the study procedures, participants were debriefed and compensated for their time.

5.6   **Study 1**

5.6.1   *Participants*

Participants were 123 student volunteers who were recruited from the University of Pécs, Hungary (51% women; Mean Age = 21.57, SD = 3.56, 100% White/Euro). Inclusion criteria was fluency in Hungarian.

5.6.2   *Materials and procedure*

Participants performed all measures in person within a laboratory setting. After consent, participants listened to the ToM stories (*CST* and narrative stories) as part of larger ongoing studies

investigating social cognition in a neuro-typical student sample. Each participant listened to, and was tested on, all *CST* and narrative stories.

5.6.3   *Results and discussion*

At first, all variables were correlated (*see Table 5.1*). Replicating previous research, Machiavellianism and primary psychopathy were negatively but not significantly correlated with the traditional narrative approach of ToM assessment. Further, narcissism and secondary psychopathy were uncorrelated with the traditional narrative approach to ToM. None of the DT traits had a significant raw correlation with the *CST*. Next, we conducted two separate regressions on mental questions of narrative stories and *CST* stories with Machiavellianism (*Mach-IV*), primary psychopathy, secondary psychopathy, and narcissism (*NPI*) as predictors.

The results demonstrated that Machiavellianism and narcissism had positive and significant relationships with the mental tasks of the *CST*, but not of the narrative stories (*see Table 5.2*). Further, primary psychopathy showed a significant negative relationship with the mental tasks of the *CST*. Secondary psychopathy was unrelated to ToM ability.

The findings of the first study are consistent with both theoretical implications on the relationship between manipulation and mindreading. Thus, Machiavellianism (and narcissism) had positive associations with mental state assessment of conflict-related scenarios, whereas primary psychopathy had a negative association.

Table 5.1

Study 1. Correlations between CST and Narrative Stories and the Dark Triad

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Machiavellianism						
2. Primary psychopathy	.68***					
3. Secondary psychopathy	.32***	.35***				
4. Narcissism	.24**	.54***	.25**			
5. CST Stories	.12	-.02	.02	.12		
6. Narrative Stories	-.16	-.17	.03	-.03	.39***	

Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 5.2

Study 1-3. All regressions with Standard Dark Triad Measures.

		Scripted Stories			Narrative Stories	
Predictors	*B*	*95%CI*	*p*	*B*	*95%CI*	*p*
Study 1 (n = 123) Standard D3 Measures						
MACH IV	.30*	(.05, .54)	.02	-.09	(-.34, .16)	.46
LEVP	-.34*	(-.62, -.05)	.02	-.17	(-.46, .12)	.24
LEVS	-.02	(-.21, .18)	.88	.10	(-.09, .30)	.29
NPI	.23*	(.02, .45)	.04	.06	(-.16, .27)	.62
Study 2 (n = 334) Standard D3 Measures						
MACH IV	.04	(-.04, .13)	.33	.13*	(.01, .26)	.05
LEVP	-.20*	(-.29, -.11)	.01	-.27*	(-.41, -.14)	.01
LEVS	-.03	(-.11, .05)	.49	-.11	(-.23, .01)	.06
NPI	-.08*	(-.16, -.01)	.03	-.10	(-.21, .02)	.09
Study 2 SD3 Measures						
SD3 Machiavellianism	-.11	(-.23, .02)	.10	-.04	(-.16, .09)	.59
SD3 Psychopathy	.01	(-.12, .14)	.86	-.11	(-.24, .02)	.11
SD3 Narcissism	-.23*	(-.34, .11)	.01	-.08	(-.20, .03)	.16
Study 3 (n = 189) Standard D3 Measures						
MACH IV	.18*	(.00, .36)	.05		-	
LEVP	-.33*	(-.52, -.13)	.01		-	
NPI	-.09	(-.24, .07)	.26		-	
Study 3 SD3 Measures						
SD3 Machiavellianism	.09	(-.07, .26)	.25		-	
SD3 Psychopathy	-.30*	(-.45, -.17)	.01		-	
SD3 Narcissism	-.11	(-.26, .04)	.14		-	

Note: *p < .05.

5.7   Study 2

5.7.1   *Measures*

Study 1 was the first attempt to examine the relationship between the *CST* and the DT. However, there were several key limitations that needed to be dealt with in a replication. The first is that only the standard measures of the DT were used. Although these measures have successfully been used in previous research (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006), similar findings with another set of DT assessments would be advantageous. Next, Study 1 was drawn from a single Eastern European culture. Thus, the findings were extended by drawing a sample from a US border city with primarily Latinx participants. Finally, it is unclear as to whether the tasks can be conducted online, or if a laboratory setting is needed. Thus, in the second study mindreading tasks were examined in both lab and online formats.

5.7.2   *Participants and procedure*

Participants were 355 students at a medium sized southwestern university. A total of 21 participants were removed for failing attention checks within the survey, leaving a total of 334 (70% women, Mean age = 20.86, SD = 3.73, 87% Latinx; 13% other). Among all participants, 42% were run through the study in a laboratory setting, and the other half were run online. Finally, to reduce participant fatigue, the validated *NPI-13* (Gentile et al., 2013) was used rather than the full 40-item *NPI* (Raskin & Terry, 1988).

5.7.3   *Results and discussion*

In Study 2, interaction terms between each DT measure and the sample (dummy coded: 1 = online, 0 = lab) were computed. The two ToM tasks (*CST* and narrative) were regressed on these two main effects and their interaction. Sample had neither a main effect on either ToM task, nor did it interact with any DT trait (the closest was *Mach-IV**sample, which was $\beta = .14$, $p = .058$). Because these two samples revealed no significant differences, they were combined.

Next, all study variables were correlated (*see Table 5.3*). The same two regressions as for Study 1 on the standard DT measures were conducted for the ToM tasks of both the *CST* and narrative

stories. As can be seen in *Table 5.2*, the findings of Study 1 did not replicate. Among the standard DT measures, Machiavellianism was significantly and positively associated with the ToM tasks of narrative stories, whereas primary psychopathy was significantly and negatively associated with narrative ToM. For the *CST*, Machiavellianism was not significant, however, narcissism and primary psychopathy were both significantly and negatively associated. The same regressions were conducted for the *SD3* measures as well, where narcissism was negatively related to ToM (*see Table 5.2*).

Table 5.3

Study 2. Correlations between CST and Narrative Stories and the Dark Triad

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. SD3 Mach									
2. MACH IV	.55***								
3. SD3 Narc	.34***	.26***							
4. NPI	.37***	.33***	.63***						
5. SD3 Psych	.56***	.59***	.37***	.41***					
6. LEVP	.56***	.59***	.36***	.42***	.52***				
7. LEVS	.36***	.45***	.08	.17**	.43***	.44***			
8. CST Stories	-.16**	-.16**	-.24***	-.23***	-.13*	-.31***	-.15**		
9. Narrative Stories	-.16**	-.13*	-.14*	-.22***	-.20***	-.32***	-.21***	.38***	

Note: *p* < .05. **p* < .01. ***p* < .001.

5.7.4 *Exploratory analyses*

One key factor in whether or not ToM can be properly assessed is whether individuals understand the factual information about the stories on which they were assessed. Some individuals may lack the attention or working memory necessary to retain such information. Because of these cognitive constraints, in Study 2 it was tested whether accuracy in factual information retention (i.e., information), moderated the effect of the DT traits in predicting ToM tasks.

Separate regressions were conducted for the *CST* and narrative ToM. Further we conducted separate regressions for the *SD3* measures and the standard DT measures (four regressions in total). Each regression model included the DT variables, information, and all possible interactions with information. The results, regardless of DT assessment used, revealed that only Machiavellianism had a significant positive interaction with information within the *CST* (*see Table 5.4*).

Besides, primary psychopathy as measured with the *LSRP* had a significant negative interaction within the *CST*. No significant interaction was found within the narrative approach. It is important to note that regressing the *CST* test on only Machiavellianism, information, and Machiavellianism*information, the same results emerged for both *SD3* Machiavellianism ($B = .22$, *95%CI = .12, 31, p < .001*; see Figure 5.1), and the *Mach-IV* ($B = .23$, *95%CI = .13, 33, p < .001; see Figure 5.2*).

Table 5.4

Factual accuracy and Dark Triad interactions predicting mindreading accuracy in CST and Narrative Stories. Study 2

	Scripted Stories			Narrative Stories		
Standard Measures	B	95%CI	p	B	95%CI	p
MACH IV	.06	(-.06, .18)	.30	.11	(-.01, .24)	.07
LEVP	-.21*	(-.33,-.08)	.01	-.19*	(-.32, -.06)	.01
LEVS	-.05	(-.15, .06)	.42	-.10	(-.21, .02)	.10
NPI	-.09	(-.20, .01)	.07	-.07	(-.18, .04)	.19
Factual accuracy	.33*	(.23, .44)	.01	.32*	(.21, .44)	.01
MACH IV * Factual accuracy	.27*	(.16, .38)	.01	.06	(-.06, .14)	.34
LEVP * Factual accuracy	-.13*	(-.25, -.01)	.04	-.08	(-.20, .05)	.25
LEVS * Factual accuracy	.02	(-.09, .13)	.71	.03	(-.09, .14)	.65
NPI * Factual accuracy	.02	(-.09, .12)	.79	.03	(-.08, .14)	.56
SD3 Measures						
Machiavellianism	-.04	(-.15, .08)	.55	-.01	(-.12, .12)	.99
Psychopathy	.03	(-.09, .15)	.61	-.09	(-.21, .03)	.15
Narcissism	-.19*	(-.29, -.08)	.01	-.06	(-.17, .05)	.25
Factual accuracy	.36*	(.26, .45)	.01	.37*	(.27, .47)	.01
Machiavellianism * Factual accuracy	.22*	(.10, .34)	.01	.06	(-.07, .19)	.36
Psychopathy * Factual accuracy	-.06	(-.18, .06)	.30	-.01	(-.14, .11)	.83
Narcissism * Factual accuracy	.03	(-.16, .27)	.62	-.09	(-.21, .02)	.11

Note: *p < .05.

Figure 5.1 *SD3 Machiavellianism and Factual Information interaction for Study 2.*

Figure 5.2 *Mach-IV and Factual Information interaction for Study 2.*

In sum, our exploratory analyses revealed that the relationship between Machiavellianism and the *CST* depends on the level of comprehension participants had for factual information. However, this interaction did not emerge for narrative stories, nor were there any interactions with narcissism for either type of story. Thus, it appears that information comprehension may be a critical factor in ensuring that individuals high in Machiavellianism are able to perform well on tasks assessing conflict-related ToM. In contrast, a negative interaction emerged for primary psychopathy indicating that deficits in mental state attribution remained even if these individuals understood the factual information in relation to the conflict scenarios in the stories.

5.8   Study 3

In Study 2, evidence was found that information comprehension moderates the relationship between Machiavellianism and mindreading in understanding conflict and manipulation. However, given the exploratory nature of the analyses and lack of an *a priori* prediction, a replication was vital to building confidence in this finding. Further, Study 3 was preregistered at the Open Science Framework website (DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/34UHM, link: https://osf.io/34uhm).

Several other changes to Study 3 were made. Given that secondary psychopathy from the *LSRP* has consistently predicted little variance, it was dropped for Study 3 in order to shorten the study length. Further, the main interest here was in directly replicating the findings with respect to the *CST* stories. Thus, narrative stories were not included in order to shorten the study length further.

5.8.1   *Participants*

229 students were recruited at a mid-sized northwestern university. A total of 36 participants failed attention checks leaving a final sample of 193 (51% women; Mean Age = 21.57, SD = 3.56, 61% White/Euro, 17% East Asian, 22% Other).

5.8.2 *Measures*

Similar to Study 2, both the *SD3* (Machiavellianism α = .79, narcissism α = .61, psychopathy α = .71), and the standard measures of the DT (*Mach-IV; α = .76; LSRP1; α = .87; NPI-13; α = .70*) were used.

5.8.3 *Results and discussion*

The correlations of Study 3 are presented in *Table 5.5*. With the exception of *Mach-IV*, the DT traits had significant negative raw correlations with the *CST*. Further, regression analyses revealed a significant positive relationship with *Mach-IV* and a significant but negative relationship with psychopathy as measured with both the *LSRP1* and the *SD3* (*Table 5.2*).

Once again, the *CST* was regressed on Machiavellianism, information, and the Machiavellianism*information interaction for both *SD3 Machiavellianism* and *Mach-IV*. A significant interaction emerged once again for both the *SD3 Machiavellianism* (B = .16, 95%CI = .07, .26, p = .001; *see Figure 5.3*) and the *Mach-IV* scales (B = .19, 95%CI = .09, .29, p < .001; *see Figure 5.4*), with interaction patterns similar to Study 2. Because *SD3 narcissism* had a marginally significant interaction with information in the large regression (.06), this interaction was analyzed separately as well, which was significant (B = .15, 95%CI = .05, .24, p = .004; *see Figure 5.5*). No other effects were significant. At one standard deviation above the mean in information, *SD3 narcissism* (B = .08, 95%CI = -.06, .22, p =.249), *SD3 Machiavellianism* (B = .09, 95%CI = -.05, .22, p =.226), and the *Mach-IV* (B = .04, 95%CI = -.07, .15, p = .453) all were unrelated to the *CST*. However, at one standard deviation below the mean in information, *SD3 narcissism* (B = -.22, 95%CI = -.36, -.08, 31, p = .002), *SD3 Machiavellianism* (B = -.22, 95%CI = -.35, -.09, p = .001), and the *Mach-IV* (B = -.23, 95%CI = -.36, -.09, p = .001) were all negatively associated with the *CST*.

Table 5.5

Study 3. Correlations between CST Stories and the Dark Triad

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. SD3 Mach							
2. MACH IV	.59***						
3. SD3 Narc	.41***	.17**					
4. NPI	.45***	.32***	.55***				
5. SD3 Psych	.48***	.44***	.31***	.44***			
6. LEVP	.59***	.66***	.33***	.46***	.63***		
7. CST Stories	-.11	-.14*	-.16*	-.24***	-.38***	-.32***	

Note: *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Figure 5.3 *SD3 Machiavellianism and Factual Information interaction for Study 3.*

Figure 5.4 *Mach-IV and Factual Information interaction for Study 3.*

Figure 5.5 *SD3 Narcissism and Factual Information interaction for Study 3.*

In sum, the findings from Study 2 were replicated by demonstrating positive relationships between Machiavellianism and the *CST* and a negative relationship with primary psychopathy. The exploratory findings from Study 2 was also replicated with a preregistered study, and results showed that the information*Machiavellianism interaction emerged once again. This finding demonstrates that information comprehension matters in the relationship that Machiavellianism has with ToM in understanding conflict situations.

5.9   General discussion

Previous research on dark personalities and ToM have shown inconsistent results that may reflect the application of general ToM methods in examination of the relationship between mindreading and the DT traits. One potential explanation is that previous research applied tasks that are not appropriate for assessing how deception and manipulation actually takes place.

Using narrative stories as stimuli, individuals are deprived of mental state attribution of social interactions and understand the dynamics between characters. However, when using scripted ToM stimuli such as the *CST*, individuals have the opportunity to grasp information of conversations as they unfold, providing a more realistic method of mental state assessment. This is especially salient for tasks that involve conflict situations, deception, or manipulation.

5.9.1   *Limited understanding only for psychopathy*

These findings across three studies applying the *CST* show deficits for primary psychopathy in mental state attribution for various conflict- and manipulation-related scenarios. Thus, these results are consistent with the theory that suggests a deficient understanding of others' mental states might lead to antisocial behavior in primary psychopathy (Feshbach, 1978; Hughes, Dunn, & White, 1998). Further, these results are consistent with previous research on psychopathic individuals having difficulties in reasoning about actions associated with others' distress (Blair, 2018). This was not the case, however, for the other DT traits. Thus, there was no indication for ToM impairment in secondary psychopathy, narcissism, or Machiavellianism.

5.9.2 *Advanced understanding for Machiavellianism*

In contrast to psychopathy, the findings of the present research show some positive relationships between Machiavellianism and mindreading. More specifically, exploratory analyses revealed that there was a significant Machiavellianism*information interaction such that individuals high in Machiavellianism and high in information retention performed better than individuals high in Machiavellianism but low in information retention.

This interaction either did not emerge or was even negative for psychopathy. Instead, psychopathy and especially, primary psychopathy had consistently negative associations with ToM, regardless of information retention. Finally, the exploratory findings for Machiavellianism were replicated in a preregistered study. Thus, Machiavellianism, regardless of operationalization, was (at worst) neutral to ToM when individuals high in Machiavellianism retained information about the presented story.

These findings are consistent with the theory that suggests that strategic manipulation requires at least some understanding of other people's mental states (Lyons et al., 2010; McIlwain, 2003; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). In this way, individuals who effectively engage mindreading processes might use such information about others to achieve their interpersonal goals more efficiently. However, future research and potential meta-analyses of different levels of manipulation are needed to further investigate the relationship between Machiavellianism and mindreading in manipulation.

5.9.3 *Future directions and limitations*

These findings are the first look into the DT's relationship with ToM by applying a realistic measure designed for assessing mental state attribution in conflict, deception, and manipulation. Thus, these findings provide insight into a long-standing quandary about how dark personalities manipulate and whether manipulation, and more specifically, strategic manipulation requires advanced mindreading ability. Further, these findings have implications for how ToM should be

tested, especially among dark personalities in scenarios that provide settings for detecting various types of conflict.

The present findings also serve to further validate the *CST*, a novel approach to assess ToM, which applies scripted rather than narrative stories as stimuli. Among neuro-typical adults, ToM tasks that are sensitive to individuals in upper ranges are needed to capture more subtle differences. Even though these differences are more subtle, they are likely to be nevertheless valuable in assessing important differences in mindreading that may have a profound impact on negotiation, communication, manipulation, and other interpersonal skills.

The present research has limitations. Although in our samples laboratory and online tasks could be compared directly, there is no guarantee that full attention was paid to the stories. Further, all samples were consisted of college students, which limits generalizability. However, some notable strengths are the use of three separate samples, which were drawn from two different countries and had diversity in ethnicity.

5.9.4 *Conclusion*

In sum, the above three studies demonstrated that ToM can be more sensitively assessed in neuro-typical adults, and that the DT traits show nuanced relationships with ToM as measured with the *CST* as opposed to more traditional narrative-based approaches. Across all studies, negative relationships were found with primary psychopathy in relation to ToM performance.

In contrast, Machiavellianism had positive relationship with ToM, although in the USA samples, this relationship was moderated by information retention such that high levels of information led to increased ToM scores in individuals high in Machiavellianism.

Thus, we are beginning to understand how individuals high in dark personality traits are able to manipulate in spite of scoring traditionally law or average on ToM tasks. It appears that with the application of scripted stories of the *CST*, research is able to better capture ToM abilities of those high in DT, providing clues into a long-standing conundrum about the relationship between mindreading and manipulation.

6 Giving in to the impulses

Theory

When it comes to interpersonal harm at the dispositional level, it is not surprising that the three most commonly studied traits are those of the DT (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). All three traits have limited empathy and lack honesty (Jones & Figueredo, 2013), with a lack of empathy explicit to the definition of psychopathy (Hare, 2003). However, they seem to have different relationships with impulsivity.

Although psychopathy is consistently associated with poor impulse control, the relationship between other DT traits and impulsivity is inconsistent. For example, Machiavellianism is a construct defined by caution and strategic thinking (Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Jones & Paulhus, 2011a). Thus, positive correlations particularly with non-planning is antithetical to the construct.

Theoretically, psychopathy and narcissism are associated with a short-term focus, whereas Machiavellianism theoretically predicts a longer-term focus (Jones & Paulhus, 2011a; Miller, Hyatt, Maples-Keller, Carter, & Lynam, 2016).

Nevertheless, some researchers have argued that short-term motivations are characteristic of all three DT traits (Jonason & Tost, 2010). For example, researchers have argued that a short-term life history strategy is a common theme among the DT (e.g. Jonason et al., 2010; *see also 2.3.1*). Further, some have argued that all three traits are associated with seeking short-term gains, even at the cost of long-term gains (Crysel et al., 2013). Research using the Dirty Dozen (Jonason & Webster, 2010) assessment finds strong evidence for a short-term orientation among those high in Machiavellianism (Jonason & Tost, 2010).

6.1 Two faces of impulsivity

Here the focus of research presented in this chapter is on the issue of impulsivity because of its central relationship with long- vs. short-term behavior (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). Impulsivity is a multidimensional and complex construct composed (regardless of operationalization) of different sub-dimensions (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). It encompasses a

range of maladaptive characteristics: premature decision-making, a lack of planning, fast action, and carelessness (e.g. Barratt, Stanford, Kent, & Felthous, 1997; DeWit, 2008; Schalling, 1978).

However, impulsivity has been also linked to some positive outcomes such as fast information processing, spontaneity, and being venturesome (e.g. Miller, Joseph, & Tudway, 2004; Vigil-Colet & Morales-Vives, 2005). Nevertheless, the inability to delay gratification is a critical feature of impulsivity (Malesza & Ostaszewski, 2016; Morgan, Gray, & Snowden, 2011), and intolerance to delaying action is a central feature of long- vs. short-term orientation (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).

Considering the functional (adaptive) and dysfunctional (maladaptive) aspects of impulsivity (Dickman, 1990) research has revealed a positive relationship between narcissism and functional impulsivity, whereas psychopathy was related to the dysfunctional dimension (Jones & Paulhus, 2011a). Among the DT, psychopathy is the most closely related to impulsivity, both empirically and theoretically. Impulsivity is a central component in defining psychopathy across a variety of psychopathy perspectives (Hare, 1996; 2003; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Patrick, Fowles & Krueger, 2009; Miller & Lynam, 2015). In the followings, I will discuss the relationship between impulsivity and each of the DT personalities.

6.2   Functional impulsivity

Narcissism is related to impulsivity, but unrelated to deficits in impulse control. Instead, narcissism is associated with an approach-oriented (i.e., functional; Dickman, 1990) form of impulsivity (Jones & Paulhus, 2011b). Narcissism is characterized by strong sensation-seeking tendencies (Emmons, 1981) and week avoidance motivations (Foster & Trimm, 2008). Thus, unsurprisingly, narcissistic individuals are prone to engage in risky social situations such as financial risk-taking (Foster, Reidy, Misra, & Goff, 2011) or gambling with someone else's money (Jones, 2013).

Contrary to psychopathy, however, while playing the same game, narcissism did not predict choosing to gamble, however, among those who decided to gamble with someone else's money, narcissism was associated with greater losses (Jones, 2013). Narcissistic impulsivity is linked to

overconfidence (Paulhus et al., 2003) and might be evoked by an ego-threat. Indeed, research has shown that ego-threatened narcissists preferred less money immediately to more money later (Crysel et al., 2013). Besides impulsive reaction to an insult, narcissistic individuals may as well seek temporary immediate gratification because of their desire for recognition (Vazire & Funder, 2006).

6.3 Dysfunctional impulsivity

Psychopathic individuals are willing to take unnecessary risks for minimal gain (Cleckley, 1976). They are driven by the urgent need of getting what they want and get it now, thus, in other words, they seek immediate gratification (Crone, Vendel, & van der Molen, 2003). This propensity of them is linked to deficits in emotional processing and decision-making (Mitchell, Colledge, Leonard, & Blair, 2002; Yang, Rain, Narr, Colletti, & Toga, 2009).

Psychopathy's dysfunctional impulsivity is strongly related to their inability to delay gratification (Ainslie, 1975) which easily leads to reckless and self-destructive behaviors (Jones, 2013). As a result of such maladaptive impulsivity, research has established psychopathy as an important predictor of bullying and online trolling behavior (Baughman, Dearing, Giammarco, & Vernon, 2012; Craker & March, 2016; March, Grieve, Marrington, & Jonason, 2017). Psychopathy also predicted gambling with someone else's money for selfish gain, even when the game situation almost certainly anticipated the loss of the money for that other person (Jones, 2013).

6.4 Anxious impulsivity?

In theory, Machiavellianism should have no relationship with impulsivity; empirically, however, this is not the case (Miller et al., 2016). Relevant studies reported weak or mixed results between impulsivity, low self-control and Machiavellianism (Crysel et al., 2013; Jonason & Tost, 2010).

Research using the *Mach-IV* (Christie & Geis, 1970) or the *Machiavellian Personality Scale (MPS*; Dahling, Whitaker, & Levy, 2009) have mixed results with impulsivity, depending on the sample and impulsivity assessment (e.g., Birkas, Csatho, Gacs, & Bereczkei, 2015). Thus, the link between Machiavellianism and short-term orientation has been inconsistent depending on

operationalization (Jonason & Tost, 2010; Jonason et al., 2010; Jones & Paulhus, 2011a, Malesza & Ostaszewski, 2016; McDonald et al., 2012; Vazire & Funder, 2006).

On the one hand, Machiavellianism has been linked to low self-control (Jonason & Tost, 2010) and risky decision-making (Rim, 1966). However, the willingness to take risks for Machiavellian individuals was associated with a calculating demeanor to maximize their gains and minimize their losses (Weinstein & Martin, 1969). On the other hand, Machiavellians' cheater strategy is characterized by using long-term deception tactics (Jones, 2014). Further, Machiavellianism was not linked to gambling (Jones, 2013), or overt styles of aggression (Jones & Paulhus, 2010).

In line with this, several authors suggest that emotional coldness, which is related to impulse control, is part of the Machiavellians' rational, calculating disposition (Bereczkei, 2017; Jones & Paulhus 2009, Pilch 2008). However, while individuals high in Machiavellianism might seem to appear cold-minded and rational, they might also experience intense negative emotions, tension, and anxiety (Birkas et al., 2015; McHoskey, 2001; Szijjarto & Bereczkei, 2015; *see also 3.4*). They just want to keep it for themselves and under strict control (McHoskey 1999).

As a result, Machiavellian individuals might want to make great efforts to conceal their anxiety and analyze their own behaviors in a similarly rational and calculating manner as they analyze their partners' behaviors. As a result, this might affect their self-reflection in terms of impulsivity.

Research

The traits of the DT of personality have different relationships with impulsivity. Although psychopathy is consistently associated with poor impulse control, the relationship between other DT traits and impulsivity is inconsistent. For example, Machiavellianism is a construct defined by caution and strategic thinking (*see 1.4.2*). Thus, positive correlations particularly with non-planning is antithetical to the construct.

However, previous research has revealed gender-related differences among the DT, which may partially account for mixed findings. Using a student sample (N = 898), the study presented in this chapter examined separate relationships between impulsivity and the DT based on gender.

Results show that Machiavellianism in men is positively correlated with planning, whereas Machiavellianism in women is negatively correlated with planning. Thus, it appears that Machiavellianism may have different behavioral patterns depending on gender. These findings have implications for how Machiavellianism is expressed between men and women, and may guide future predictions for Machiavellianism based on gender.

6.5   Introduction

Previous research has revealed gender-related differences among the DT, which may partially account for mixed findings (Crysel, Crosier, & Webster, 2013; Jonason & Tost, 2010). For these reasons, the following research attempted to examine separate relationships between impulsivity and the DT based on gender.

6.5.1   Gender differences

According to theory, impulsivity is a key component to the etiology of crime and women's higher self-control is used to explain the gender gap in delinquency (Chapple & Johnson, 2007). Compared to women, men also score higher on measures of dark personality (Jonason, Li, Webster, & Schmitt, 2009). Past research has established differences between men and women in relation to impulsivity (Moffitt, Caspi, Rutter, & Silva, 2001; Zager, 1994). Several studies have demonstrated

that even at an early age, girls show lower levels of impulsivity than do boys (e.g. Burton, Cullen, Evans, Alarid, & Dunaway, 1998; Chapple & Johnson, 2007; Hope & Chapple, 2005).

Recent evidence has emerged suggesting that men and women are not only different in mean levels of the DT, but express DT traits differently (Jonason et al., 2013; Jones & de Roos, 2017; Jones & Weiser, 2014). For example, Tran and colleagues (2018) found that the core of dark personalities was taxonic among men, but dimensional among women.

This finding means that men have a clearer designation of when they cross the threshold into "having" a dark personality than do women. Similarly, men and women differ with respect to infidelity and Machiavellianism, such that Machiavellianism was similar to psychopathy only among women (Jones & Weiser, 2014). Jones and de Roos (2017) found that relationships between sociosexuality and the DT were different based on gender.

For example, men high in Machiavellianism were less likely to engage in short-term sexual behavior when compared with women high in Machiavellianism. Finally, research has found that men high in Machiavellianism were more self-controlled and more concerned with future consequences than women (Jonason & Tost, 2010; Study 1). Given these relationships, Machiavellianism may have a differential relationship with impulsivity depending on gender and its operationalization.

Previous research using the *Mach-IV* operationalization of Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) found positive correlates with dysfunctional impulsivity in both men and women (Jones & Paulhus, 2011b). Although these correlations were stronger in women, and the correlation between psychopathy and impulsivity was stronger, the *Mach-IV* correlated positively with impulsivity.

In contrast, the *Short Dark Triad (SD3)* operationalization of Machiavellianism focused on the planning and strategic nature of Machiavellianism at its inception (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). Thus, the *SD3* may be a more appropriate assessment to capture the planning and strategic nature of Machiavellianism, when gender is taken into account.

6.5.2 *Predictions*

The present research tested how gender differences might affect the relationship between impulsivity and the DT (especially Machiavellianism) using the *SD3*.

1. Specifically, it was predicted that the *SD3 Machiavellianism* would have no relationship with impulsivity. Further, this Machiavellianism-impulsivity relationship will be especially attenuated among men. Moreover, the non-planning aspects of impulsivity will be negatively correlated with Machiavellianism.

2. For narcissism and psychopathy, however, consistent relationships were predicted with impulsivity across men and women.

3. Finally, it was predicted that psychopathy would have the strongest and most positive correlations with impulsivity of all DT traits, regardless of gender.

6.6 Method

6.6.1 *Participants and procedure*

The participants were 898 students (women = 618, men = 268; Mean age = 20.67, SD = 4.51; 85% Latin American heritage, 7% European Heritage, 8% Other) who volunteered to participate in a large prescreen measure for course credit at the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) in the United States. Ethics approval was obtained under IRB protocol: *Prescreen* (#548187-5).

6.6.2 *Measures*

The DT personality traits were measured with the *Short Dark Triad* scale *(SD3*; Jones & Paulhus, 2014), a 27-item inventory measuring individual levels of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy (*see also Chapter 5*). The scale encompasses the attention-seeking self-promotion of narcissism (e.g. ''I like to be the center of attention''), the impulsive thrill-seeking of psychopathy (e.g. ''I'll say anything to get what I want''), and the strategic manipulative nature of Machiavellianism (e.g. ''I like to use clever manipulation to get my way''). Responses are collected on 5-point Likert-scales ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).

The *Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11*; Patton et al., 1995) is a 30-item self-report questionnaire designed to assess the construct of impulsivity. The *BIS-11* was chosen because of its ability to assess non-planning and other sub-facets. Patton and colleagues identified six sub-components found in three over-arching factors. Recently, Spinella (2007) reduced these items to five per factor, for a short-form of 15-items (i.e., *BIS-SF*).

For the purposes of consistency, items were scored on a $1 - 5$ scale similar to the *SD3*. The *BIS-SF* contains three subscales; 1. attentional impulsiveness, defined as poor concentration and distractibility (e.g. "I don't pay attention"), 2. motor impulsiveness, or the tendency to act without thinking (e.g. "I act on impulse"), and 3. non-planning impulsiveness, or the lack of future plans and forethought (e.g. "I plan for job security"). *Table 6.1* contains descriptive information about the scale alphas (all were above .68) and the means and standard deviations.

Table 6.1

Overall Sample of Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Dark Triad and Impulsivity.

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.	Machiavellianism	$\alpha = .76$						
2.	Narcissism	.24**	$\alpha = .68$					
3.	Psychopathy	.54**	.18**	$\alpha = .73$				
4.	Motor Impulsivity	.29**	.08	.40**	$\alpha = .79$			
5.	Non-planning	.05	-.16**	.23**	.29**	$\alpha = .69$		
6.	Inattention	.16**	-.04	.29**	.40**	.28**	$\alpha = .68$	
7.	Overall Impulsivity	.23**	-.05	.42**	.79**	.69**	.74**	$\alpha = .80$
Mean (SD) Overall Sample		3.03 (0.61)	2.97 (0.53)	2.14 (0.58)	2.84 (0.83)	1.94 (0.73)	2.74 (0.73)	2.51 (0.56)
Mean (SD) Men		3.14 (0.65)	3.02 (0.53)	2.41 (0.60)	2.84 (0.83)	1.97 (0.74)	2.77 (0.73)	2.53 (0.57)
Mean (SD) Women		2.98 (0.60)	2.95 (0.53)	2.03 (0.53)	2.85 (0.83)	1.93 (0.72)	2.73 (0.72)	2.50 (0.56)
Differences *t* (*Cohen's d*)		3.42** (0.26)	1.95* (0.13)	9.03** (0.67)	-0.05 (0.01)	0.77 (0.05)	0.71 (0.06)	0.71 (0.05)

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01

6.7 Results

The bivariate correlations found in *Table 6.1* revealed that Machiavellianism and psychopathy both had positive and significant correlations with the overall index of the *BIS-SF*. However, when examined by factor, Machiavellianism had no relationship with non-planning, whereas psychopathy had a positive and significant correlation. Further, a standardized (Fisher's *r*-to-*z*; Fisher, 1921) test for correlation strength indicated that these two correlations were significantly different, as were all correlations dealing with Machiavellianism and impulsivity (overall and factor scores) vs. psychopathy and impulsivity (overall impulsivity and factor scores), *ts* > 4.08, *ps* < .001.

6.7.1 *Gender effects*

First, *t*-tests were ran exploring gender differences across overall impulsivity, the three impulsivity factors, and the DT (*see Tables 6.1 & 6.2*). Note that, unexpectedly, there were no significant gender differences for any aspects of impulsivity. However, the DT gender differences were as expected (Jonason et al., 2009).

Table 6.2

Gender-Separated Correlations Between Dark Triad and Impulsivity.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Machiavellianism	----	.21**	.55$_a$*	.22$_a$*	-.14$_a$*	.12$_a$	.10$_a$
2. Narcissism	.24$_a$**	----	.19$_b$*	.04$_b$	-.27$_b$**	-.13$_b$*	-.16$_b$*
3. Psychopathy	.52$_b$**	.16$_a$**	----	.39$_c$**	.14$_c$*	.26$_c$**	.37$_c$**
4. Motor Impulsivity	.32$_c$**	.11$_a$**	.44$_a$**	----	.34$_d$**	.36$_c$**	.79$_d$**
5. Non-planning	.13$_d$**	-.11$_b$**	.28$_b$**	.27$_a$**	----	.26$_c$**	.70$_d$**
6. Inattention	.18$_d$**	-.01$_c$	.32$_b$**	.42$_b$**	.29$_a$**	----	.72$_d$**
7. Overall Impulsivity	.29$_c$**	.01$_c$	.47$_a$**	.78$_c$**	.68$_b$**	.75**	----

Note: *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$. Men are above the diagonal (n =268) women are below (n = 618). Correlations in different columns with different subscripts are significantly different from each other.

To test the moderating impact of gender on the relationship that each DT trait has with impulsivity, several moderated regression models were conducted (*Table 6.3*). First, each measure of the DT, gender, and the three traits of DT by gender interactions were entered into four separate regressions predicting: overall impulsivity, and the three factors of impulsivity.

The results (*see Table 6.3*) indicated that Machiavellianism interacted with gender such that high levels of Machiavellianism were only associated with impulsivity among women (*see Figure 6.1*). Breaking down this interaction further, driving this interaction was the non-planning factor. When separating the correlations by gender, both narcissism and Machiavellianism were *negatively* related to non-planning among men, and both of these correlations were different, ($t \geq 5.70$, $p < .001$), from that of psychopathy (which was significantly *positive* with non-planning in men).

Table 6.3

Gender*Dark Triad Interactions Predicting Impulsivity in Simultaneous Moderated Regression.

	Overall Impulsivity β (95%CI)	Motor Impulsivity	Non-planning	Inattention
Machiavellianism	-0.37*	-0.15	-0.56**	-0.13
	(-0.64, -0.11)	(-0.42, 0.12)	(-0.85, -0.28)	(-0.42, 0.15)
Narcissism	-0.38*	-0.10	-0.42**	-0.32*
	(-0.64, -0.11)	(-0.35, 0.14)	(-0.68, -0.16)	(-0.57, -0.06)
Psychopathy	0.61*	0.46**	0.41**	0.44**
	(0.33, 0.90)	(0.18, 0.76)	(0.11, 0.72)	(0.14, 0.75)
Gender (1 = m, 2 = w)	0.11*	0.14**	0.04	0.07*
	(0.11, 0.39)	(0.15, 0.44)	(-0.07, 0.24)	(0.01, 0.31)
Mach*Gender	0.40*	0.25	0.50**	0.14
	(0.13, .066)	(-0.03, 0.52)	(0.22, 0.78)	(-0.14, 0.42)
Narcissism*Gender	0.26*	0.11	0.23	0.23
	(0.03, 0.50)	(-0.13, 0.36)	(-0.03, 0.48)	(-0.03, 0.48)
Psychopathy*Gender	-0.12	-0.06	-0.08	-0.09
	(-0.39, 0.16)	(-0.34, 0.22)	(-0.37, 0.21)	(-0.38, 0.20)

Note: *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$.

Figure 6.1 *Machiavellianism*Gender in predicting Impulsivity.*

However, due to issues concerning partialling of the DT (Lynam, Hoyle, & Newman, 2006),

separate regressions were conducted for each DT trait (e.g., Machiavellianism, gender,

Machiavellianism*gender; *see Table 6.4*). With respect to non-planning, the results indicated that,

for each DT trait, higher scores were associated with more non-planning in women. However, simple

slopes analyses (*Table 6.5*) revealed that higher psychopathy was still associated with more non-

planning for both men and women. This was not the case for Machiavellianism or narcissism.

Table 6.4

*Gender*Dark Triad Interactions Predicting Impulsivity, One at a Time in Moderated Regression.*

	Overall Impulsivity β (95%CI)	Motor Impulsivity	Non-planning	Inattention
Machiavellianism only				
Gender (1 = m, 2 = w)	-0.01 (-0.16, 0.14)	0.07 (-0.07, 0.22)	-0.07 (-0.22, 0.08)	-0.02 (-0.17, 0.13)
Machiavellianism	-0.11 (-0.35, 0.14)	0.09 (-0.15, 0.33)	-0.41* (-0.66, -0.16)	0.05 (-0.20, 0.30)
Mach*Gender	0.35* (0.11, 0.59)	0.21 (-0.03, 0.45)	0.47* (0.22, 0.72)	0.11 (-0.13, 0.36)
Narcissism only				
Gender (1 = m, 2 = w)	-0.07 (-0.22, 0.08)	0.02 (-0.13, 0.17)	-0.04 (-0.24, 0.06)	-0.07 (-0.22, 0.08)
Narcissism	-0.32* (-0.59, -0.06)	-0.03 (-0.29, 0.23)	-0.45* (-0.71, -0.19)	-0.25 (-0.51, 0.02)
Narcissism*Gender	0.29* (0.03, 0.55)	0.12 (-0.14, 0.39)	0.30* (0.04, 0.56)	0.21 (-0.05, 0.47)
Psychopathy only				
Gender (1 = m, 2 = w)	0.11 (0.09, 0.38)	0.28* (0.14, 0.44)	0.08 (-0.08, 0.24)	0.15 (-0.01, 0.30)
Psychopathy	0.22 (-0.01, 0.45)	0.28* (0.05, 0.52)	-0.03 (-0.28, 0.22)	0.18 (-0.07, 0.42)
Psychopathy*Gender	0.25* (0.02, 0.47)	0.17 (-0.06, 0.40)	0.29* (0.04, 0.53)	0.14 (-0.10, 0.38)

Note: *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$.

Table 6.5

*Gender*Dark Triad Simple Slopes in Moderated Regression.*

	Overall Impulsivity	Motor Impulsivity	Non-planning	Inattention
	β (95%CI)			
Men				
Machiavellianism	0.10	0.21*	-0.14*	0.12
Narcissism	-0.16*	0.04	-0.28*	-0.13*
Psychopathy	0.36*	0.38*	0.14*	0.26*
Women				
Machiavellianism	0.30*	0.34*	0.14*	0.18*
Narcissism	0.01	0.11*	-0.11*	-0.01
Psychopathy	0.50*	0.46*	0.27*	0.35*

Note: *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$.

6.8   Discussion

It was predicted that gender would moderate the relationship between impulsivity and the *SD3* operationalization of Machiavellianism, such that men high in Machiavellianism would exhibit less impulsivity. Not only did this interaction emerge, non-planning impulsivity and Machiavellianism were *negatively* related with each other in men. This finding is an important step towards supporting the *SD3* operationalization of Machiavellianism (at least in men) as true to its construct definition (Miller et al., 2016).

6.8.1   *Psychopathy: the most impulsive trait*

The *SD3* operationalization of psychopathy was consistently associated with all aspects of impulsivity regardless of gender. This finding is true to the construct definition of psychopathy (e.g., Cleckley, 1976), and operationalizations based on measures developed for the four-factor psychopathy model such as the *PCL-R* (Hare, 2003) and *Self-Reported Psychopathy (SRP)* scale (Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, 2016). Thus, all individuals high in psychopathy have difficulties inhibiting their impulses (Foster & Trimm, 2008), have a disinhibited neurological profile (Broerman, Ross, & Corr, 2014), and show a tendency to act in a careless and impulsive manner (March et al., 2017).

Furthermore, research applying both self-report and behavioral-task measures of impulsivity demonstrated positive associations between psychopathy and all the measures used to assess impulsivity (Malesza & Ostaszewski, 2016). They concluded that the relationship between behaviorally measured impulsivity and the DT is primarily driven by psychopathy. Further, psychopathy is linked with a neurological profile that is more prone to reward sensitivity and poor inhibition (Hughes, Moore, Morris, & Corr, 2012).

Finally, psychopathy (even at the subclinical level) is associated with aggressive behavior (e.g., Reidy, Zeichner, & Martinez, 2008), and is the most directly aggressive among the DT traits (Jones & Paulhus, 2010; Jones & Neria, 2015). Thus, motor impulsivity may further contribute to the high correlation between psychopathy and aggression (Dambacher et al., 2014).

6.8.2 *Narcissism: the least impulsive trait*

Finally and unexpectedly, narcissism was moderated by gender, and had the least impulsive profile of the DT traits. Given this non-impulsive profile, it appears (according to the *SD3* operationalization of narcissism) that individuals high in narcissism do indeed have the *ability* to think ahead and inhibit impulses (as do men high in Machiavellianism). Although, it is worth noting that individuals high in narcissism are overconfident (Jones & Paulhus, 2011b), which accounts for their risk behaviors (Lakey, Rose, Campbell, & Goodie, 2008).

6.8.3 *Machiavellianism: gender impacts on impulsivity*

It is important to note that motor impulsivity was positive and significant for both men and women high in Machiavellianism. This heterogeneity with respect to the relationship between Machiavellianism and different aspects of impulsivity suggests the relationship is more complicated than previously indicated.

Nevertheless, this motor-impulsivity finding may make sense against the backdrop of the opportunistic and risk-taking aspects discussed in early Machiavellianism literature (Christie & Geis, 1970). Surprisingly, however, motor impulsivity was not associated with gender in spite of its relationship with aggression (Dambacher et al., 2014).

Machiavellianism has been linked with psychopathology in samples that collapse men and women (Monaghan, Bizumic, & Sellbom, 2016). It may be the case that for in women high in Machiavellianism, there is a higher presence of anxious and hypersensitive features, whereas high Machiavellianism in men is not associated with such features.

These tendencies, against the backdrop of the emotionally cold character of Machiavellian men, leads to the ability to calculate possible consequences and plan possible reactions. These abilities would be advantageous in risky situations. Indeed, a study found that individuals high in psychopathy and Machiavellianism enact a risky life-style (Jonason, Slomski, & Partyka, 2012).

6.8.4 *Future directions and limitations*

Future research should take into account potential moderating effects of gender or biological sex when analyzing DT results. These considerations would be most important when examining outcome variables related to planning or long- vs. short-term focus. Further, these moderating differences should especially be explored for Machiavellianism.

Although not all DT research needs to separate men and women, nor does it require consistent hypotheses about gender, there are relevant outcomes that should be reconsidered by gender. In particular, cases that involve Machiavellianism and strategic outcomes as opposed to reckless outcomes.

There were several limitations to the present study. First, the data were all self-reported. Future research should explore gender differences in Machiavellianism and impulsivity using behavioral tasks. Second, the data were limited to university student sample, and collected alongside a prescreen of other instruments[1]. Further, the ethnicity of the sample was primarily that of individuals from Latin American decent. Finally, these results were only tested for the *SD3*. Thus, it is unclear if other measures of Machiavellianism and other traits of the DT will show these effects.

In this way, future research should replicate the present findings using other populations besides university students, different ethnic / racial groups, and examine these effects with other measures of the DT. Further, the current findings are based on a single sample, thus, replication is needed.

6.8.5 *Conclusion*

In conclusion, the *SD3* is a popular operationalization of the DT traits. Using the *SD3* operationalization of the DT, we demonstrated that gender differences have an impact on the impulsivity of those high in narcissism and Machiavellianism. Specifically, we found that

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[1] These measures included: Biculturalism, alcohol use, nostalgia, USA Identity, ethnic identity, linguistic ability, political correctness, sadism, views on abortion, individualism-collectivism, and demographics (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity, language, citizenship, income, relationship status, religion).

Machiavellianism is significantly associated with more planning in men high in Machiavellianism as opposed to men low in Machiavellianism.

Narcissism also had different relationships based on gender, with men high in narcissism also showing less impulsivity than did women high in narcissism. Psychopathy, however, was consistent across men and women, and still had the strongest overall correlations with impulsivity.

Consequently, we conclude that the calculating, planning, strategic, and manipulative aspect of Machiavellianism might be a characteristic feature only of Machiavellian men, but not of women.

7 Final Summary

Taken together, these findings on the emotional, cognitive, and impulsive characteristics of those high in Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy have implications for diverse manipulation strategies inside the Dark Triad personality. The observation that Machiavellians apply strategic and calculating forms of manipulation seems to be related to their above average performance in certain social contexts. This observation may have additional implications.

Machiavellians may have unique capacity to understand others' mental states in assessing their potential targets and use this knowledge in their exploitative behavior (*Chapter 5*). In addition, narcissistic individuals might use their emotional understanding when manipulating others (*Chapter 3*). They also have a superior sense of self and may assume others to be naturally disingenuous as a result. Finally, psychopathic individuals do not seem to pay attention on the emotional or mental states of others, even if the task requires the detection of manipulative intentions of characters in social situations.

Results of the empirical studies proposed in this dissertation highlight important differences among the DT for diverse cognitive functioning and manipulative behavior. Future application of the CST can serve as a basis for further investigations in the field of social cognition. For example, it can serve to discover further characteristics of individuals with manipulative tendencies.

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Appendix: Questionnaires

Mach-IV SCALE

(Christie & Geis, 1970)

Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements by choosing a number from the scale below that reflects your opinion.

1	2	3	4	5
strongly disagree	disagree	neither agree nor disagree	agree	strongly agree

_____ 1. Anyone who completely trusts anyone is asking for trouble.

_____ 2. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.

_____ 3. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.

_____ 4. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.

_____ 5. Generally speaking, people won't work hard unless they're forced to do so.

_____ 6. It is wise to flatter important people.

_____ 7. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.

_____ 8. Most people are brave.

_____ 9. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.

_____ 10. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.

_____ 11. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.

_____ 12. There is a sucker born every minute.

_____ 13. Most people are basically good and kind.

_____ 14. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons that might carry more weight.

_____ 15. It is possible to be good in all respects.

_____ 16. Most people forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their property.

_____ 17. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.

_____ 18. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.

_____ 19. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest.

MACH IV SKÁLA

Az alábbi állítások mindegyike alatt hét számot talál. Ezek közül karikázza be azt, amely jelzi, mennyiben ért egyet az adott állítással.

A számokhoz tartozó fokozatok:

1 = egyáltalán nem értek egyet

2 = nem értek egyet

3 = kis mértékben nem értek egyet

4 = semleges

5 = kis mértékben egyetértek

6 = egyetértek

7 = teljes mértékben egyetértek

1.) A legjobban úgy lehet az emberekkel bánni, ha azt mondjuk nekik, amit hallani akarnak.

$$1 \quad\quad 2 \quad\quad 3 \quad\quad 4 \quad\quad 5 \quad\quad 6 \quad\quad 7$$

2.) Amikor szívességet kérünk valakitől, nyomósabb érvek helyett jobb őszintén megmondani, mi okunk van erre.

$$1 \quad\quad 2 \quad\quad 3 \quad\quad 4 \quad\quad 5 \quad\quad 6 \quad\quad 7$$

3.) Aki tökéletesen megbízik valaki másban, az keresi a bajt.

$$1 \quad\quad 2 \quad\quad 3 \quad\quad 4 \quad\quad 5 \quad\quad 6 \quad\quad 7$$

4.) Kerülőutak nélkül nehéz az életben előrejutni.

$$1 \quad\quad 2 \quad\quad 3 \quad\quad 4 \quad\quad 5 \quad\quad 6 \quad\quad 7$$

5.) Minden esetben a becsületesség a legjobb politika.

<div align="center">1   2   3   4   5   6   7</div>

6.) A legbiztosabb, ha számítunk arra, hogy adandó alkalommal mindenkiből előjön a rossz oldala.

<div align="center">1   2   3   4   5   6   7</div>

7.) Sose áruld el senkinek a tetteid igazi okát – hacsak ebből nem származik hasznod.

<div align="center">1   2   3   4   5   6   7</div>

8.) Csak akkor szabad cselekedni, amikor az erkölcsileg helyénvaló.

<div align="center">1   2   3   4   5   6   7</div>

9.) Bölcs dolog fontos embereknek hízelegni.

<div align="center">1   2   3   4   5   6   7</div>

10.) Mindent egybevéve jobb jelentéktelennek és tisztességesnek lenni, mint fontosnak és tisztességtelennek.

<div align="center">1   2   3   4   5   6   7</div>

11.) Tévedés azt állítani, hogy minden percben születik egy palimadár.

<div align="center">1   2   3   4   5   6   7</div>

12.) A gyógyíthatatlan betegségben szenvedőknek meg kellene adni a lehetőséget arra, hogy a fájdalommentes halált válasszák.

<div align="center">1   2   3   4   5   6   7</div>

13.) Lehetséges minden szempontból jó embernek lenni.

<div align="center">1   2   3   4   5   6   7</div>

14.) Az emberek legtöbbje alapjában véve jó és kedves.

<div align="center">1   2   3   4   5   6   7</div>

15.) A hazugságra nincs mentség.

<div align="center">

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

</div>

16.) A legtöbb ember könnyebben túlteszi magát a szülei halálán, mint a vagyona elvesztésén.

<div align="center">

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

</div>

17.) A legtöbb olyan ember, aki viszi valamire, tiszta és erkölcsös életet folytat.

<div align="center">

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

</div>

18.) Általában véve a legtöbb ember csak akkor dolgozik keményen, ha erre rákényszerül.

<div align="center">

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

</div>

19.) A fő különbség a bűnözők és a legtöbb egyéb ember között az, hogy a bűnözők elég ostobák ahhoz, hogy lebukjanak.

<div align="center">

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

</div>

20.) A legtöbb ember bátor.

<div align="center">

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

</div>

Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-13)

Raskin & Hall, 1979

Read each statement and then choose the one that is closer to your own feelings. Indicate your answer by CLICKING on the letter „A" or „B".

1.   A. When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed.

       B. I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so.   1. _____

2.   A. I like to have authority over other people.

       B. I don't mind following orders.   2. _____

3.   A. I find it easy to manipulate people.

       B. I don't like it when I find myself manipulating people.   3. _____

4.   A. I insist upon getting the respect that is due me.

       B. I usually get the respect that I deserve.   4. _____

5.   A. I don't particularly like to show off my body.

       B. I like to display my body.   5. _____

6.   A. My body is nothing special.

       B. I like to look at my body.   6. _____

7.   A. I try not to be a show off.

       B. I am apt to show off if I get the chance.   7. _____

8.   A. I expect a great deal from other people.

       B. I like to do things for other people.   8. _____

9.   A. I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve.

       B. I take my satisfactions as they come.   9. _____

10.   A. I have a strong will to power.

       B. Power for its own sake doesn't interest me.   10. _____

11.   A. I like to look at myself in the mirror.

       B. I am not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror.   11. _____

12.   A. Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me.

       B. People always seem to recognize my authority.   12. _____

13.   A. I am a born leader.

        B. Leadership is a quality that takes a long time to develop.   13. _____

NPI-40

Ebben a kérdőívben olyan állításokat talál, amelyeket az emberek gyakran használnak saját véleményük vagy viselkedésük jellemzésére. Mindegyik állításhoz kétféle válaszlehetőség tartozik: „igaz" vagy „nem igaz". Kérjük, olvassa el figyelmesen valamennyi kijelentést, azután jelölje be a válaszlapon azt a választ, amelyik meggyőződése szerint jobban illik Önre. Ne töprengjen túlságosan sokáig az egyes válaszokon!

		Igaz	Nem
1.	Született tehetségem van arra, hogy befolyásoljak másokat.		
2.	A szerénység nem áll jól nekem.		
3.	Majdnem mindent meg mernék tenni.		
4.	Tudom, hogy jó vagyok, mert mások folyamatosan ezt mondják nekem.		
5.	Sokkal jobb lenne a világ, ha én irányítanám.		
6.	Bármilyen helyzetből „kivágom" magam.		
7.	Szeretek a figyelem középpontjában lenni.		
8.	Sikeres leszek.		
9.	Különlegesnek gondolom magam.		
10.	Jó vezetőnek tartom magam.		
11.	Rámenős vagyok.		
12.	Szeretem, ha van tekintélyem, hatalmam más emberek felett.		
13.	Könnyen manipulálok másokat.		
14.	Ragaszkodom ahhoz, hogy megkapjam a nekem járó tiszteletet.		
15.	Szeretek büszkélkedni a testemmel.		
16.	Az emberek számomra nyitott könyvek.		
17.	Szeretek felelősséget vállalni a döntéshozatalokért.		
18.	Meg akarom mutatni a világnak, hogy viszem valamire.		
19.	Szívesen nézegetem a testem.		
20.	Hajlamos vagyok a kérkedésre, ha lehetőségem van rá.		
21.	Mindig tudom, hogy mit teszek.		
22.	Céljaim elérése ritkán függ másoktól.		
23.	Mindenki szereti hallgatni az én történeteimet.		
24.	Sokat várok más emberektől.		
25.	Csak akkor leszek elégedett, ha mindent megkapok, amit csak megérdemlek.		

26.	Szeretem, ha bókolnak nekem.		
27.	Erősen vágyom a hatalomra.		
28.	Szeretek új hóbortokat kezdeni, és divatot teremteni.		
29.	Szeretem nézegetni magam a tükörben.		
30.	Imádok a figyelem középpontjában lenni.		
31.	Úgy élhetem az életem, ahogyan csak akarom.		
32.	Úgy tűnik, hogy az emberek mindig elismerik a tekintélyemet.		
33.	Vezető lennék inkább.		
34.	Nagyszerű ember leszek.		
35.	Bárkivel bármit el tudok hitetni, amit csak akarok.		
36.	Született vezető vagyok.		
37.	Bárcsak egyszer valaki megírná az életrajzomat.		
38.	Zavar, ha az emberek nem figyelnek fel a külsőmre, amikor társaságba		
39.	Másoknál tehetségesebb vagyok.		
40.	Rendkívüli ember vagyok.		

Levenson Self Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP)

(Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995)

Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements:

1= Strongly Disagree

2= Disagree

3= Neither Agree nor Disagree

4= Agree

5= Strongly Agree

1. _____ Success is based on survival of the fittest; I am not concerned about the losers.
2. _____ I quickly lose interest in tasks I start.
3. _____ When I get frustrated, I often "let off steam" by blowing my top.
4. _____ Making a lot of money is my most important goal.
5. _____ Before I do anything, I carefully consider the possible consequences.
6. _____ My main purpose in life is getting as many goodies as I can.
7. _____ For me, what's right is whatever I can get away with.
8. _____ I am often bored.
9. _____ I enjoy manipulating other people's feelings.
10. _____ I often admire a really clever scam.
11. _____ I would be upset if my success came at someone else's expense.
12. _____ People who are stupid enough to get ripped off usually deserve it.
13. _____ I tell other people what they want to hear so that they will do what I want them to do.
14. _____ I feel bad if my words or actions cause someone else to feel emotional pain.
15. _____ Looking out for myself is my top priority.
16. _____ Most of my problems are due to the fact that other people just don't understand me.
17. _____ Cheating is not justified because it is unfair to others.
18. _____ I find myself in the same kinds of trouble, time after time.
19. _____ Even if I were trying very hard to sell something, I wouldn't lie about it.
20. _____ In today's world, I feel justified in doing anything I can get away with to succeed.
21. _____ I don't plan anything very far in advance.
22. _____ I let others worry about higher values; my main concern is with the bottom line.
23. _____ I find that I am able to pursue one goal for a long time.

24. ____ I make a point of trying not to hurt others in pursuit of my goals.

25. ____ I have been in a lot of shouting matches with other people.

26. ____ Love is overrated.

LSRP

A következőkben állításokat olvashatsz, döntsd el, hogy mennyire értesz egyet velük. Nincs jó vagy rossz válasz, a legjobb, ha az első gondolatodnak megfelelő választ jelölöd be (**X**).

	Egyáltalán nem értek egyet	Inkább nem értek egyet	Inkább egyet értek	Teljesen egyet értek
1. A siker a legerősebb túlélésén alapszik; nem foglalkozom a vesztesekkel.				
2. Ha belekezdek egy feladatba, hamar elvesztem az érdeklődésemet.				
3. Ha valami nem sikerül, gyakran dühbe gurulok.				
4. Az életem legfőbb célja, hogy minél több anyagi (pl. lakás, kocsi) javat szerezzek.				
5. Mielőtt bármit is csinálnék, alaposan végig gondolom a lehetséges következményeket.				
6. A legfontosabb célom, hogy rengeteg pénzt keressek.				
7. Számomra minden elfogadható és helyes, amit meg tudok úszni.				
8. Gyakran unatkozom.				
9. Szeretem manipulálni mások érzéseit.				
10. Gyakran csodálom az igazán okos csalókat.				
11. Kiborítana, ha valaki más kárán érné el sikert.				
12. Azok az emberek, akik elég hülyék ahhoz, hogy átverjék őket, meg is érdemlik azt.				
13. Azt mondom az embereknek, amit hallani akarnak tőlem, így azt teszik, amit én akarok, hogy tegyenek.				
14. Rosszul érzem magam, ha szavaim vagy tetteim fájdalmat				

okoznak valakinek.				
15. Számomra a saját boldogulásom az elsődleges.				
16. A legtöbb problémám abból adódik, hogy az emberek nem értenek meg engem.				
17. A csalás helytelen dolog, mivel tisztességtelen másokkal szemben.				
18. Időről-időre hasonló gondban találom magam.				
19. Még akkor sem hazudnék, ha valamit nagyon szeretnék eladni.				
20. A mai világban igazoltnak érzem magam mindenben, ha tetteimet siker koronázza.				
21. Semmit sem tervezek jóval előre.				
22. Aggódjanak csak mások a magasabb erkölcsi értékekért, engem ezek egyáltalán nem érdekelnek.				
23. Egy cél mellett hosszú időn át kitartok.				
24. Fontosnak tartom, hogy céljaim elérése közben ne sértsek meg másokat.				
25. Sokszor kiabálok/veszekedek másokkal.				
26. Szerintem az emberek túlértékelik a szeretetet.				

Short Dark Triad (SD3)

(Jones & Paulhus, 2014)

Please indicate how much you agree with the following questions using the scale below:

1	2	3	4	5
strongly disagree	disagree	neither agree nor disagree	agree	strongly agree

1. It's not wise to tell your secrets.
2. Generally speaking, people won't work hard unless they have to.
3. Whatever it takes, you must get the important people on your side.
4. Avoid direct conflict with others because they may be useful in the future.
5. It's wise to keep track of information that you can use against people later.
6. You should wait for the right time to get back at people.
7. There are things you should hide from other people because they don't need to know.
8. Make sure your plans benefit you, not others.
9. There is a sucker born every minute.
10. People see me as a natural leader.
11. I hate being the center of attention.
12. Many group activities tend to be dull without me.
13. I know that I am special because everyone keeps telling me so.
14. I like to get acquainted with important people.
15. I feel embarrassed if someone compliments me.
16. I have been compared to famous people.
17. I am an average person.
18. I insist on getting the respect I deserve.
19. I like to get revenge on authorities.
20. I avoid dangerous situations.
21. Payback needs to be quick and nasty.
22. People often say I'm out of control.
23. It's true that I can be cruel.
24. People who mess with me always regret it.
25. I have never gotten into trouble with the law.
26. I like to pick on losers.
27. I'll say anything to get what I want.

Davis: Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)

(Davis, 1994; in Kulcsár, 2002)

Kérem, olvassa el az egyes állításokat, és az alábbiak szerint jelölje azt a számot, amely a legjellemzőbb Önre.

4 – teljes mértékben jellemző

3 – nagyon jellemző

2 – jellemző

1 – alig jellemző

0 – egyáltalán nem jellemző

1. _____ Elég gyakran álmodozom és fantáziálok olyan dolgokról, amelyek megtörténhetnek velem.

2. _____ Gyakran gondolok aggodalommal és együttérzéssel azokra az emberekre, akiknek a sorsa kevésbé szerencsés, mint az enyém.

3. _____ Olykor nehézséget okoz, hogy a dolgokat a másik személy nézőpontjából ítéljem meg.

4. _____ Megesik, hogy nem nagyon szomorít el mások problémája.

5. _____ Nagyon bele tudom élni magam egy regényhős érzéseibe.

6. _____ Veszélyhelyzetben szorongás fog el, és igen kényelmetlenül érzem magam.

7. _____ Általában tárgyilagos maradok, ha filmet vagy színdarabot nézek, nem élem bele magam teljesen a cselekménybe.

8. _____ Vitás kérdésekben megpróbálom minden egyes vitapartner nézőpontját figyelembe venni, mielőtt magam döntenék.

9. _____ Ha azt látom, hogy valakit kihasználnak, többnyire felveszem a „védő" szerepét.

10. _____ Olykor tehetetlennek érzem magam, ha erős érzelmekkel teli szituációba kerülök.

11. _____ Olykor úgy próbálom megérteni a barátaimat, hogy elképzelem, milyenek lehetnek a dolgok az ő nézőpontjukból tekintve.

12. _____ Ritkán fordul velem elő, hogy teljesen elmerülök egy jó könyvben vagy filmben.

13. _____ Megpróbálok nyugodt maradni, ha azt látom, hogy valakit megsértettek.

14. _____ Mások balszerencséje nem szokott túlzottan igénybe venni.

15. _____ Ha tudom, hogy valamiben igazam van, nem vesztegetem az időmet azzal, hogy mások érveit végighallgassam.

16. _____ Miután megnéztem egy színdarabot vagy filmet, úgy érzem magam, mintha én lettem volna az egyik szereplő.

17. _____ Megriadok, ha érzelmileg feszült helyzetbe kerülök.

18. _____ Olykor nem érzek túl nagy sajnálatot, ha azt látom, hogy igazságtalanul bánnak valakivel.

19. _____ Vészhelyzetekben általában elég jól megállom a helyemet.

20. _____ Többnyire érzékenyen érintenek azok az események, amelyeknek tanúja vagyok.

21. _____ Azt hiszem, minden kérdésnek két oldala van, ezért megpróbálom mindkettőt megismerni.

22. _____ Lágyszívű emberként jellemezhetném magam.

23. _____ Ha egy jó filmet nézek, könnyen bele tudom képzelni magam a főhős helyébe.

24. _____ Vészhelyzetekben elveszítem a fejem.

25. _____ Ha valami felidegesít, általában leállok egy percre, és megpróbálom magam a másik helyébe képzelni.

26. _____ Ha egy érdekes novellát vagy regényt olvasok, elképzelem, hogy én mit éreznék, ha mindaz, amiről szó van, velem történne.

27. _____ Nagyon kikészülök, ha azt látom, hogy valakinek nagy szüksége volna segítségre, mert vészhelyzetbe került.

28. _____ Mielőtt bárkit kritizálnék, megpróbálom elképzelni, hogy érezném magam az ő helyében.

Schütte Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test (SREIT/EIS)

(Schutte et al., 1998; in Nagy, 2010)

Kérem, olvassa el az egyes állításokat, és döntse el, mennyire jellemzőek Önre! Jelölje meg a legmegfelelőbb számot az alábbiak szerint:

5 – teljes mértékben jellemző

4 – nagyrészt jellemző

3– közepesen jellemző

2 – kevéssé jellemző

1 – egyáltalán nem jellemző

1. _____ Tudom, mikor kell a személyes problémáimat megosztani másokkal.

2. _____ Ha akadályokba ütközöm, eszembe jut, hogy amikor hasonló akadályokkal kerültem szembe, hogyan győztem le azokat.

3. _____ Arra számítok, hogy majdnem mindenben jól teljesítek, amit megpróbálok.

4. _____ Mások könnyen megbíznak bennem.

5. _____ Nehéz megértenem mások nem verbális üzeneteit.

6. _____ Hangulatváltozásaim kapcsán új lehetőségeket fedezek fel.

7. _____ Tisztában vagyok az érzelmeimmel.

8. _____ Jó dolgokra számítok.

9. _____ Szeretem másokkal megosztani az érzéseimet.

10. _____ Amikor pozitív érzelmeket élek át, tudom, mit kell tennem, hogy ezt az érzést hosszasan fenntartsam.

11. _____ Általában olyasmiket szervezek, ami másokat szórakoztat.

12. _____ Olyan programokat keresek, amelyek örömet okoznak nekem.

13. _____ Tisztában vagyok a másoknak küldött nem-verbális üzeneteimmel.

14. _____ Úgy állítom be magam, hogy jó benyomást keltsek mások előtt.

15. _____ Amikor jó hangulatban vagyok, a problémákat könnyen oldom meg.

16. ____ Arckifejezéseik alapján felismerem, milyen érzelmeket élnek át az emberek.

17. ____ Amikor jó hangulatban vagyok, könnyen jutnak eszembe új ötletek.

18. ____ Könnyen felismerem az érzelmeimet.

19. ____ Úgy hozom meg a kedvem egy feladathoz, hogy elképzelem, milyen sikeresen fogom majd teljesíteni.

20. ____ Megdicsérek másokat, amikor valami jót csinálnak.

21. ____ Értem a nem-verbális üzeneteket, amelyeket mások küldenek nekem.

22. ____ Új ötletek jutnak eszembe, amikor érzelmi változásokon esek át.

23. ____ Amikor kihívás előtt állok, feladom, mert úgy érzem, hogy úgyis kudarcot vallok.

24. ____ Tudom, hogy mások mit éreznek, pusztán abból, hogy rájuk nézek.

25. ____ Segítek másoknak, hogy jobban érezzék magukat, amikor maguk alatt vannak.

26. ____ A jó hangulatokat hívom segítségül, amikor akadályokba ütközöm.

27. ____ Mások hangjából már meg tudom állapítani, hogyan érzik magukat.

28. ____ Nehéz megértenem, hogy mások miért éreznek úgy, ahogy éreznek.

Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11)

(Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995)

People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is a test to measure some of the ways in which you act and think. Read each statement and put an X on the appropriate circle on the right side of this page. Do not spend too much time on any statement. Answer quickly and honestly.

	Rarely/ Never	Occasi onally	Often	Almost Always/ Always
1. I plan tasks carefully.				
2. I do things without thinking.				
3. I make-up my mind quickly.				
4. I am happy-go-lucky.				
5. I don't "pay attention."				
6. I have "racing" thoughts.				
7. I plan trips well ahead of time.				
8. I am self-controlled.				
9. I concentrate easily.				
10. I save regularly.				
11. I "squirm" at plays or lectures.				
12. I am a careful thinker.				
13. I plan for job security.				
14. I say things without thinking.				
15. I like to think about complex problems.				
16. I change jobs.				
17. I act "on impulse."				
18. I get easily bored when solving thought problems.				
19. I act on the spur of the moment.				
20. I am a steady thinker.				
21. I change residences.				

22. I buy things on impulse.				
23. I can only think about one thing at a time.				
24. I change hobbies.				
25. I spend or charge more than I earn.				
26. I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking.				
27. I am more interested in the present than the future.				
28. I am restless at the theater or lectures.				
29. I like puzzles.				
30. I am future oriented.				

Conflict Stories Task (CST)

(Szabó, Bereczkei, & Jones, under submission)

STORY 3

CAST:
Man
Police officer

10 a.m. The man is carefully closing the door of the jewelry store behind his back. He stops for a moment as if hesitating, like he is about to go back to the store, but finally he turns around. He takes a look around, and then stuffs his black gloves into his pocket. He pulls up the zipper of his jacket hiding the shiny jewels in his shabby inner pocket. Moving forward with quick steps he runs through the crossroad after having reached the end of the street, even though the traffic light was red. There is a police officer turning from the left corner behind the man's back.

Police officer: Hey, you! Stop!

Man: I… I didn't want to… just, you know… because of my family.

The police officer backing down a little, furrowing his brow looks at the man who is pattering nervously:
Alright, you may hurry home to your family. But take care. And don't do such thing again.

The man looks at the officer transfixed, and then he looks down at his own ragged trouser leg. Suddenly, lifting his hand to his forehead, he turns around and moves forward with long steps.

1.

a) The police officer stopped the man early in the morning.

b) The police officer stopped the man late in the evening.

2.

a)   The police officer knew that the man had just robbed the jewelry store.

b)   The police officer did not know that the man had just robbed the jewelry store.

3.

a)   The man believed that the police officer knew that he had robbed the store.

b)   The man believed that the police officer did not know that he had robbed the store.

4.

a)   The man came to realize that the police officer believed that he was explaining himself because he had walked through the red traffic light.

b)   The man did not know that the police officer believed that he was explaining himself because he had walked through the red traffic light.

5.

a)   The police officer stopped the man because he had robbed the jewelry store.

b)   The police officer stopped the man because he had walked through the red traffic light.

6.

a)   The police officer knew that the man had robbed the jewelry store but he took pity on him because the man did this for his family, so the officer let him go home.

b)   The police officer knew that the man had walked through the red traffic light but he took pity on him because the man hurried home to his family, so the officer let him go home.

7.

a)   The man came to realize that the police officer let him go because he believed his family was the reason he robbed the jewelry store.

b)   The man came to realize that the police officer let him go because he believed his family was the reason he walked through the red traffic light.

8.

a)   The man was feeling sorry and ashamed because he robbed the jewelry store, but his act was necessary because his family lived in great poverty.

b)   The man was merely using his family as an excuse to give a reason why he had robbed the jewelry store.

STORY 5

https://youtu.be/p3fflbFPB20

CAST:
Helen
Evelyn – Helen's friend
Angela – Helen's friend

Helen and Evelyn are chatting in front of a university building.

Evelyn: …and have you heard anything from Angela? I haven't seen her since we graduated from high school.

Helen: Oh yes, I've heard and I've been hearing about her constantly since then… She went to law school and, guess what, she got a new car for this from her parents. You know, this girl can talk soooooo much. She never keeps her mouth shot. Ever. And I'm so tired of it… what's more, we don't even have a common topic to talk about.

Evelyn: Then why don't you just be done with her and come with me more often… for a coffee break? How about tomorrow afternoon?

Helen: Sounds great but unfortunately I have to study. Since exam period started I haven't seen Angela either… thank goodness. But to end all communications with her, that wouldn't be nice. After all she did nothing wrong. Besides, it can be useful if you know somebody who has a good grip of the law – *laughing.*

Evelyn: Ahm, if I were you I wouldn't be so sure that she did nothing wrong to you… I've heard some quite interesting things from Tammy about what Angela told others from you behind your back.

Helen: Excuse me??? What things?

Evelyn: Well, she told for example… But look, here she comes! What is she doing out here? OK, I'm gonna take off. See you later!

Angela: Hey, Helen!

Helen: Angela, you're here?

Angela: Yes, I've come to see you. And now I can see how hard you're studying… I've tried to contact you at least five times during the last couple of days. And now I've come to see that you have time to chat with Evelyn! I don't get you. I think you're just too yellow to tell me that you want to get rid of me.

Helen: Come on, Angela…

Angela – with anger: What? Just say it!

Helen: Well, if you feel like it then you're probably right. There is not much reason for us to stay in touch.

1.

a)   Helen and Angela were classmates at college.

b)   Helen and Angela were classmates at high school.

2.

a)   Helen could not meet Angela because she was too busy to write essays.

b)   Helen could not meet Angela because she had a hard exam period.

3.

a)   Helen didn't like to talk with Angela because they did not even have a common topic.

b)   Helen didn't like to talk with Angela because she felt that Angela, in fact, disliked her.

4.

a)   Angela did not believe that Helen did not want to meet her because of being busy.

b)   Angela did not believe that Helen wanted to get rid of her with the constant rejections.

5.

a)   Helen intended to make Angela get on her bad side with the constant rejections.

b)   Helen did not intend to make Angela get on her bad side with the constant rejections.

6.

a) Helen had planned ahead to end all communications with her friend whom she was tired of.

b) Helen had not planned ahead to end all communications with her friend whom she was tired of.

7.

a) Helen came to realize that there was no reason to stay in touch with the friend whom she was tired of now that she had spoken ill of her behind her back.

b) Helen came to realize that she should stay in touch with the friend whom she was tired of now that she had spoken ill of her behind her back.

STORY 6

CAST:
Shop assistant
Shopkeeper
Customer

In a clothing store, the shop assistant and the shopkeeper are talking quietly, turning their back to the entrance. The entrance door opens and a fine melodious ring announces a customer has come in. Both turn back at once, then the shop assistant comes to see the customer while the shopkeeper disappears into the stockroom at the back of the store.

Shop assistant: Good morning! Can I help you?

Customer: Good morning! There are some beautiful wool coats in the shop window. I'd like to take a closer look at them. I'm looking for an elegant wool coat which is also suitable for casual wear.

Shop assistant: A coat? Pardon me, my hearing is a bit... impaired.

Customer: Yes, a coat. A w-o-o-l c-o-a-t!

Shop assistant: Then this way, please. Here we have lots of wool coats.

The customer is checking and trying on the coats while the shop assistant is eagerly praising how they look. The customer is turning back and forth among the coats for a long time, then finally starts looking for the price tag on the last coat she tried. She finds the tag but it only shows general information without the price. She turns to the shop assistant.

Customer: I can't find the price. How much does this coat cost?

Shop assistant: Pa... pardon? Speak a bit louder, please.

Customer: There's no price on this coat. H-o-w m-u-c-h d-o-e-s i-t c-o-s-t?

The Shop assistant turns toward the stockroom: Lizzie! How much does this coat cost?

The Shopkeeper sticks her head out of the stockroom: That beautiful cashmere coat? Six hundred dollars.

The Shop assistant cupping his hands behind his ears: How much?

Shopkeeper: S-i-x h-u-n-d-r-e-d.

The Shop assistant turns to the customer: She says it is three hundred dollars.

Customer: All right, I will buy it.

Both move forward to the counter, the customer pays three hundred dollars and leaves with the coat. As soon as the entrance door is closed, the shopkeeper comes from the stockroom and pats the shop assistant on the shoulder with a smile on her face.

Shopkeeper: Today we got a good deal again.

1.

a)   The customer had seen beautiful quilted coats in the shop window.

b)   The customer had seen beautiful wool coats in the shop window.

2.

a)   There was a tag on the cashmere coat.

b)   There was no tag on the cashmere coat.

3.

a)   The costumer thought the shop assistant knew what the real price of the coat was.

b)   The costumer thought the shop assistant did not know what the real price of the coat was.

4.

a) The shop assistant knew that the customer thought she obtained the coat at a lower price.

b) The shop assistant did not know that the customer thought she obtained the coat at a lower price.

5.

a) The shopkeeper thought that the shop assistant knew that the customer thought she obtained the coat at a lower price.

b) The shopkeeper did not think that the shop assistant knew that the customer thought she obtained the coat at a lower price.

6.

a) The shop assistant sold the coat at a lower price than he should have.

b) The shop assistant sold the coat at the exact price that he should have.

7.

a) The shopkeeper knew that the shop assistant did not have a hearing impairment.

b) The shopkeeper knew that the shop assistant had a hearing impairment.

8.

a) The customer left the shop in a rash manner because she hoped that they in the shop would not find out that the shop assistant had a hearing impairment.

b) The customer left the shop in a rash manner because she hoped that they in the shop would not find out that she obtained the coat at a lower price.

STORY 8

https://youtu.be/ap7AA-8qwLY

CAST:

Katie – secretary

Grace – head of division

Adam – executive director

Alice – Adam's wife

Co-worker

The Staff were summoned to a meeting at the marketing department to get introduced to the new head of division, Grace. Adam, the executive director, introduces the new boss to everyone. At last, it comes to Katie.

Adam: Katie is an experienced colleague and she plays a vital role in the workplace performance here. She'll be a great help to you too, Grace.

Adam's office. Adam and Katie are having a conversation.

Adam: How did Grace handle everything?

Katie: Good, actually, quite smooth. I'm sure she has good vision… even if her ideas might seem to be a little too radical sometimes. But I've told the colleagues who came complaining to me to give her time to settle into her work. And I will keep an eye on things and, as always, report to you.

Adam: Good. I'm glad that you're paying attention, Katie.

Adam and Grace are talking in front of Katie's desk. Katie is staring at the monitor motionlessly.

Adam: I've just heard from your colleagues how amazing your new campaign was, Grace!

Grace: Yes, we worked a lot and it was a success, luckily.

Adam: Having reached fifteen percent a growth in one month, that's something! Congratulations. Keep up the good work!

Katie is talking with Alice, Adam's wife at a corporate event.

Alice: Katie, you really should have brought your husband here. How long have you been married again?

Katie: Almost twelve years. I know, unbelievable.

Alice: This is so nice. Adam keeps telling me about the exemplary personal life you lead. You know, he is very touchy in this subject. It happened once at his old firm that he fired one of his best employees when it turned out that he started an affair with his assistant.

Katie is chatting quietly with some of her co-workers at the marketing department.

Katie: You know it felt very bad. I could barely bring myself to talk about this to Adam. After all, I like Grace so much. But I've seen her entering the elevator arm-in-arm with Steven. And on Thursday she was tangled up with Paul.

Co-worker: With Paul? He wasn't even here in the office that day! Besides, everyone knows that Paul is the ideal husband!

Katie: Then it was another day. And I saw what I saw. I didn't want to hurt Grace but the big boss should know about all of this. And it's in the interest of the company that the whole truth about Grace is revealed. She has become the little favorite here lately, anyway…

Grace is hurrying to meet Katie at her desk.

Grace: Katie, do you happen to know where Adam is? We're supposed to have a meeting but I can't find him. This is the second time this week. Is it possible he is avoiding me for some reason?

Katie: Well… Adam has just gone out for lunch. You know, I'm not supposed to tell you this… but lately Adam is not satisfied with your work. I've seen this many times before and I'm a little worried for you…

Grace: The way he acted recently… I suspected that there was something wrong. Does he want to fire me? But our results are better than before!

Katie: You know what Adam's like. It's important for him to speak with a common voice. And it isn't good if that is missing. But I'm sure you'll find another job. What's more, I have an acquaintance, who works in marketing at a multinational corporation; she might be able to help you.

Grace: Katie, thank you so much. You're truly an angel.

1.

a) Adam was the executive director.

b) Adam was the head of the marketing division.

2.

a) Katie was single.

b) Katie was married.

3.

a) Katie, from what she said, had seen Grace with Paul on Thursday.

b) Katie, from what she said, had seen Grace with Paul on Friday.

4.

a) Katie thought that Adam thought that she (Katie) did all she could to serve the firm's interest.

b) Katie thought that Adam did not think that she (Katie) did all she could to serve the firm's interest.

5.

a) Grace thought that Katie knew that Adam wanted to fire her (Grace).

b) Grace thought that Katie knew that Adam did not want to fire her (Grace).

6.

a) Katie found out that the big boss could not stand workplace affairs but she was obliged to tell him that she saw the head of the division to making passes to several co-workers, however she meant no harm to her.

b) Katie found out that the big boss could not stand workplace affairs so she told him that she saw the head of the division to making passes to several co-workers, meaning Katie discovered how to get rid of her.

7.

a) The head of the division thought that Katie was helping her with everything.

b) The head of the division did not think that Katie was helping her with everything.

8.

a) The big boss believed what Katie told him about the head of the division that she did not do her job properly and he ignored her (the head of the division) for this reason.

b) The big boss believed what Katie told him about the head of the division making passes to several co-workers and he ignored her (the head of the division) for this reason.

9.

a) Katie offered to help the head of the division find a new job because she felt regret and guilt about having sneaked on her.

b) Katie offered to help the head of the division find a new job because she wanted her to be out of the door as soon as possible.

STORY 10

https://youtu.be/Bq90btXNk4I

CAST:
Richard
Peter – Richard's co-worker
Annie – Richard's girlfriend
Christian – Annie's son
Charles – Richard's boss

Richard received a promotion and he was sent to the big city. He has just moved in to his new apartment with his girlfriend, Annie and her ten-year-old son, Christian when Richard decides to throw a housewarming party. All the people that hold important positions at the foundation, where Richard just began to work as a PR manager, were invited to the party.

Richard and Peter, one of the PR associates, are having a conversation at the housewarming party.

Peter: I'm so happy to be able to work with you, Richard. You've done such an amazing job down at Hudson and everyone knows it.

Richard: Thank you, Peter. And I have to tell you I'm very happy for the opportunity to lead such a wonderful team.

Peter: You know what they say, that your position is the stepping stone to the regional leader position…

Richard: Oh, really? Well, look, for me the only thing that matters here is to collect more money for the children.

Richard and Annie are talking after the housewarming party has ended.

Annie: This evening turned out well, didn't it?

Richard: Yes. And the executive team simply adored you, luckily. Of course, so did I.

Annie: Yeah. My only concerns are about Christian. He seems to be so tired since we moved here. He couldn't even fell asleep tonight until the guests had left. And, you know, tomorrow is gonna be his first day at the new school.

Richard: Don't worry Annie. Kids get used to new things so fast. And so much more excitement and opportunity is waiting for him here in the big city. I think we should go out for a day with him…

Annie: Oh, sure. That sounds so good. But I know that you'll be up to your ears in work, much more than before. And I'll end up spending nights alone with Christian.

Richard: Yes, I will have a lot of work to do, but Annie, please, don't go into this again. You know how important the work what I'm doing is. The more money I can collect, the more we can help sick children. I couldn't bear it if I let them down.

Annie: Yes, I know that. You're right. Sorry for being selfish.

A few months later. Richard is arriving home late in the evening.

Richard: Hi Honey. What's for dinner?

Annie: Hi. It was spaghetti. But it cooled off hours ago. You have to warm it up. I'm going to bed, good night!

Richard: But Annie! Tell me what's wrong?

Annie: What's wrong!? Are you seriously asking me that? I haven't seen you for weeks. You always come home late at night, even on the weekends. Do you really have to go to every single party and social drinking event??

Richard: I'm really sorry but my work can't get done only from behind a desk. And people are more generous at parties. Try to understand please, with all of these things I'm helping… I'm helping children!

Annie: Children, yes, I know. By the way, when will you start to pay attention to Christian and what happens to him? His grades have been continuously falling since we moved here. He doesn't feel good

here. Neither do I. I think it would be the best for us if we moved back to Hudson. By the way, they haven't found anyone for your old job so far.

Richard: Moving back!? That's out of the question. I didn't work this hard for nothing. Besides, the foundation needs me. But I will talk with Christian.

Annie: Then talk. However, I could not continue this much longer.

Richard and Charles, the CEO of the foundation, are having lunch together.

Charles: You know, Richard, some people are talking about you applying for the regional leadership position in PR, which I would absolutely support.

Richard: Well, yes, I've been thinking about it. And I'm really thankful for your support.

Charles: As a matter of fact, there is only one thing that worries me. I have no idea why anyone would say that you're having family issues… But if I even thought… those rumors even partially… could be true… a man leaving his woman with a child… working for THIS foundation… well, I couldn't endorse you for that position.

A couple of weeks later Richard is having a romantic dinner with Annie.

Richard: I was thinking about us… and I have this idea for the weekend. If you like it, we can go fishing with Christian.

Annie: Great, that's a very good idea… But Richard, this doesn't sound like you at all. Plus, we are having dinner together for the second time this week. Please don't take this wrong, I love this change! But there's nothing wrong, right?

Richard: What would be wrong? No. Simply I've had second thoughts… and I came to realize that I love you more than my life. *– He gets down on one knee taking a ring out from his pocket. –* Annie, tell me, will you marry me?

1.

a)   Christian, Annie's son, was ten years old.

b)   Christian, Annie's son, was fifteen years old.

2.

a) Richard was the PR manager at the foundation.

b) Richard was the CEO at the foundation.

3.

a) Annie thought that Richard thought that helping children was the most important for him.

b) Annie thought that Richard thought that his own career was the most important for him.

4.

a) Richard thought that Annie thought that Richard did his best to support the case of sick children.

b) Richard thought that Annie did not think that Richard did his best to support the case of sick children.

5.

a) Richard thought that Charles did not believe that Richard had problems with his family.

b) Richard thought that Charles believed that Richard had problems with his family.

6.

a) Richard neglected his girlfriend because of his passion to help sick children.

b) Richard neglected his girlfriend because of his passion to build his career.

7.

a) The girlfriend expressed her displeasure but then felt sorry for attempting to distract Richard from his important helper work.

b) The girlfriend expressed her displeasure and did not feel sorry for attempting to distract Richard from his important helper work.

8.

a) His boss warned Richard that there are rumors about him having problems in his private life but the boss did not believe them.

b) His boss warned Richard that if he left his girlfriend and her child he wouldn't get the position he wanted to apply for.

9.

a) Richard got his boss's message and asked his girlfriend to marry him because he came to realize that the woman was the most important for him.

b) Richard got his boss's message and asked his girlfriend to marry him because his career was the most important for him.

STORY 11

https://youtu.be/UF2zHJFI-4k

CAST:

Kimberly

Joan – Kimberly's friend

Sheila – Kimberly's friend

Candice – Sheila's friend

Alex – Joan's boyfriend

Kimberly and Joan are chatting in front of the classroom.

Kimberly: I heard you entered the physics competition. How is your preparation going?

Joan: Pretty well, although I have to read some more books. They say Simon's book is excellent, I just don't know where to get it.

Kimberly: Sheila is also running for the competition. Did you know that?

Joan: Of course, at least I thought so. She'll take all opportunities to show me up. She wants to be on top of the class anyway she can… And that doesn't bother me at all, you know, that's not what's important for me. I just want to learn and get admitted into a good college… But Sheila and Candice and their whole bunch…

Kimberly: Yeah, I know. Sheila's and Candice's opinions always matter in our class.

Joan: And that's also fine… It's just they are so rude to me! They started to call me names and they seem to always try to piss me off on purpose. Careful, they're coming! I'm going back inside otherwise they'll see us together and you'll end up being the next victim of their bullying…

Sheila and Candice are approaching Kimberly.

Sheila: Good morning, Kimberly. Were you talking to Joan just now?

Kimberly: She just asked me if I knew whether literature class got cancelled today.

Sheila: She doesn't even know that? Ugh, this girl is not getting the picture at all. Anyway, today is a good day! I've found Simon's book. You know, this book is the best to prepare for the competition and it can be borrowed from the county library!

Kimberly looks away and sees Alex, Joan's boyfriend walking to their direction on the corridor. He is going to pass them shortly.

Kimberly (– speaking louder): Are you serious? Simon's book available at the county library? I'd never have thought to look there. I thought it was out of print!

1.

a) Kimberly was the main influencer in her class.

b) Kimberly was pretty tight with the main influencers in her class.

2.

a) Sheila found Simon's book in the public library.

b) Sheila found Simon's book in the county library.

3.

a) Kimberly knew that her friendship with Joan annoyed Sheila.

b) Kimberly knew that her friendship with Joan did not annoy Sheila.

4.

a) Kimberly thought that Alex knew that Joan wanted the book so he would notice the information she gave about the book.

b) Kimberly thought that Alex did not know that Joan wanted the book so he would not notice the information she gave about the book.

5.

a) Kimberly started to speak louder because she was surprised that the influencer girl had found the book.

b) Kimberly started to speak louder because she wanted the boyfriend of the bullied girl to hear what she was about to say.

6.

a) Kimberly did not want to tell the information she heard about the book to the bullied girl because she was afraid that the influencer girls would come to know that it was her who had revealed this information.

b) Kimberly did not want to tell the information she heard about the book to the bullied girl because she was afraid that the bullied girl would then win the physics competition.

STORY 13

https://youtu.be/RkW2jFIR1aI

CAST:
Andrea
Jessica – Andrea's friend
Brad – Andrea's boyfriend
Matthew
Clara – Andrea's mother

The seventeen-year-old Andrea is lying on her couch while chatting with her friend, Jessica.

Jessica: Now tell me what's up! Your sighs can be heard from the basement.

Andrea: It's nothing. I'm just finished with this world. Brad didn't call me back… And it was because of him that I broke my mom's car. He should really pay for it or have it repai…

Jessica: What did you do!? You haven't even got your license yet!

Andrea: Jess!! I know that. But I'll get it soon so I took the car… My mom doesn't even use this one. She purchased another one for herself and this one would be mine anyway. So I went to Brad's party. And we had a fight because he hadn't paid much attention to me.

Jessica: Meaning he was engaged with other stuff AS WELL. Since he was the one who organized the party.

Andrea: Now whose side are you on?

Jessica: Just keep talking.

Andrea: Well, so I flirted a little with Matthew. We had some beer. But Brad didn't show any reaction. So then I got pissed, jumped into the car, and came home… Only… there were these stupid bins of the stupid neighbors there… And Matthew had given me some crazy strong beer… So I bumped against them. And the car got dented. Just on one side.

Jessica: What did your mom say?

Andrea: Nothing. I'll tell her later.

Jessica: Andy!

Andrea: I said later, if I get my license. And dad would pay for the repair. Or, better yet, Brad! It was his fault, after all.

Jessica: So you blame Brad.

Andrea: Of course, who else?

On that evening Clara, Andrea's mother enters her room.

Clara: Andrea, we need to talk. I can't believe what you did again.

Andrea: What, what? Why are you always so negative? You always think there's something wrong with me!

Clara: Unfortunately, I don't think that, I know that…

Andrea: Because you hate me! Everybody just hates me! My teachers, my friends. Even my dad hates me; this is why he left me! You think I did this on purpose, that I'm stupid? And now you're mean to me.

Clara: But my… calm down. Nobody hates you. But I can't let this go.

Andrea: Because everything is my fault, right!? Everything would be better without me. You would be happier. And sure I'll go away! I'll pack my stuff and go when you're not home. I won't even care if you die. I'll go to daddy who understands me way much better than you.

Clara: But… but, honey. I'm just trying to help you. Help you to take more responsibility for what you're doing. And for what you're promising to others. Because you had promised that you would go and take extra coaching for chemistry with Mrs Sanchez every Tuesday. And she was waiting for you today, but you didn't show. And I had to pay for it!

Andrea is closing her eyes and rubbing her forehead: But… I've had so much to do recently; I can't keep everything straight.

Clara: That is not an excuse! … I thought I should punish you. But now I can see that you're totally exhausted. So, it would be enough for you to make a call to Mrs Sanchez and properly apologize to her. Also, next time you'll show up to the chemistry coaching on time.

Andrea: Alright, then good.

Clara: Is that all?

Andrea: Just leave me alone!

1.

a)   Andrea flirted with Brad at the party.

b)   Andrea flirted with Matthew at the party.

2.

a)   Andrea didn't show up to the extra coaching for mathematics.

b)   Andrea didn't show up to the extra coaching for chemistry.

3.

a)   Clara thought that Andrea was on edge because she had damaged her car.

b)   Clara did not think that Andrea was on edge because she had damaged her car.

4.

a)   Andrea believed that Clara knew that Andrea was being defensive because of the damaged car.

b) Andrea believed that Clara did not know that Andrea was being defensive because of the damaged car.

5.

a) Andrea came to realize that Clara believed that she was explaining herself because she had missed the extra coaching.

b) Andrea did not know that Clara believed that she was explaining herself because she had missed the extra coaching.

6.

a) Andrea damaged her mother's car and told her what she did.

b) Andrea damaged her mother's car and did not tell her what she did.

7.

a) Her mother called Andrea to account for damaging her car.

b) Her mother called Andrea to account for not showing up to the extra coaching.

8.

a) Andrea was threatening and accusing her mother because she wanted to get a smaller punishment.

b) Andrea was threatening and accusing her mother because she wanted her mother to pay more attention to her.

9.

a) Andrea was relieved because her mother did not punish her severely for damaging her car.

b) Andrea was relieved because her mother did not come to realize that she had damaged her car.

STORY 14

CAST:
Melinda
Andrew – Melinda's boyfriend
Simon – Andrew's friend

Melinda's office. Andrew, Melinda's boyfriend enters through the door.

Andrew: Hi Mellie, how was your day?

Melinda: Hi darling! So good to see you. I'm done in a minute. What about dining out tonight?

Andrew: That would be nice but I've just bumped into Simon in the hall and we want to go play tennis. I would love to come by after. Could cook something good for me? It is so rare that I get to eat your cooking anyway.

Melinda: Rare. Hum. What do you actually mean by that?

Andrew: Ah nothing, nothing. You just cook so well we should eat together more often... And I had a talk with Simon and, you know, he gets dinner at home every day... It must feel so good.

Melinda: Oh, Simon? I see. I'm sure Simon's mother waits for her only son with marvelous meals every day but, as far as I know, Simon's mother is retired so she doesn't sit in an office ten hours a day!

Andrew: Ok, ok, got it. Never mind, it was just an idea. See you in the evening, then! Bye darling.

Melinda's office. A few days later. Simon is standing at the door with a heap of CDs in his hands.

Simon: Hey Minnie!

Melinda: Melinda if you don't mind. Hi Simon!

Simon: Could you please take these to Andrew? I really can't meet up with him today. I've got a date, although, I'm not sure if I can trust women nowadays…... Anyway, Andrew must receive these today, so is it ok?

Melinda: Simon, I've got too much on my plate already! I still have a lot to get done. I'm not sure if I can take them to him today. Besides, there's not enough room in my bag for so many CDs.

That night Andrew and Melinda are talking at the girl's apartment.

Andrew: Didn't Simon send some CDs to me?

Melinda: Oh no... he came to my office and asked if you would see me there today because he had to give you some CDs.

Andrew: Damn, that was very very important!

Melinda: I told him I'd take them but he said something like women can't be trusted.

Andrew: Ah, Simon can't ever really be trusted. He's my friend... and he says you can't be trusted? Maybe it's time to think this friendship over.

Melinda lowers her eyes: Just as you please, Andrew.

1.

a) Melinda, who was Simon's girlfriend, became jealous of Andrew.

b) Melinda, who was Andrew's girlfriend, became jealous of Simon.

2.

a) The very next morning Andrew asked whether Simon had sent him a couple of CDs.

b) The very next evening of that day Andrew asked whether Simon had sent him a couple of CDs.

3.

a) Andrew suspected that Melinda wanted to play him off against Simon.

b) Andrew did not suspect that Melinda wanted to play him off against Simon.

4.

a) Simon believed that Melinda did not want to take the CDs to Andrew because there was not enough room in her bag for them.

b) Simon believed that Melinda did not want to take the CDs to Andrew because she wanted to sabotage Andrew.

5.

a) Melinda thought that Andrew would be convinced that Simon did not like Melinda.

b) Melinda thought that Andrew would not be convinced that Simon did not like Melinda.

6.

a)   Andrew wanted his girlfriend to cook more frequently.

b)   Andrew wanted his girlfriend to dine more frequently with his mother.

7.

a)   Andrew's girlfriend was willing to take the CDs to Andrew but Andrew's friend did not want to entrust them to her.

b)   Andrew's girlfriend was not willing to take the CDs to Andrew although Andrew's friend would have given them to her.

8.

a)   Andrew's girlfriend precisely repeated to Andrew the disparaging remark about women which Andrew's friend made because he did not want to entrust the CDs to the girl.

b)   Andrew's girlfriend did not precisely repeat to Andrew the disparaging remark about women which Andrew's friend made because he was not sure about his date.

9.

a)   Andrew's girlfriend lied to Andrew in order to show him his friend in an unfavorable light.

b)   Andrew's girlfriend did not mean to lie to Andrew, she just did not remember exactly what Andrew's friend said.

KONFLIKTUS TÖRTÉNETEK TESZT (CST)

3. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:
Férfi
Rendőr

Este tíz óra. A férfi óvatosan behúzza maga mögött az ékszerüzlet ajtaját. Tétován megáll, majd mintha visszamenne az üzletbe, de végül megfordul. Körülnéz, azután zsebébe gyömöszöli a fekete kesztyűjét, és felhúzza a cipzárt a kabátján, teljesen elrejtve a szakadt belső zsebéből kissé kikandikáló, csillogó ékszereket. Sietős léptekkel elindul, és az utca végére érve átszalad a kereszteződésen. A lámpa pirosat jelez. Balról a férfi háta mögött egy rendőr fordul be a sarkon.

Rendőr: Hé, álljon meg!

A férfi: Én nem akartam… csak, tudja… a családom miatt.

A rendőr kissé hátrahőköl, ráncolja a homlokát, majd ránéz az idegesen toporgó férfira: Jól van, akkor siessen haza a családjához! De csak óvatosan. És többet ilyet ne csináljon.

A férfi tágra nyílt szemmel mered a rendőrre, majd lefelé bámul, a rongyos nadrágszárára. Aztán hirtelen a homlokához emeli a kezét, megfordul, és hosszú léptekkel továbbindul.

1.)

A. A rendőr kora reggel állította meg a férfit.

B. A rendőr késő este állította meg a férfit.

2.)

A. A rendőr tudta, hogy a férfi éppen kirabolta az ékszerüzletet.

B. A rendőr nem tudta, hogy a férfi éppen kirabolta az ékszerüzletet.

3.)

A. A férfi azt hitte, hogy a rendőr tudja, hogy ő kirabolta az üzletet.

B. A férfi azt hitte, hogy a rendőr nem tudja, hogy ő kirabolta az üzletet.

4.)

A. A férfi rájött, hogy a rendőr azt hiszi, hogy ő azért magyarázkodik, mert átment a tilos jelzésen.

B. A férfi nem tudta, hogy a rendőr azt hiszi, hogy ő azért magyarázkodik, mert átment a tilos jelzésen.

5.)

A. A rendőr azért állította meg a férfit, mert az kirabolta az ékszerüzletet.

B. A rendőr azért állította meg a férfit, mert az tilosban kelt át a zebrán.

6.)

A. A rendőr tudta, hogy a férfi kirabolta az ékszerüzletet, de megszánta, mert az a családja miatt tette, ezért hazaengedte a férfit.

B. A rendőr tudta, hogy a férfi átment a piroson, de megszánta, mert az siet haza a családjához, ezért hazaengedte a férfit.

7.)

A. A férfi rájött, hogy a rendőr abban a hitben engedi elmenni, hogy a családjára hivatkozva megindokolta, miért rabolta ki az ékszerüzletet.

B. A férfi rájött, hogy a rendőr abban a hitben engedi elmenni, hogy a családjára hivatkozva megindokolta, miért sietett át a piroson.

8.)

A. A férfi megbánta és szégyellte, hogy kirabolta az ékszerüzletet, de a kényszer szülte tettét, mert a családja nagy szegénységben él.

B. A férfi csupán felhasználta a családját, hogy indokot szolgáltasson ahhoz, miért rabolta ki az ékszerüzletet.

5. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:

Helga - egyetemista lány

Evelin - Helga barátnője

Anikó - Helga barátnője

Helga és Evelin az egyetem épülete előtt beszélgetnek.

Evelin: …és nem hallottál valamit Anikóról? Az érettségi óta nem találkoztam vele.

Helga: De hallottam, én hallgatom azóta is… Most éppen a jogra jár, képzeld, kapott érte a szüleitől egy autót. Te, ennek a lánynak be nem áll a szája… annyit tud beszélni. Én már nagyon unom… ráadásul közös témánk se nagyon akad.

Evelin: Akkor miért nem építed le, és jössz inkább többször velem kávézni? Mondjuk holnap délután?

Helga: Jó lenne, de sajnos tanulnom kell. Amióta a vizsgaidőszak tart, Anikóval se találkoztam. Szerencsére. De megszakítani vele a kapcsolatot, hát, az nem volna szép dolog. Végül is nem tett semmi rosszat. Ráadásul jól jöhet még az embernek, ha van egy jogász ismerőse.

Evelin: Hm, én abban nem lennék olyan biztos, hogy semmi rosszat nem tett veled... Elég érdekes dolgokat hallottam Timitől, hogy Anikó miket mesél rólad a hátad mögött.

Helga: Micsoda??? Miket?

Evelin: Hát, például… De nézd már, éppen itt jön! Mit keres ez itt? Na, én megyek, majd beszélünk, szia!

Anikó: Szia, Helga!

Helga: Anikó, hát te itt?

Anikó: Igen, hozzád jöttem. Látom, most is, mennyire tanulsz. Legalább ötször kerestelek a napokban, hogy találkozzunk. Most meg itt beszélgetsz Evelinnel! Nem értelek. Szerintem csak félsz a szemembe mondani, hogy le akarsz rázni.

Helga: Ugyan már, Anikó…

Anikó: Na, mondjad már!

Helga: Hát, ha így gondolod, akkor nyilván így is van. Akkor tényleg nincs sok értelme, hogy tartsuk a kapcsolatot.

1.)

A. Helga és Anikó évfolyamtársak voltak az egyetemen.

B. Helga és Anikó osztálytársak voltak a középiskolában.

2.)

A. Helga azért utasította vissza Anikó találkozási kísérleteit, mert a megírandó dolgozatai miatt nem volt ideje rá.

B. Helga azért utasította vissza Anikó találkozási kísérleteit, mert a vizsgái miatt nem volt ideje rá.

3.)

A. Helga azért nem szeretett Anikóval beszélgetni, mert közös témájuk se nagyon akadt.

B. Helga azért nem szeretett Anikóval beszélgetni, mert érezte, hogy Anikó valójában nem kedveli őt.

4.)

A. Anikó nem hitte el, hogy Helga a teendői miatt nem tud vele találkozni.

B. Anikó nem hitte el, hogy Helga le akarja őt rázni az állandó visszautasításokkal.

5.)

A. Helgának az volt a szándéka, hogy a visszautasítások révén előbb-utóbb magára haragítsa Anikót.

B. Helgának nem állt szándékában, hogy a visszautasításokkal előbb-utóbb magára haragítsa Anikót.

6.)

A. Helga már jó előre eltervezte, hogy megszakítja a kapcsolatot a megunt barátnővel.

B. Helga nem tervezte előre, hogy megszakítja a kapcsolatot a megunt barátnővel.

7.)

A. Helga rájött, hogy már nem éri meg továbbra is tartani a kapcsolatot a megunt barátnővel így, hogy az a rossz hírét keltette a háta mögött.

B. Helga rájött, hogy továbbra is tartania kell a kapcsolatot a megunt barátnővel így, hogy az a rossz hírét keltette a háta mögött.

6. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:
Eladó
Üzletvezető
Vásárló

A ruhaüzletben az eladó és az üzletvezető háttal a bejáratnak halkan beszélgetnek. Az üzlet ajtaja kinyílik, és finom, dallamosan csengő hang jelzi, hogy vendég érkezett. Egyszerre fordulnak hátra, majd az eladó a vevő köszöntésére siet, az üzletvezető pedig hátul eltűnik a raktárban.

Eladó: Jó napot kívánok! Miben segíthetek?

Vásárló: Jó napot kívánok! Olyan szép kabátok vannak a kirakatban. Megnézném. Egy elegáns, de hétköznap is hordható szövetkabátot keresek.

Eladó: Kabátot? Bocsásson meg, de kissé… rossz a hallásom.

Vásárló: Igen, kabátot. Sz-ö-v-e-t-k-a-b-á-t-o-t!

Eladó: Akkor erre tessék. Itt vannak a szövetkabátjaink.

A vásárló nézegeti és próbálgatja a kabátokat, miközben az eladó készségesen dicséri. A vásárló sokat forgolódik, végül az utolsóként felvett modellen elkezdi keresni az árcédulát. A cédulát megtalálja, de csak az általános információkat tartalmazza, ár nincs rajta. Az eladóhoz fordul.

Vásárló: Nem találom az árát. Mennyibe kerül ez a kabát?

Eladó: Ho… hogy mondja? Kicsit hangosabban, ha kérhetem.

Vásárló: Nincs rajta ár. M-i-b-e k-e-r-ü-l?

Az Eladó –a raktár felé fordul: Erzsike! Mennyibe kerül ez a kabát?

Az Üzletvezető –kidugja a fejét a raktárból: Az a gyönyörű kasmír-szövet kabát? Hatvankétezer.

Az Eladó –a kezét a füléhez emelve: Mennyi?

Üzletvezető: H-a-t-v-a-n-k-é-t-e-z-e-r!

Az Eladó –a vevőhöz fordul: Azt mondja, harminckétezer forint.

Vásárló: Rendben, akkor megveszem.

Mindketten a pulthoz sietnek, a vásárló kifizeti a harminckétezer forintot, és távozik a kabáttal. Amint becsukódik az üzlet ajtaja, az üzletvezető kijön a raktárból, és mosolyogva vállon veregeti az eladót.

Üzletvezető*:* Ma is jó üzletet csináltunk.

1.)

A. A vásárló szép steppelt dzsekiket látott a kirakatban.

B. A vásárló szép kabátokat látott a kirakatban.

2.)

A. A kasmír-szövet kabáton volt cédula.

B. A kasmír-szövet kabáton nem volt cédula.

3.)

A. A vásárló azt gondolta, hogy az eladó tudja, mi a kabát valódi ára.

B. A vásárló azt gondolta, hogy az eladó nem tudja, mi a kabát valódi ára.

4.)

A. Az eladó tudta, hogy a vásárló azt gondolja, hogy alacsonyabb áron jut hozzá a kabáthoz.

B. Az eladó nem tudta, hogy a vásárló azt gondolja, hogy alacsonyabb áron jut hozzá a kabáthoz.

5.)

A. Az üzletvezető azt gondolta, hogy az eladó tudja, hogy a vásárló azt gondolja, olcsóbban jutott hozzá a kabáthoz.

B. Az üzletvezető nem gondolta, hogy az eladó tudja, hogy a vásárló azt gondolja, olcsóbban jutott hozzá a kabáthoz.

6.)

A. Az eladó alacsonyabb áron adta el a kabátot, mint kellett volna.

B. Az eladó pontosan azon az áron adta el a kabátot, amelyen el kellett adnia.

7.)

A. Az üzletvezető tudta, hogy az eladó jól hall.

B. Az üzletvezető tudta, hogy az eladó nem hall jól.

8.)

A. A vásárló gyorsan távozott, mert azt remélte, így nem jönnek rá az üzletben, hogy az eladó valójában nem hall jól.

B. A vásárló gyorsan távozott, mert azt remélte, így nem jönnek rá az üzletben, hogy valójában alacsonyabb áron jutott hozzá a kabáthoz.

8. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:
Kati - titkárnő
Gréta - osztályvezető
András - igazgató
Eszter - András felesége
Egy munkatárs

A marketingosztályon összalkalmazotti értekezletet hívnak össze, hogy bemutassák az új osztályvezetőt, Grétát. A vállalati igazgató, András mindenkinek bemutatja az új főnököt, majd végül a titkárságvezetőre, Katira kerül a sor.

András: Kati régi motoros, és kulcsszerepe van abban, hogy az osztály gördülékenyen végezze a munkáját, óriási segítséget fog nyújtani neked is, Gréta.

András irodája. András és Kati beszélgetnek.

András: Hogy sikerült Grétának az indulás?

Kati: Jól, mondhatni zökkenőmentesen. Én biztos vagyok benne, hogy Gréta jót akar, még ha az ötletei sokszor túl radikálisak is. De mondtam a kollégáknak is, akik hozzám jöttek emiatt, hogy adjanak neki időt, hogy belerázódjon a munkába. Addig meg én folyamatosan rajta tartom a szemem az ügyeken, és mint mindig, azonnal beszámolok neked.

András: Rendben, örülök, hogy odafigyelsz, Kati.

András és Gréta Kati íróasztala előtt beszélgetnek. Kati mozdulatlanul a monitort bámulja.

András: Gréta, most hallottam a kollegáktól, milyen nagyszerűen sikerült az új kampányod.

Gréta: Igen, sokat dolgoztunk rajta, és szerencsére eredményesen is.

András: Egy hónap alatt tizenöt százalékos növekedést elérni, ez nem semmi! Gratulálok, csak így tovább!

Kati András feleségével, Eszterrel beszélget egy vállalati összejövetelen.

Eszter: Kati, igazán elhozhattad volna a férjedet, mióta is vagytok házasok?

Kati: Lassan tizenkét éve. Szinte hihetetlen.

Eszter: Ez nagyon szép, András is mindig mondja, hogy milyen példás magánéletet élsz. Tudod, ő erre nagyon kényes. Egyszer, még a régi cégnél kirúgta az egyik legjobb beosztottját, mert kiderült, hogy viszonyt kezdett az asszisztensével.

Kati a marketingosztály néhány munkatársával sutyorog.

Kati: Tudjátok, nagyon rossz érzés volt. Alig tudtam rávenni magam, hogy beszéljek erről Andrásnak. Hiszen annyira kedvelem Grétát. De hát tegnap Istvánnal láttam karonfogva beszállni a liftbe, csütörtökön meg Péterrel gabalyodott össze.

Egy munkatárs: Péterrel? De hiszen csütörtökön nem is volt bent! És egyébként is, mindenki tudja, hogy Péter mintaférj!

Kati: Akkor egy másik napon volt. És láttam, amit láttam. És nem akartam ártani Grétának, de a nagyfőnöknek tudnia kellett erről, mert a cégnek igenis fontos, hogy kiderüljön Grétáról a teljes igazság. Mostanában úgyis ő lett itt a kis kedvenc…

Gréta Kati asztalához siet.

Gréta: Kati, nem tudod, hol van András? Most lenne megbeszélésünk, de nincs az irodájában. A héten már másodszor. Lehet, hogy valamiért kerül engem?

Kati: Hát…, András most ment el ebédelni. Tudod, ezt nem lenne szabad elmondanom neked, de András mostanában nincs megelégedve a munkáddal. Én ezt már sokszor láttam, kicsit féltelek…

Gréta: Ahogyan az utóbbi időben viselkedik velem, sejtettem, hogy baj lesz. Lehet, hogy ki akar rúgni? Pedig az eredményeink jobbak, mint voltak.

Kati: De hát tudod, milyen András. Neki a közös hang is fontos, és nem jó, ha ez nincs meg. De biztos találsz másik munkát. Sőt, van egy ismerősöm, aki egy multicégnél marketinges, szerintem ő tud neked segíteni.

Gréta: Kati, köszönöm, te tényleg egy angyal vagy.

1.)

A. András a vállalat igazgatója volt.

B. András a marketingosztály vezetője volt.

2.)

A. Kati egyedülálló volt.

B. Kati házasságban élt.

C.

3.)

A. Kati elmondása szerint csütörtökön látta együtt Grétát Péterrel.

B. Kati elmondása szerint pénteken látta együtt Grétát Péterrel.

4.)

A. Kati azt gondolta, hogy András azt gondolja, hogy ő, vagyis Kati mindent megtesz a cég érdekében.

B. Kati azt gondolta, hogy András nem gondolja, hogy ő, vagyis Kati mindent megtesz a cég érdekében.

5.)

A. Gréta azt gondolta, hogy Kati tudja, hogy András ki akarja őt, vagyis Grétát rúgni.

B. Gréta azt gondolta, hogy Kati tudja, hogy András nem akarja őt, vagyis Grétát kirúgni.

6.)

A. Kati megtudta, hogy a nagyfőnök nem viseli el a munkahelyi kapcsolatokat, de kénytelen volt elmondani neki, hogy látta az osztályvezető asszonyt több munkatársával is kikezdeni, bár Kati nem akart a nőnek rosszat.

B. Kati megtudta, hogy a nagyfőnök nem viseli el a munkahelyi kapcsolatokat, ezért azt mondta neki, hogy látta az osztályvezető asszonyt több munkatársával is kikezdeni, így Kati rájött, hogyan szabadulhat meg a nőtől.

7.)

A. Az osztályvezető asszony azt hitte, hogy Kati mindenben segít neki.

B. Az osztályvezető asszony nem hitte, hogy Kati mindenben segít neki.

8.)

A. A nagyfőnök elhitte Katinak, hogy az osztályvezető asszony nem végzi jól a munkáját, és ezért kerülte őt, vagyis az osztályvezetőt.

B. A nagyfőnök elhitte Katinak, hogy az osztályvezető asszony több munkatársával is kikezdett, és ezért kerülte őt, vagyis az osztályvezetőt.

9.)

A. Kati azért ajánlotta fel az osztályvezető asszonynak, hogy segít neki munkát keresni, mert megbánta, hogy beárulta őt a nagyfőnöknél, és bűntudata volt.

B. Kati azért ajánlotta fel az osztályvezető asszonynak, hogy segít neki munkát keresni, hogy minél előbb házon kívül tudhassa őt.

10. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:

Gellért

Péter - Gellért munkatársa

Anna - Gellért barátnője

Krisztián - Anna fia

Károly - Gellért főnöke

Gellértet előléptették, és a fővárosba helyezték át. Éppen csak beköltözött az új lakásába barátnőjével, Annával és annak tíz éves kisfiával, Krisztiánnal, és máris lakásavatót rendeztek. Az ünnepségre az alapítvány, amelynél Gellért immár marketingvezetőként dolgozott, minden fontos pozíciót betöltő munkatársát meghívták.

Gellért és Péter, az egyik marketinges, a lakásavatón beszélgetnek.

Péter: Nagyon örülök, hogy végre együtt dolgozhatunk, Gellért. Elképesztő munkát végeztél Szegeden, ezt itt mindenki tudja.

Gellért: Köszönöm, és örülök, hogy ilyen remek csapatot irányíthatok.

Péter: Tudod, azt is mondják, hogy a te pozíciód már a regionális vezetői poszt előszobája.

Gellért: Tényleg? Hát, nézd, nekem csak az számít, hogy minél több pénzt gyűjtsünk a gyerekeknek.

Gellért és Anna a lakásavatót követően beszélgetnek.

Anna: Jól sikerült az este, nem gondolod?

Gellért: Igen, és az igazgatói brancs különösen imádott téged, szerencsére. Ahogyan én is.

Anna: Csak Krisztiánért aggódom egy kicsit. Olyan fáradtnak látom a költözés óta. Ma sem tudott elaludni, míg el nem mentek a vendégek, és holnap lesz az első napja az új iskolában.

Gellért: Ugyan már, a gyerekek olyan gyorsan megszokják az új dolgokat. És annyival több izgalom és lehetőség vár rá itt a fővárosban. Majd elmegyünk együtt kirándulni…

Anna: Na, persze. Ez jól hangzik, de tudom, hogy annyi lesz a munkád, hogy ki sem látszol majd belőle. Még több, mint eddig. És újra csak kettesben fogunk tölteni minden estét Krisztiánnal.

Gellért: Igen, sok lesz a munkám, de Anna, ne kezdjük ezt megint elölről. Tudod, hogy milyen fontos munkát végzek. Minél több pénzt szerzek, annál többet tudunk segíteni a beteg gyerekeknek. Nem tudnám elviselni, ha nem tennék meg értük mindent.

Anna: Igen, tudom, igazad van. Ne haragudj, önző voltam.

Néhány hónappal később. Gellért késő este ér haza a munkából.

Gellért: Szia drágám, mi a vacsora?

Anna: Szia, spagetti volt, de már órák óta kihűlt. Meg kell melegítened. Én megyek lefeküdni, jó éjszakát.

Gellért: De Annám, mondd, mi a baj?

Anna: Mi a baj!? Ezt komolyan kérdezed? Hetek óta nem látlak, mindig éjjel esel haza. Még hétvégén is. Tényleg muszáj minden partin és italozáson ott lenned?

Gellért: Nagyon sajnálom, de az én munkámat nem csak az asztal mellől kell végezni. És egy partin még adakozóbbak az emberek. Értsd már meg, mindezzel gyerekeken segítek!

Anna: Gyerekeken, igen, tudom. Jut eszembe, mikor figyelsz végre arra, hogy Krisztiánnal mi történik? Folyamatosan romlanak a jegyei, mióta ideköltöztünk. Nem érzi jól magát itt. És én sem. Én azt hiszem, mindenkinek az lenne a legjobb, ha visszamennénk Szegedre. Még úgysem találtak a régi helyedre senkit.

Gellért: Visszamenni!? Arról szó sem lehet. Nem azért dolgoztam ennyit. És az alapítványnak szüksége van rám. Majd valamikor beszélek Krisztiánnal.

Anna: Beszélj. De én sem bírom már így sokáig.

Gellért és Károly, az alapítvány ügyvezető igazgatója együtt ebédelnek.

Károly: Tudod, Gellért, egyesek azt beszélik, hogy megpályázod a regionális marketingvezetői pozíciót, és ezzel maximálisan egyetértek.

Gellért: Nos, igen, gondolkozom rajta. És nagyon örülök a támogatásodnak.

Károly: Valójában csak egy dolog aggaszt engem. Fogalmam sincs, miért mondaná bárki, hogy esetleg családi gondjaid lennének… De ha azt gondolnám, hogy a pletykákból akár csak egy szó is igaz… egy férfi, aki otthagyja az asszonyát egy gyerekkel… meg az alapítványi munka… hát, nem tudnálak javasolni a posztra.

Néhány héttel később. Gellért romantikus vacsorára viszi Annát.

Gellért: Tudod, arra gondoltam, hogy a hétvégén elvihetnénk Krisztiánt horgászni.

Anna: Persze, nagyon jó ötlet… De Gellért, rád sem ismerek. A héten már másodszor vacsorázunk együtt. Ne értsd félre, imádom ezt a változást. De nincs baj, ugye?

Gellért: Már hogy lenne baj? Egyszerűen átgondoltam néhány dolgot, és rájöttem, hogy jobban szeretlek az életemnél is. - *Letérdel, és elővesz egy gyűrűt.* –Anna, mondd, hozzám jössz feleségül?

1.)

A. Krisztián, Anna fia, tíz éves volt.

B. Krisztián, Anna fia, tizenöt éves volt.

2.)

A. Gellért az alapítvány fővárosi marketingvezetője volt.

B. Gellért az alapítvány regionális marketingvezetője volt.

3.)

A. Anna azt gondolta, hogy Gellért azt gondolja, a beteg gyerekek megsegítése a legfontosabb.

B. Anna azt gondolta, hogy Gellért azt gondolja, a saját karrierje a legfontosabb.

4.)

A. Gellért azt gondolta, hogy Anna azt gondolja, hogy Gellért mindent a beteg gyerekek érdekében tesz.

B. Gellért azt gondolta, hogy Anna nem gondolja, hogy Gellért mindent a beteg gyerekek érdekében tesz.

5.)

A. Gellért azt gondolta, hogy Károly nem hiszi el, hogy Gellértnek családi gondjai vannak.

B. Gellért azt gondolta, hogy Károly elhiszi, hogy Gellértnek családi gondjai vannak.

6.)

A. Gellért elhanyagolta a barátnőjét a beteg gyerekek megsegítése miatt.

B. Gellért elhanyagolta a barátnőjét a karrierje miatt.

7.)

A. A barátnő elégedetlenségének adott hangot, de meg is bánta, amiért el akarja vonni Gellértet fontos segítő munkája mellől.

B. A barátnő elégedetlenségének adott hangot, és nem bánta, amiért el akarja vonni Gellértet fontos segítő munkája mellől.

8.)

A. A főnöke figyelmeztette Gellértet, hogy arról pletykálnak, nincs minden rendben a magánéletében, de a főnök nem hitt a pletykáknak.

B. A főnöke figyelmeztette Gellértet, hogy ha elhagyja a barátnőjét a gyerekkel, nem kapja meg a megpályázott pozíciót.

9.)

A. Gellért megértette a főnöke intését, és feleségül kérte a barátnőjét, mert rájött, hogy számára a nő a legfontosabb.

B. Gellért megértette a főnöke intését, és feleségül kérte a barátnőjét a karrierje érdekében.

11. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:
Kinga - középiskolás lány
Vera - Kinga barátnője
Móni - Kinga barátnője
Zsuzsa - Móni barátnője
Ádám - Vera barátja

Kinga és Vera az osztályterem előtt beszélgetnek.

Kinga: Hallottam, hogy indulsz a fizikaversenyen. Hogy megy a felkészülés?

Vera: Egész jól, bár még néhány könyvet el kellene olvasnom. A Szilágyi-könyvről azt mondják, hogy nagyon jó, csak azt nem tudom, hogy hol lehetne beszerezni.

Kinga: Móni is indul, tudtad?

Vera: Persze, vagyis gondoltam. Móni minden lehetőséget megragad, hogy le tudjon győzni engem. Mindenáron osztályelső akar lenni, de ez még nem is zavar, nekem nem ez a fontos. Én tanulni szeretnék és bejutni a legjobb egyetemre. Csak hát Móni és Zsuzsa, meg az ő udvartartásuk…

Kinga: Igen, tudom. Móni és Zsuzsa szava nagyon számít a mi osztályunkban.

Vera: Ez sem lenne baj, csak… olyan utálatosak velem! Kikiáltottak strébernek, és mintha folyton szándékosan keresztbe tennének nekem. Ó, de már jönnek is, bemegyek, nehogy meglássanak veled, mert akkor te leszel a közutálat következő áldozata…

Móni és Zsuzsa odaérnek Kingához.

Móni: Jó reggelt, Kinga, csak nem Verával beszélgettél?

Kinga: Csak megkérdezte, elmarad-e ma a németóra.

Móni: Még ezt sem tudja? Jaj, ez a lány nagyon nincs képben. De hagyjuk, ma jó napom van, megtaláltam a Szilágyi-könyvet. Tudod, ez a legjobb a felkészüléshez, és bent van a Megyei Könyvtárban.

Kinga félrefordítja a fejét, és meglátja, hogy Ádám, Vera barátja közeledik a folyosón, mindjárt elhalad mellettük.

Kinga: Nem mondod, tényleg? Megvan a Szilágyi-féle könyv a Megyei Könyvtárban? Nem gondoltam volna, azt hittem, ott nem is lehet hozzájutni!

1.)

A. Kinga az osztály legbefolyásosabb tanulója volt.

B. Kinga jóban volt az osztály legbefolyásosabb tanulóival.

2.)

A. Móni rátalált a Szilágyi-féle könyvre a Városi Könyvtárban.

B. Móni rátalált a Szilágyi-féle könyvre a Megyei Könyvtárban.

3.)

A. Kinga tudta, hogy Mónit zavarja az ő barátsága Verával.

B. Kinga tudta, hogy Mónit nem zavarja az ő barátsága Verával.

4.)

A. Kinga azt gondolta, Ádám tud róla, hogy Verának szüksége van a könyvre, ezért fel fog figyelni a könyvről hallott információra.

B. Kinga azt gondolta, Ádám nem tud róla, hogy Verának szüksége van a könyvre, ezért nem fog felfigyelni a könyvről hallott információra.

5.)

A. Kinga azért beszélt hangosan, mert meg volt lepődve, hogy a népszerű lány véletlenül rátalált a könyvre.

B. Kinga azért beszélt hangosan, hogy a kiközösített lány barátja hallja, amit mond.

6.)

A. Kinga nem akarta elmondani a kiközösített lánynak azt, amit a könyvről hallott, mert attól tartott, hogy a népszerű lányok megtudják, hogy tőle származik az információ.

B. Kinga nem akarta elmondani a kiközösített lánynak azt, amit a könyvről hallott, mert attól tartott, hogy a kiközösített lány akkor megnyeri a fizikaversenyt.

13. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:

Andrea - középiskolás lány

Beatrix - Andrea barátnője

Péter - Andrea barátja

Balázs

Klára - Andrea édesanyja

A 17 éves Andrea és osztálytársa, Beatrix Andrea szobájában heverésznek.

Beatrix: Mondd már, mi van! Akkorákat sóhajtozol, hogy a pincében is hallani.

Andrea: Semmi. Csak elegem van mindenből. Péter sem hívott vissza... Pedig miatta törtem össze anyám kocsiját. Igazán kifizethetné vagy megjavít…

Beatrix: Mit csináltál!? De még nincs is meg a jogsid!

Andrea: Bea!! Tudom, hogy nincs még, de nemsokára meglesz, és elvittem az autót… Anyám úgyse használja. Vett magának másikat, ez meg az enyém lesz. És elmentem a Péter bulijába. És összevesztünk, mert alig foglalkozott velem.

Beatrix: Aha, vagyis nem CSAK veled volt elfoglalva. Mivel ő szervezte az egészet.

Andrea: Te most kinek a pártján állsz?

Beatrix: Jó, mondd tovább.

Andrea: Na, és akkor elkezdtem egy kicsit flörtölni Balázzsal. Ittunk néhány sört. De Péter nem jött oda. És akkor begurultam. Beültem az autóba, és hazajöttem… Csak… ott voltak a hülye szomszéd hülye kukái… És Balázs is olyan erős sört hozott… Szóval nekimentem. Az autó meg behorpadt, oldalt.

Beatrix: Anyád mit szólt hozzá?

Andrea: Semmit. Majd elmondom neki.

Beatrix: Andi!

Andrea: Majd, ha meglesz a jogsim. Apám majd kifizeti a javítást. De még jobb, ha Péter... Végül is mindenről ő tehet.

Beatrix: Szóval Péter a hibás.

Andrea: Persze, ki más?

Este Klára, Andrea édesanyja benyit a lánya szobájába.

Klára: Andrea, beszélnünk kell. Nem hiszem el, hogy megint mit csináltál.

Andrea: Mit, mit? Mit vagy mindig ilyen negatív? Te mindig csak rosszakat gondolsz rólam!

Klára: Sajnos nem gondolom, hanem tudom, hogy…

Andrea: Mert utálsz! Engem mindenki utál! Utálnak a tanáraim, utálnak a barátaim is. Még apa is utál, ezért hagyott el engem! Azt hiszed, szándékosan csináltam, hogy hülye vagyok? Most meg gonosz vagy velem.

Klára: De Andikám, nyugodj meg. Senki nem utál téged. De ezt nem tudom szó nélkül hagyni.

Andrea: Mert mindenért én vagyok a hibás, ugye!? Jobb volna, ha nem is lennék. Te is annak örülnél. Majd elmegyek. Összepakolok, és elmegyek, amikor nem leszel itthon. Az sem érdekel, ha meghalsz. Elmegyek apuhoz, ő úgyis jobban megért.

Klára: De… de, kicsim. Én csak segíteni szeretnék. Hogy nagyobb felelősséget vállalj azért, amit teszel. És amit megígérsz. Mert megegyeztünk, hogy keddenként kémiából korrepetálásra mész a tanárnőhöz. És ő ott várt rád az iskolában, hiába. Én meg kifizettem az órát.

Andrea lehunyja a szemét, megdörzsöli a homlokát: De… hát annyi dolgom van, nem tudok mindent észben tartani.

Klára: Ez nem kifogás! Arra gondoltam, hogy megbüntetlek. De látom, hogy teljesen kikészültél. Ezért elég lesz, ha felhívod a tanárnőt, és bocsánatot kérsz tőle. És jövő héten percre pontosan ott leszel a foglalkozáson.

Andrea: Jó, akkor jó.

Klára: Ennyi?

Andrea: Most hagyjál!

1.)

A. Andrea Péterrel flörtölt a bulin.

B. Andrea Balázzsal flörtölt a bulin.

2.)

A. Andrea nem ment el a korrepetálásra matematikából.

B. Andrea nem ment el a korrepetálásra kémiából.

3.)

A. Klára azt gondolta, hogy Andrea azért ingerült, mert összetörte az autóját.

B. Klára nem gondolta, hogy Andrea azért ingerült, mert összetörte az autóját.

4.)

A. Andrea azt hitte, hogy Klára tudja, hogy Andrea az összetört autó miatt védekezik.

B. Andrea azt hitte, hogy Klára nem tudja, hogy Andrea az összetört autó miatt védekezik.

5.)

A. Andrea rájött, hogy Klára azt hiszi, hogy ő azért magyarázkodik, mert nem ment el a korrepetálásra.

B. Andrea nem tudta, hogy Klára azt hiszi, hogy ő azért magyarázkodik, mert nem ment el a korrepetálásra.

6.)

A. Andrea összetörte az anyja autóját, és elmondta neki, mit tett.

B. Andrea összetörte az anyja autóját, és nem mondta el neki, mit tett.

7.)

A. Az anyja felelősségre vonta Andreát, amiért összetörte az autót.

B. Az anyja felelősségre vonta Andreát, amiért nem ment el a korrepetálásra.

8.)

A. Andrea azért fenyegetőzött és vádolta az anyját, mert azt akarta elérni, hogy kisebb büntetést kapjon.

B. Andrea azért fenyegetőzött és vádolta az anyját, mert azt akarta elérni, hogy az anyja foglalkozzon vele.

9.)

A. Andrea megkönnyebbült, amiért az anyja nem büntette olyan szigorúan az autó összetörését.

B. Andrea megkönnyebbült, amiért az anyja nem jött rá az autó összetörésére.

14. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:

Melinda

András - Melinda barátja

Simon - András barátja

Melinda irodája. András, Melinda párja benyit az ajtón.

András: Szia Melcsi, milyen napod volt?

Melinda: Szia, drágám! De jó, hogy bejöttél. Mindjárt végzek. Mit szólnál, ha elmennénk vacsorázni?

András: Hát az nagyon jó lenne, de az előbb összefutottam a folyosón Simonnal, és megbeszéltük, hogy elmegyünk fallabdázni. De majd utána felugrok hozzád. Főzhetnél valami finomat. Úgyis olyan ritkán ehetem a főztödet.

Melinda: Ritkán. Ühüm. Hát ez meg mit akar jelenteni?

András: Ó, semmit, semmit. Csak olyan finomakat főzöl, hogy többször is ehetnénk… Meg beszélgettem Simonnal, és tudod, rá minden nap főznek… olyan jó érzés lehet.

Melinda: Szóval Simon? Értem. Biztos vagyok benne, hogy Simon anyukája minden nap finom ételekkel várja otthon egyetlen fiacskáját, de Simon anyukája tudtommal nyugdíjas! És nem ül bent egy irodában napi tíz órát.

András: Jó, jó, értem. Semmi gond, csak egy felvetés volt. Akkor este! Puszi.

Melinda irodája. Néhány nappal később. Simon egy halom CD-vel a kezében áll az ajtóban.

Simon: Szevasz, Melcsike!

Melinda: Melinda, ha kérhetem. Szia Simon!

Simon: Elvinnéd ezeket Andrásnak? Ma kivételesen nem találkozunk. Randim lesz, bár, amennyire ma meg lehet bízni a nőkben… De muszáj Andrásnak még ma megkapnia, szóval?

Melinda: Simon, azt se tudom, hol áll a fejem! Rengeteg munkám van még. Nem biztos, hogy ma oda tudom adni neki. Különben sem fér el a táskámban ennyi CD.

1.)

A. Melinda, aki Simon párja volt, féltékeny lett Andrásra.

B. Melinda, aki András párja volt, féltékeny lett Simonra.

2.)

A. András már másnap reggel megkérdezte, hogy nem küldött-e neki Simon néhány CD-t.

B. András még aznap este megkérdezte, hogy nem küldött-e neki Simon néhány CD-t.

3.)

A. András sejtette, hogy Melinda össze akarja ugrasztani őt és Simont.

B. András nem sejtette, hogy Melinda össze akarja ugrasztani őt és Simont.

4.)

A. Simon azt hitte, Melinda azért nem akarta elvinni a CD-ket Andrásnak, mert azok nem fértek el a táskájában.

B. Simon azt hitte, Melinda azért nem akarta elvinni a CD-ket Andrásnak, mert ki akar tolni Andrással.

5.)

A. Melinda azt gondolta, hogy Andrásban megerősödik a gondolat, hogy Simon nem kedveli Melindát.

B. Melinda azt gondolta, hogy Andrásban nem erősödik meg a gondolat, hogy Simon nem kedveli Melindát.

6.)

A. András el akarta érni, hogy a barátnője gyakrabban főzzön.

B. András el akarta érni, hogy a barátnőjével gyakrabban egyenek az édesanyjánál.

7.)

A. András barátnője elvitte volna Andrásnak a CD-ket, de András barátja nem akarta rá (vagyis a barátnőre) bízni.

B. András barátnője nem akarta elvinni Andrásnak a CD-ket, pedig András barátja odaadta volna neki (vagyis a barátnőnek).

8.)

A. András barátnője pontosan felidézte Andrásnak a nőket becsmérlő megjegyzést, amit András barátja azért tett, mert nem akarta a lányra bízni a CD-ket.

B. András barátnője nem idézte pontosan Andrásnak a nőket becsmérlő megjegyzést, amit András barátja azért tett, mert nem volt biztos a randevújában.

9.)

A. András barátnője hazudott Andrásnak, hogy rossz színben tüntesse fel előtte a barátját.

B. András barátnője nem hazudni akart Andrásnak, csak nem emlékezett pontosan arra, mit is mondott András barátja.

NARRATIVE CONFLICT STORIES

(Stories based on Happe, 1994; Kinderman, Dunbar, Bental, 1998; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007)

STORY 1

CAST:

Peter

Anne

Esther – Anne's friend

Peter was a senior high school student who met Anne at a house party he had in his parents' apartment. Peter immediately started to like Anne. They had a conversation during which he loaned her a book that was required reading for senior students. A couple of days later he called Anne on the phone and told her that unfortunately he needed the book back. He had to take a test on it the following day so it would be best if he could get it back that day, so he asked Anne to meet him. Esther, who was a friend of Anne, overheard the conversation. Because Esther was secretly in love with Peter, she offered to bring Peter the book, especially since she lived in the same neighborhood as Peter. Anne knew that Esther liked Peter so she refused Esther's offer. Anne told Esther she had promised to meet Peter, and she believed Peter would feel bad if she would not go. She claimed that Peter would think that she had deceived him. Esther did not believe this excuse and said that she would go with Anne because she wanted to go home anyway. Anne told her that first she had to wait for her parents to arrive, so Esther soon said goodbye.

1.

a)   The house party was held in the apartment of Peter's parents.

b)   The house party was held in the apartment of Anne's parents.

2.

a)   Esther, who was a friend of Peter, lived near Anne's apartment.

b) Esther, who was a friend of Anne, lived near Peter's apartment.

3.

a) Esther believed that Anne didn't know that she was secretly in love with Peter.

b) Esther knew that Anne knew that she was secretly in love with Peter.

4.

a) Anne knew that Esther wanted to bring the book to Peter because she lived nearby.

b) Anne knew that Esther wanted to bring the book to Peter because she wanted to meet him.

5.

a) Esther thought that Anne knew that she lived near Peter's apartment and so Anne would think it was natural that she would go with her for a while.

b) Esther knew that Anne would not be happy if she would offer to go with her so she was not surprised when Anne made an excuse.

6.

a) Peter liked the girl whom he met at the house party.

b) Peter liked the friend of the girl whom he met at the house party.

7.

a) Peter was liked by the girl whom he met at the house party but he was not liked by her friend.

b) Peter was liked by the girl whom he met at the house party and he was also liked by her friend.

8.

a) The girl whom Peter met at the house party made her friend not go with her to meet Peter because she wanted to meet the boy alone.

b) The girl whom Peter met at the house party had to wait for her parents so her friend could not go with her and she had no intention of meeting the boy alone.

STORY 7

CAST:

John

Pete – John's friend

Penny

Sheila – Penny's friend

It was nearly the end of the day. John thought it might be nice to go to the pub for a drink after work. At first, he wasn't sure whom he should ask to go with him. He really wanted to ask Sheila, whom he liked a lot, but he thought that she didn't like him enough to want to give up her aerobics class to go drinking with him. He could, of course, ask Pete, his usual drinking companion. Pete was always happy to spend an hour or two in the pub before going home. Then he happened to see Penny. He knew that Penny was one of Sheila's friends. Penny might be able to help him out. She would know whether Sheila would be willing to go out for a drink rather than go to her aerobics class. "Listen Penny," he said, "I thought I might want to go for a drink after work. I was going to ask you and Sheila if you wanted to come. Would you ask Sheila whether she would like to come for a drink with us?" Penny looked surprised. John had never asked her to go out with him before, but she thought that he was very interested in Sheila. She began to suspect that John wanted to find out whether she knew what Sheila might want to do.

1.

a)   The story was set in the morning.

b)   The story was set in the afternoon.

2.

a)   After work, Sheila was going to an aerobics class.

b)   After work, Sheila was going home.

3.

a)   John thought that Penny knew what Sheila wanted to do.

b) John thought that Penny did not know what Sheila wanted to do.

4.

a) Penny believed that John thought she would not know what Sheila would want to do.

b) Penny believed that John was hoping she would know what Sheila would want to do.

5.

a) John hoped that Penny believed that John wanted Penny to find out what Sheila wanted to do because John wanted to go out with Sheila alone.

b) John hoped that Penny believed that John wanted Penny to find out what Sheila wanted to do because John wanted to go out with them both.

6.

a) John wanted to go out with the aerobics girl.

b) John wanted to go out with the friend of the aerobics girl.

7.

a) John invited the aerobics girl and her friend out for a drink because he was shy to ask only the girl he actually liked.

b) John invited the aerobics girl and her friend out for a drink because he saw more chance this way of one of the girls would like him back.

8.

a) The friend of the aerobics girl realized that John invited them both for a drink because he was shy to invite her alone.

b) The friend of the aerobics girl realized that John invited them both for a drink because he wanted to find out whether the aerobics girl would go out with him.

STORY 9

CAST:
Lily
Ann – Lily's friend
Sophie – Lily's cousin

Lily and Ann are good friends who have been planning for a long time to go on a ski tour in Aspen. Since the trip would have been too expensive for only two, Lily persuaded two other friends to join. However, by the time of booking accommodation, it turned out that the friends could not go with them. Lily knew how much Ann wanted to go on this trip; she did not want it to be dropped just because of her friends. Therefore, she asked her cousin Sophie to join. "I can't give you a definite answer yet, but I will in a couple of days" – said Sophie. Lily was so happy even about this uncertain response that she immediately told Ann. The next morning, Lily said to Sophie: "I told Ann that you would probably join us for skiing and she was very happy about it!" Sophie did not answer but became very nervous. Originally, she wanted to withdraw from the trip because she did not want to spend so much money on it. Now, however, she was afraid that if she did so, Ann would think she was completely unreliable. She thought she could not do it to Ann after being helped by her so many times. Eventually, she decided to join the ski tour.

1.

a) Lily and Ann were cousins.

b) Lily and Ann were friends.

2.

a) Sophie knew that Lily wanted to travel but she herself originally intended to withdraw from the trip because she did not want to spend money on it.

b) Sophie knew that Lily wanted to travel but she herself originally intended to withdraw from the trip because she did not want to go skiing with Ann.

3.

a) Sophie did not want to leave Ann in the lurch because she was helped by her so many times.

b) Sophie did not want to leave Ann in the lurch because she was afraid of her.

4.

a) Sophie knew that Lily did not know that Sophie did not want to come because she had found the expenses high.

b) Sophie did not know that Lily did not know that Sophie did not want to come because she had found the expenses high.

5.

a) Lily's cousin wanted to go by all means on the ski tour.

b) Lily's cousin wanted rather not to go on the ski tour.

6.

a) Lily's cousin was obliged to go on the ski tour after Lily had thrilled her friend by telling her that her cousin would probably join.

b) Lily's cousin was obliged to go on the ski tour after all the other candidates had called the journey off.

7.

a) Lily asked her cousin to join for skiing because she did not want it to be dropped because of her, that is because of her friends.

b) Lily asked her cousin to join for skiing because she knew that she would not dare to say no to her.

STORY 12

CAST:

Prisoner

Interrogators

During a war between two countries, the Green army captures a member of the Blue army. In the course of the interrogation they want him to tell them where the Blue army's planes are. They know that there are only two places suitable for building an airfield; a track by the sea or one of the wide plateaus on the nearby mountain. They also know that the prisoner will obviously not want to betray his fellows so he will probably lie. They foresee stern torture if he does not reveal the location of the airfield. The prisoner is thinking: "The planes are in the mountain. They obviously want to bomb the area. I can't let this happen." He turns to his interrogators and says: "Alright, I tell you. The planes are in the mountain."

1.

a)   Soldiers of the Green army wanted to know where the planes of the Blue army were.

b)   Soldiers of the Blue army wanted to know where the planes of the Green army were.

2.

a)   The prisoner did not know that the interrogators knew that the planes were placed either by the sea or in the mountain.

b)   The prisoner knew that the interrogators knew that the planes were placed either by the sea or in the mountain.

3.

a)   The prisoner thought that the interrogators thought that he wanted to mislead them.

b)   The prisoner thought that the interrogators did not know if he told the truth or lied.

4.

a) The prisoner knew that the interrogators believed that he would lie so he told the truth in order to mislead them.

b) The prisoner knew that the interrogators thought it likely that they would torture him so he told the truth in order to save himself.

5.

a) The interrogators foresaw the torture in order to let the prisoner know what he could count on.

b) The interrogators foresaw the torture in order to force the prisoner to reveal the truth.

6.

a) The prisoner misled the interrogators in order to save his troops.

b) The prisoner told the truth in order to save himself from torture.

STORY 15

https://youtu.be/z5vE47059lo

CAST:
Sam
Henry

Sam wanted to pay the registration for his car. He asked Henry if he could tell him where he could pay it. Henry told him that he believed there was a Department of Motor Vehicle on Elm Street. When Sam got to Elm Street, he found it was closed. A notice on the door said that it had moved to new premises in Bold Street. So Sam went to Bold Street and found the new Department of Motor Vehicle. When he got to the counter, he discovered that he had left his proof of insurance at home. He realized that without proof of insurance, he could not get his car registered, so he went home empty-handed.

1.

a) Sam wanted to go to the Department of Motor Vehicle to get a license.

b) Sam wanted to go to the Department of Motor Vehicle to register his car.

2.

a) The Department of Motor Vehicle on Elm Street had a notice on the door saying it had moved to Bold Street.

b) The Department of Motor Vehicle on Elm Street had a notice in the window saying it had moved to Bold Street.

3.

a) Henry thought Sam would find the Department of Motor Vehicle on Elm Street.

b) Henry thought Sam would find the Department of Motor Vehicle on Bold Street.

4.

a) Sam thought that Henry knew the Department of Motor Vehicle was on Bold Street.

b) Sam thought that Henry knew the Department of Motor Vehicle was on Elm Street.

5.

a) Sam thought that Henry believed that Sam wanted to register his car.

b) Sam thought that Henry did not know that Sam wanted to register his car.

6.

a) The man who told Sam where to go knew for sure that Sam would find a Department of Motor Vehicle on the street he knew.

b) The man who told Sam where to go did not know for sure that Sam would find a Department of Motor Vehicle on the street he knew.

7.

a) Sam could not get what he wanted in the Department of Motor Vehicle because of his own fault.

b) Sam could not get what he wanted in the Department of Motor Vehicle because of the fault of the man that showed him the way.

NARRATÍV KONFLIKTUS TÖRTÉNETEK

1. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:

Péter - középiskolás fiú

Anna - középiskolás lány

Eszter - középiskolás lány

Péter érettségi előtt álló középiskolás fiú. A szülei lakásán rendezett házibulin ismerkedett meg Annával, aki azonnal megtetszett neki. Beszélgetésük során kölcsönadott neki egy könyvet, ami kötelező olvasmány volt a negyedikeseknek. Néhány nappal később felhívta Annát és közölte vele, hogy sajnos szüksége van a könyvre. Másnap dolgozatot írnak belőle, így jó volna, ha még aznap hozzá tudna jutni. Megkérte Annát, hogy találkozzanak. Eszter, Anna egyik barátnője, fültanúja volt a beszélgetésnek. Miután titokban szerelmes volt Péterbe, felajánlotta, hogy elviszi neki a könyvet, hiszen úgyis arra lakik. Anna tudta, hogy Eszternek tetszik a fiú, ezért elhárította az ajánlatot. Azt mondta, hogy megígérte Péternek, hogy találkozik vele, és azt hiszi, nem esne jól a fiúnak, ha nem menne el. Péter azt hinné, hogy becsapta. Eszter nem hitte el ezt a kifogást, és azt mondta, hogy rendben, akkor elkíséri Annát, hiszen ő is éppen hazaindul. Anna erre azt mondta, hogy előbb meg kell várnia, míg a szülei hazaérkeznek, így Eszter hamarosan elköszönt.

1.)

A. A házibulit Péter szüleinek lakásán rendezték.

B. A házibulit Anna szüleinek lakásán rendezték.

2.)

A. Eszter Péter barátja volt, aki Anna lakása közelében lakott.

B. Eszter Anna barátnője volt, aki Péter lakása közelében lakott.

3.)

A. Eszter azt hitte, Anna nem tudja, hogy titokban szerelmes Péterbe.

B. Eszter tudta, hogy Anna tudja, hogy titokban szerelmes Péterbe.

4.)

A. Anna tudta, hogy Eszter azért akarja elvinni a könyvet Péternek, mert arra lakik.

B. Anna tudta, hogy Eszter azért akarja elvinni a könyvet Péternek, hogy találkozhasson vele.

5.)

A. Eszter azt gondolta, hogy Anna tudja, hogy ő Péter lakása közelében lakik, és így természetesnek tartja, hogy elkíséri egy darabon.

B. Eszter tudta, hogy Anna nem fog örülni annak, ha felajánlja, hogy elkíséri, így nem lepődött meg, amikor Anna kifogással élt.

6.)

A. A házibulin megismert lány tetszett Péternek.

B. A házibulin megismert lány barátnője tetszett Péternek.

7.)

A. Péter nem tetszett a házibulin megismert lánynak, de tetszett a barátnőjének.

B. Péter tetszett a házibulin megismert lánynak és a barátnőjének is.

8.)

A. A házibulin megismert lány elérte, hogy a barátnője ne kísérhesse el őt Péterhez, mert egyedül akart a fiúval találkozni.

B. A házibulin megismert lánynak meg kellett várnia a szüleit, a barátnője ezért nem tudta elkísérni, és nem azt akarta elérni, hogy egyedül találkozzon a fiúval.

7. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:

Fogoly

Vallatók

A két ország között kitört háború során a Zöld hadsereg elfogta a Kék hadsereg egyik felderítőjét. Kihallgatás során meg akarták tőle tudni, hol vannak a Kék hadsereg repülői. Tudták, hogy csak két alkalmas hely van a repülőtér kiépítésére, a tengerpart melletti sáv, és a közeli hegy egyik széles fennsíkja. Azt is tudták, hogy a fogoly nyilvánvalóan nem akarja elárulni társait, ezért valószínűleg hazudni fog. Kilátásba helyezték, hogy ha nem árulja el a repülőtér helyét, kemény kínvallatásnak vetik alá. A fogoly azt gondolta: „A repülők a hegyekben vannak. Ezek nyílván le akarják bombázni a terepet. Ezt nem hagyhatom". A vallatóihoz fordult és azt mondta: „Rendben van, elárulom. A repülők a hegyekben vannak".

1.)

A. A Zöld hadsereg tagjai meg akarták tudni, hol vannak a Kék hadsereg repülői.

B. A Kék hadsereg tagjai meg akarták tudni, hol vannak a Zöld hadsereg repülői.

2.)

A. A fogoly nem tudta, hogy a vallatók tudják, hogy a repülők vagy a tengerparton vagy a hegyekben vannak.

B. A fogoly tudta, hogy a vallatók tudják, hogy a repülők vagy a tengerparton vagy a hegyekben vannak.

3.)

A. A fogoly azt gondolta, hogy a vallatók azt gondolják, hogy félre akarja őket vezetni.

B. A fogoly azt gondolta, hogy a vallatók nem tudják, hogy igazat mond-e nekik vagy hazudik.

4.)

A. A fogoly tudta, hogy a vallatók azt hiszik, hogy hazudni fog, ezért az igazat mondta, abból a célból, hogy megtévessze őket.

B. A fogoly tudta, hogy a vallatók komolyan gondolják, hogy meg fogják kínozni, ezért inkább elmondta az igazságot, azért, hogy megmeneküljön.

5.)

A. A vallatók kilátásba helyezték a kínvallatást azért, hogy a fogoly tudja, mire számítson.

B. A vallatók kilátásba helyezték a kínvallatást azért, hogy kikényszerítsék a fogolyból az igazságot.

6.)

A. A fogoly félrevezette a vallatókat, hogy mentse a társait.

B. A fogoly elárulta az igazat, hogy megmeneküljön a kínzástól.

9. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:
Lilla
Anna - Lilla barátnője
Zsófi - Lilla unokatestvére

Lilla és Anna jó barátnők, akik már régóta tervezik, hogy elmennek együtt egy sítúrára Szlovéniába. Mivel kettőjüknek túl drága lenne az utazás, Lilla beszervezte két ismerősét is. De mire eljött az idő, hogy lefoglalják a szállást, kiderült, hogy az ismerősök mégse tudnak velük tartani. Lilla tudta, hogy Anna mennyire vágyik erre az utazásra; nem akarta, hogy az egész az ő ismerősei miatt hulljon kútba. Ezért megkérte az unokatestvérét, Zsófit, hogy tartson velük. „Még nem tudok biztos választ adni, majd egy pár nap múlva" – mondta Zsófi. Lilla annyira örült még ennek a feltételes válasznak is, hogy azonnal beszámolt róla Annának. Másnap délelőtt Lilla azt mondta Zsófinak: „Megmondtam Annának, hogy valószínűleg te is jössz síelni, és nagyon örült neki!" Zsófi erre nem válaszolt semmit, de nagyon ideges lett. Eredetileg vissza akarta mondani az utazást, mert nem akart annyi pénzt kiadni rá. Most viszont már félt attól, hogy ha ezt teszi, Anna teljesen megbízhatatlannak fogja tartani. Úgy gondolta, ezt nem teheti

meg Annával azok után, hogy az már annyiszor segített neki. Így végül úgy döntött, mégiscsak elmegy a sítúrára.

1.)

A. Lilla és Anna unokatestvérek voltak.

B. Lilla és Anna barátnők voltak.

2.)

A. Zsófi tudta, hogy Lilla szeretne elutazni, de eredetileg vissza akarta mondani az utazást, mert nem akart pénzt kiadni rá.

B. Zsófi tudta, hogy Lilla szeretne elutazni, de eredetileg vissza akarta mondani az utazást, mert nem szívesen ment volna sítúrára Annával.

3.)

A. Zsófi azért nem akarta cserbenhagyni Annát, mert az sokszor segített neki.

B. Zsófi azért nem akarta cserbenhagyni Annát, mert félt tőle.

4.)

A. Zsófi tudta, hogy Lilla nem tudja, hogy ő nem akar velük menni, mert sokallja a költségeket.

B. Zsófi nem tudta, hogy Lilla nem tudja, hogy ő nem akar velük menni, mert sokallja a költségeket.

5.)

A. Lilla unokatestvére mindenképpen el akart menni a sítúrára.

B. Lilla unokatestvére inkább nem ment volna el a sítúrára.

6.)

A. Lilla unokatestvére kénytelen volt elmenni a sítúrára, miután Lilla a barátnőjét is felvillanyozta azzal, hogy az unokatestvére valószínűleg velük tart.

B. Lilla unokatestvére kénytelen volt elmenni a sítúrára, miután minden más jelentkező lemondta az utazást.

7.)

A. Lilla azért hívta el az unokatestvérét a sítúrára, mert nem akarta, hogy miatta, vagyis az ő ismerősei miatt hiúsuljon meg az utazás.

B. Lilla azért hívta el az unokatestvérét a sítúrára, mert tudta, hogy ő úgysem mer nemet mondani neki.

12. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:
András
Péter - András barátja
Judit
Sára - Judit barátnője

Már majdnem vége volt a napnak. András arra gondolt, hogy milyen jó lenne munka után elmenni a kocsmába inni egyet. Először nem volt biztos benne, hogy kit kérhetne meg, hogy menjen vele. Nagyon szerette volna megkérdezni Sárát, akihez vonzódott, de azt gondolta, hogy Sára nem szereti őt eléggé ahhoz, hogy kihagyja az aerobic óráját azért, hogy elmenjen vele inni. Természetesen megkérdezhetné Pétert, a szokásos ivócimboráját. Péter mindig boldogan eltölt egy-két órát a kocsmában, mielőtt haza menne. Ekkor véletlenül meglátta Juditot. Tudta, hogy Judit Sára egyik barátnője. Judit segítségére lehetne. Judit tudni fogja, hogy Sára hajlandó lenne-e elmenni vele egyet inni az aerobic órája helyett. "Figyelj, Judit! "- mondta - " Gondoltam innék egyet munka után. Azt szeretném megkérdezni, hogy te és Sára eljönnétek-e? Megkérdeznéd Sárát is, hogy lenne-e kedve eljönni velünk inni egyet?" Judit meglepettnek tűnt. András eddig még soha nem kérte meg őt, hogy menjen el vele szórakozni, de úgy gondolta, hogy András rajong Sáráért. Judit gyanakodni kezdett, hogy András azt akarta megtudni, hogy ő tudja-e, hogy Sára el akar-e menni.

1.)

A. A történet délelőtt játszódik.

B. A történet délután játszódik.

2.)

A. Munka után Sára aerobic órára akart menni.

B. Munka után Sára haza akart menni.

3.)

A. András azt gondolta, hogy Judit tudja, hogy Sára mit akar tenni.

B. András azt gondolta, hogy Judit nem tudja, hogy Sára mit akar tenni.

4.)

A. Judit azt hitte, hogy András úgy tudja, hogy Judit szokta tudni, hogy Sára mit tenne.

B. Judit azt hitte, hogy András reméli, hogy Judit tudni fogja, hogy Sára mit tenne.

5.)

A. András azt remélte, hogy Judit azt hiszi, hogy András azt akarja Judittól, hogy tudja meg, hogy mit tenne Sára, mivel András csak egyedül Sárával akar szórakozni menni.

B. András azt remélte, hogy Judit azt hiszi, hogy András azt akarja Judittól, hogy tudja meg, hogy mit tenne Sára, mivel András mindkettőjükkel el akar menni szórakozni.

6.)

A. András randevúzni akart az aerobicos lánnyal.

B. András randevúzni akart az aerobicos lány barátnőjével.

7.)

A. András szórakozni hívta az aerobicos lányt és annak barátnőjét is, mert nem merte egyedül a neki tetsző lányt elhívni.

B. András szórakozni hívta az aerobicos lányt és annak barátnőjét is, mert így több esélyt látott arra, hogy valamelyik lánynak ő is megtetszik.

8.)

A. Az aerobicos lány barátnője rájött, hogy András azért hívta el mindkettőjüket szórakozni, mert nem merte egyedül elhívni őt.

B. Az aerobicos lány barátnője rájött, hogy András azért hívta el mindkettőjüket szórakozni, mert így akarta kideríteni, vajon az aerobicos lány elmenne-e vele.

15. TÖRTÉNET

Szereplők:

Lajos

Lajos egy postahivatalt keresett, hogy átvegye a részére érkezett ajánlott levelet. Megkérdezte Pétert, hogy meg tudná-e neki mondani, hol talál postát a közelben. Péter azt mondta, úgy gondolja, hogy van egy a Kifli utcában. Amikor Lajos odaért, zárva találta a hivatalt. Egy tábla volt kiakasztva az ajtóra, amely azt közölte, hogy elköltöztek egy új épületbe a Zsemle utcába. Lajos elment ide és megtalálta az új postahivatalt. Amikor befordult volna az ajtón, eszébe jutott, hogy otthon hagyta a személyi igazolványát. Tudta, hogy e nélkül nem fogja megkapni az ajánlott levelet, így üres kézzel tért haza.

Péter

1.)

A. Lajos azért akart a postára menni, hogy bélyeget vegyen.

B. Lajos azért akart a postára menni, hogy átvegye az ajánlott levelét.

2.)

A. A Kifli utcában lévő postahivatal ajtaján volt egy tábla, amely azt közölte, hogy a Zsemle utcába költöztek.

B. A Kifli utcában lévő postahivatal ablakában volt egy tábla, amely azt közölte, hogy a Zsemle utcába költöztek.

3.)

A. Péter úgy gondolta, hogy Lajos talál egy postahivatalt a Kifli utcában.

B. Péter úgy gondolta, hogy Lajos talál egy postahivatalt a Zsemle utcában.

4.)

A. Lajos azt gondolta, hogy Péter tudja, hogy a posta a Zsemle utcában van.

B. Lajos azt gondolta, hogy Péter tudja, hogy a posta a Kifli utcában van.

5.)

A. Lajos azt gondolta, hogy Péter azt hiszi, hogy ő (Lajos) ajánlott levélért megy.

B. Lajos azt gondolta, hogy Péter nem tudja, hogy ő (Lajos) ajánlott levélért megy.

6.)

A. A Lajost útbaigazító férfi biztosan tudta, hogy egy működő postahivatalhoz irányítja Lajost.

B. A Lajost útbaigazító férfi nem tudta biztosan, hogy egy működő postahivatalhoz irányítja Lajost.

7.)

A. Lajos a saját hibájából nem tudta elintézni a postán azt, amiért ment.

B. Lajos az őt útbaigazító férfi hibájából nem tudta elintézni a postán azt, amiért ment.